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Introduction Introduction
Israel is a product of Zionism. The Jewish state originates in Jewish nationalism 
that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe. In the course 
of the secularization and formation of national states that was taking place in 
Western Europe, the religiously hued, old Christian hatred towards Jews assumed 
racist features, turning into virulent anti-Semitism. At the same time, efforts to 
achieve real emancipation for European Jews were failing. Consequently, as new 
approaches to a resolution seemed to be called for, the Jewish people themselves 
took up the “Jewish question.”
Theodor Herzl’s 1896 pamphlet The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) was fol-
lowed in 1897 by the First Zionist Congress in Basel. With the founding of the 
World Zionist Organization the political goal was promptly proclaimed: the estab-
lishment of a Jewish state for the Jewish people outside of Europe. The hostility 
towards Jewish life in Europe turned into the Zionist principle of the “negation of 
the diaspora,” with Zionist-motivated Jewish emigration starting as early as 1882, 
first from Eastern and later also from Western Europe. And it was the old-new 
land of Israel – Eretz Israel – that in the beginning of the twentieth century was 
chosen as the appropriate territory.
Half a century later – but only after millions of European Jews had been mur-
dered by Germany’s Nazi regime – the Jewish national movement won an import-
ant victory in the proclamation of the Jewish state. Apart from 1945, the year 
1948 represents the decisive turning point in contemporary Jewish history. With 
the founding of Israel so soon after the Shoah, the Zionist project in Eretz Israel 
appeared to be a matter of bitter urgency. More than anything else, the extermina-
tion of the intended citizens of the to-be-founded Jewish state solidified Zionism 
as the ultimate answer to the “Jewish question,” not only among Jews but also on 
the international political-diplomatic stage.
These two historical momentums set into motion a historic process, namely 
the nationalization of the Jews in the second half of the twentieth century. Jewish 
national statehood was established as a manifest way of life, with political sover-
eignty and military strength becoming the cornerstones of the new Jewish-Israeli 
self-image. To wit, in the Zionist understanding of history, national statehood is 
seen as the normal state of the to-be-nationalized Jewish people – a state that 
needs to be actively fought for. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the 
Jewish self-concept has a markedly Zionist orientation: Eretz Israel is in Jewish 
hands, the majority of the Jewish people live in the old-new country, and the 
Jewish nation state is the reason d’être of Israeli polity.
But Zionist Israel is neither a self-evident nor a natural state of affairs. Israel 
does not have an internationally accepted state territory, a large part of the coun-
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try’s population is made up of non-Jews, and above all it has been in nothing less 
than a permanent state of war from the very time of its proclamation. The con-
flict over Palestine and its escalation into an irresolvable regional problem has 
deeply impacted Israeli nationalism. The fight for national statehood is de facto 
still continuing, thus dominating the policy, society, military and political culture 
of Israel. And so “security” has become a key code of Israeli society.
The history of Israel may be mapped in terms of this tension between, on the 
one hand, the perception of national statehood as a Jewish way of life to which 
there is really no alternative and, on the other hand, the given conditions for the 
realization of the Zionist project. The history of the Zionist undertaking is charac-
terized by the conflict between Zionist self-image in Eretz Israel and the reality in 
Palestine, the place where that self-image is lived. This is where the key to under-
standing Israel’s history and the Middle East conflict may be found.
In this book, I am addressing the following questions: How did Zionist Israel 
come into existence? What does the Zionist ideology, which forms the basis for the 
Israeli state, actually imply, and what does it mean for the realization of Zionism 
in a de facto bi-national Palestine? What kind of political order has emerged over 
the years in the face of this discrepancy between the prevailing notion of the 
state and the demographic and geopolitical reality? And also: How can political 
culture, the relationship between the state, politics, military and society in Israel, 
be characterized?
This book comprises five thematic clusters, in the first of which I discuss 
the origin and ideology of Zionism. From there, in the second section, I go on to 
examine the view of the enemy that has emerged in the course of Israeli history, 
taking a closer look at the way the opponent, who is identified as nemesis, is 
treated. A third chapter addresses Israeli democracy, and especially the dichot-
omy present in the self-imposed standard according to which the Israeli state can 
be not only “Jewish” but also “democratic.” The subject matter of my account is 
the demographical contradiction between a Jewish state in Eretz Israel and the 
bi-national reality in Palestine. As well it covers the meaning for Israeli democ-
racy of a political culture that has been so strongly shaped by security-political 
aspects in the course of its historical development. The key question is whether 
Israeli democracy can be sustained in the face of a permanent state of war.
The subsequent fourth part explores the role and significance of war in the 
creation and consolidation of Jewish national statehood. Here, the reasons for 
and also the form and understanding of military action as an indispensable 
instrument for ensuring the security and national statehood of Israel are inves-
tigated with a view to their consequences. And finally, the fifth chapter deals 
with the question of whether a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict is 
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compatible with Israel’s reason of state. In other words, is Zionist Israel actually 
capable of reconciling with its neighbors?
For it is especially with regard to the old-Zionist question of Palestine – which 
is, however, still being denied in the political culture of the country – that today’s 
political Israel stands with its back against the wall. As the pressure from the 
international community to resolve the problems of state and international law 
by political means is dramatically increasing, the country is poised in its tradi-
tional position of obstinate defiance. This “destructive” ethos calls for an expla-
nation. It may be found in the history of Zionist Israel that is related in this book 
– in a way that is critical without being accusing, differentiated without seeking 
to expose, and sober without being detached. 
The present volume is a translation of a research book that was published in 
2012 with the German Publisher Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn. The strong 
responses and excellent reviews it received in the academic world as well as from 
the general public suggested its great interest also for an international audience, 
and thus the present translation now makes it accessible to the global readership. 
My very special thanks go to the remarkable devoted translators and editors 
of this volume: Olga Thierbach-McLean, Ph.D. and Aram McLean. 
1 Zionism and the Ideology of the Jewish State
The Jewish Diaspora and its Negation
Zionism emerged in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century with the 
defined goal of terminating the “abnormal” political situation of the Jewish 
diaspora, that is, statelessness of the Jews, and of creating a mode of collective 
life based on a national state. Arising from the emergency situation posed by an 
increasingly rampant racist anti-Semitism in Europe, Jewish nationalism was 
funneled into a movement, with the “negation of the diaspora” forming the core 
of its ideology and the starting point of its politics. Thus, Shimon Peres (1923–
2016), a Zionist statesman and Israeli politician of many years who himself was 
born in an Eastern European shtetl and emigrated to Palestine as an adolescent, 
described the Jewish diaspora from the vantage point of an already achieved 
national statehood:
[…], a famous Jewish philosopher by the name of Yankelewitz said once that Jewish life in 
the diaspora was similar to a voyage in a subway – you travel underground, you don’t see 
the scenery, and nobody sees you in the train. It’s only now, in modern times, that Jewish 
life is being conducted as if it were a voyage in a bus; you can see from within the outside 
scenery, and you can see from the outside that people are sitting in the bus. A shtetl in many 
ways was the subway of Jewish life; it was totally disconnected from the outside world. Let’s 
have a good look at it – I mean, in a way, it was a dream and in a way it was a pleasure. It 
was a pleasure because it was disconnected from the rest of life. It wasn’t a normal place to 
live. And a dream because we weren’t living there mentally. Our hearts were in Israel. The 
shtetl was like a passing station.1
Two thousand years of Jewish diaspora as a historical transitional phase to the 
long awaited “normal” form of the national state? Apart from this Zionist one, 
there are various other Jewish interpretations of the diaspora. For instance, in his 
1931 essay Diaspora, the Jewish historian Simon Dubnow (1860–1941) points out 
that from the religious perspective, the diaspora is considered to be God’s pun-
ishment: “The hope for a return to Zion and for the coming of the Messiah has 
always remained alive in the hearts of Orthodox Jews and has constituted one of 
the thirteen tenets of Jewish religion as formulated by Maimonides.” In response 
to the resignation that was setting in after more than two thousand years of futile 
waiting for the return to Zion, Jews “have found solace in the idea that the dias-
pora was not God’s curse, but rather His blessing [of the Jewish people].” In this 
1 Peres and Littell 1998: 3–4.
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context, Dubnow quotes an explanation put forward by the medieval Torah com-
mentator Rashi who argues that the diaspora is a blessing in consideration of the 
fact that a scattered people cannot be completely exterminated at the same time. 
At least under the religious aspect, a universally beneficent effect is ascribed to 
the Jews’ way of life as a “scattered people”: “God did not ‘scatter’ the Jews, but 
sowed them among the peoples like seeds from which the true world religion of 
monotheism would grow.”2
The diverging perspectives on life in the diaspora have all found their way 
into Jewish political movements. The modern Jewish reform movement or reli-
gious liberalism accepts assimilation, i.e., the absorption into the majority popu-
lation, as something to which there is no alternative, thus embracing life in exile 
as a kind of universal task. Then there were the so-called diaspora nationalists 
who held that neither the assimilation nor the categorical rejection of the dias-
pora offered a solution. As they saw it, Jewish identity and national autonomy 
were being preserved just as well in the diaspora, namely by their own cultural 
institutions and organized communities on the one hand and assimilation to the 
new political and cultural environment on the other. By contrast, the Zionists 
deemed the diaspora a way of life that is dangerous for Jews and Jewish identity, 
since they saw assimilation and the consequential deracination as the inevitable 
result of the ever-present fierce anti-Semitism. By taking the political approach 
of radically rejecting the diaspora, Zionists brought to life “the messianic teach-
ings in a modernized political form.”3 On this point, the Israeli historian Amnon 
Raz-Krakotzkin (1958–) offers the observation that
‘negation of exile’ refers to the consciousness that deems the present Jewish settlement in, 
and sovereignty over, Palestine as the ‘return’ of the Jews to the land believed to be their 
home, and imagined, prior to its ‘redemption,’ as empty. The negation of exile appeared 
to be the ‘fulfillment’ of Jewish history and the realization of Jewish prayers and messi-
anic expectations. According to this perspective, the cultural framework that the Zionists 
wished to actualize and uncover was the ‘authentic,’ original Jewish culture, as opposed 
to the exilic culture, described in blatant orientalist terms as stagnant, unproductive, and 
irrational.4
Further, Raz-Krakotzkin points out that Zionist-Israeli historians such as Yitzhak 
Baer (1888–1980), Chaim Hillel Ben-Sasson (1914–1977), Gershom Scholem (1897–
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ation and shaping of a Zionist national history –, although they do expound the 
problems of the complex national and territorial definition of the Jewish collec-
tive in the Zionist historical narrative, still maintain that not only did the general 
“negation of exile” not call into question Zionist historiography, but that it actu-
ally firmly embedded it in Zionist culture as its very basis. In doing so, the Israeli 
present is interpreted as the “fulfillment of Jewish history”: Jewish exile culture 
is seen as the reflection of the “spirit of the nation” and the history of exile as an 
integral part of a specifically Jewish national and territorial master narrative. 
As is also noted by the American sociologist Rogers Brubaker (1956–), “nearly 
every nationalist historiography is of a teleological nature: History is read in terms 
of its outcome, it culminates in the nation state independence. This redemptive 
point of culmination can either be projected into the future – as a state that has 
to be fought for – or can be celebrated as something that has already become 
reality.”5
According to the Zionist-Israeli political scientist Shlomo Avineri (1933–), 
for example, the Zionist way of life represents a “progression.” To him, the 
Jewish national statehood has a moral-normative significance. Israel epitomizes 
the “public of the Jewish people” by taking over the role of the traditional reli-
gious-communal diaspora centers that used to be responsible for the preserva-
tion of “collective Judaism.” In the face of modernization and secularization pro-
cesses, and hence the increasing assimilation of Jews into their respective society, 
the Jewish state is attributed a normative function, namely the preservation of 
the “collective existence of the Jewish people.” Avineri stresses that the state is 
not to be seen as a substitute for Jewish religion, since the latter already has a 
deeply collectively-existentialist meaning for the faithful. Rather, it represents an 
adequate response to the danger posed by the assimilation that is brought in the 
wake of the increasing secularization of Jewish life: “Only the Jewish state, and 
not religion, can serve as a common denominator […] for all the heterogeneous 
factors of Jewish existence.”6
This approach, in which the core of Jewish identity is shifted from religion 
towards nationalism, is naturally rejected by the Jewish orthodoxy. From the very 
beginning, the majority in the orthodox camp staunchly opposed Zionism and 
the idea that any “redemption of the Jews” can be brought about by the efforts of 
men. A radical religious anti-Zionist movement, the Neturei Karta, which cham-
pions the dissolution of the State of Israel, dismisses Theodor Herzl’s idea of the 
termination of the diaspora as a violation of divine law. The Torah
5 Brubaker 2002: 218–219.
6 Avineri 1999: 251–252.
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forbids [the Jews] to leave the diaspora of their own accord and found a state before God 
brings final salvation to His people and to the entire world […]. 2,000 years ago, God sent 
the Jewish people into exile (diaspora), and it is also by God that they will be redeemed 
from it. Until then, they must be patient, faithful and loyal to their host peoples, wherever 
divine fate has cast them. This also extends to the Palestinians who live in the Holy Land 
of Palestine according to divine will. This is unambiguously recorded in written form in the 
Torah and by the prophets.7 
Here, the categorical rejection of a Jewish state and of a cessation of the diaspora 
is derived from an orthodox interpretation of Jewish religion. In a stance that is 
in opposition to the religiously motivated anti-Zionist Judaism, the anti-religious 
movement of the Canaanites proposes a new concept of a Hebrew state. This 
movement, which was founded by Yonatan Ratosh (1908–1981) and was active in 
the founding period, first and foremost aspired to the integration of the new state 
into the culture of the Middle East, which would entail the total separation of the 
Jews living in Palestine from Jewish history and thus from the diaspora Jews.8
But also the less radical, not necessarily anti-Zionist religious Jews were occu-
pied by the question as to what extent Israel as the Jewish state can really draw on 
Jewish tradition and religion, or in how far Israel can represent the Jewish people 
in the way envisioned by Avineri. The orthodox Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz (1903–1994), a resolute advocate of the separation of state and religion, 
aims his criticism not so much at the existence of the Jewish state but rather at the 
usurpation of the Jewish people and the instrumentalization of Jewish religion 
and tradition for Zionist purposes. As Leibowitz wrote in 1954:
The State of Israel does not dare disclose the true nature of its spirit, which is a rebellion 
against the religious tradition of the Jewish nation. It cannot afford to be sincere because 
the atheistic state at present does not know any other origin or any other source other than 
the historic Jewish nation on which it could draw. The only way for the state to justify its 
existence and create an ideological fundament is by falling back on Jewish history and tra-
dition. For this reason, this secular state is constantly forced to use symbols and terms of 
traditional Judaism  – in education as well as in propaganda, internally and externally – 
although the meaning and content of these symbols and terms is of a religious nature. […] 
The effects on public morality are fatal: By utilizing wordings, names and symbols depleted 
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There is a current in Jewish thought, however, which is positioned between 
secular Zionism and religious a-Zionism or anti-Zionism in which the two 
momentums – the religious and the national one – are not only considered not 
contradictory, but even jointly form the bedrock for the movement’s agitation. 
That is religious Zionism, which shares the same basic idea with secular Zionism: 
namely the negation of the diaspora and the assumption that the creation of a 
Jewish national state is the only sustainable way of Jewish life. In contrast to the 
Orthodox Jews, the early religious Zionists did not construe secular Zionism and 
its goal of settling the Holy Land to be blasphemous in any way. Rather, they effec-
tively reconciled Jewish religion and national statehood by bringing questions of 
culture and education center stage in their movement while shifting the more 
controversial messianic dimension of Jewish Orthodoxy into the background.
Initially, the establishment of a religious state in keeping with the Jewish 
Halacha law did not constitute a stated goal of religious Zionism. Only later, influ-
enced in the 1920s by the Jewish mystic Abraham Isaac Kook HaCohen (1865–
1935), did religious Zionism take on messianic features. These became manifest 
after the Six-Day War of 1967, and formed the ideological basis for the national-re-
ligious settlement movement Gush Emunim (Hebrew for “block of the faithful”) 
that was founded in 1974. It considered the creation of a secular Jewish state an 
indispensable step on the way to “messianic redemption.” Especially following 
the events of 1967, Gush Emunim and its advocates in the Knesset knew how to 
effectively rope in the state apparatus for their goal of promoting Jewish settle-
ment in the Holy Land.10 It has to be stressed here, however, that when it comes to 
the ideology of the “Judaization of the land of the forefathers,” there is barely any 
difference between religious and secular Zionism. This may explain the settle-
ment policies adopted over the years by the various Zionist-oriented Israeli gov-
ernments. The implementation of the Zionist project in Eretz Israel is the work of 
Zionist Israel, with Jewish nationalism asserting itself in the course of the second 
half of the twentieth century as the central Jewish line of thought.
On Nationalism
Emerging as a reaction to anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews in Europe, 
Zionism was ultimately inspired by European nationalism. Nationalism – and 
hence conceptions of nation, nationality and sense of national identity – has 
occupied thinkers of Romanticism since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
10 Zertal and Eldar 2004; Hagemann 2010.
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From the early 1980s on, the so-called “premoderns” dominated scientific under-
standing of nations and nationalism. They perceived nations as quasi-natural 
units which have been developing since the Middle Ages, so that the first nations 
were able to “blossom and fully unfold in an organic growth process.”11 
The second assumption relates to the right of a nation to its own state. It is 
from this premise that the right of self-determination of peoples, as evoked by 
Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) and Vladimir I. Lenin (1870–1924), was derived 
after the First World War. Thirdly, it was assumed that each nation has its own 
system of ideas and values which justifies the respective nation’s existence and 
which can be referred to as national consciousness, patriotism or national senti-
ment. And fourthly, this understanding of the nation infers the existence of a pre-
defined political and linguistic “national foundation” that provides an ideational 
“superstructure” in the form of nationalism.12
More recent studies on nationalism distance themselves from these funda-
mental assumptions. Instead, they draw on the constructivist idea according 
to which historical phenomena can be interpreted as constructs of the human 
mind.13 Max Weber (1864–1920) was the first scholar to understand nationalism as 
a historic-ideological phenomenon with a clearly definable beginning as well as 
a possible end. Weber radically contested the basic attitudes towards nationalism 
and nations that were prevailing in his own time. In doing so, he opened up the 
possibilities of new, modern research on nationalism that is based on the under-
standing of a nation as a utopian concept or “imagined order.”14 
In the words of the sociologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995): “It is nationalism 
which engenders nations, and not the other way around.”15 For the British histo-
rian Eric J. Hobsbawm (1917–2012) “no serious historian […] can be a committed 
political nationalist […] Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently 
not so. […] Historians are professionally obliged not to get it [history] wrong, or at 
least to make an effort not to.”16
But how is this comment to be understood? Does it mean that nationalism 
does not really exist? Here one should keep in mind that just like “other people” 
historians, too, are “trapped” inside their specific historical epochs and perform 
their work within specific social, political and cultural structures. Accordingly, 
11 Wehler 2007: 7.
12 Ibid. 8.
13 Cf. i.a. Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm,1983; id. 1992.
14 Wehler 2007: 9.
15 Quoted from Wehler 2007: 9.
16 Hobsbawm 1992: 12–13.
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societies shaped by nationalism tend to “produce” nationalistically oriented 
historians. This is also true for other great ideologies. When it comes to Jewish 
nationalism, Israel and the Jewish-Israeli society are steeped in Zionism, just as 
are most of its historians. They write their history from their own, that is, authen-
tic, perspective. This fact has to be acknowledged, even if the approaches they 
take may not appeal to non-Zionist or anti-Zionist readers, or are even completely 
misunderstood by them. A historian cannot ignore the ideological constellation 
of the figures he or she researches and seeks to understand, even if not sharing 
their ideology.
As for Hobsbawm, he enquires into the attraction that nationalism exerts 
on the population at large. Why is it that nationalism enjoyed and continues to 
enjoy such an enormous degree of popularity? Where does the actual source for 
this responsiveness to national ideas reside? For herein lies the weakness of the 
constructivist view; it barely offers any answers to the question regarding the 
ready absorption of nationalism by the broad population, which in turn allows 
the inference that nationalism is not a completely foreign, “constructed” element 
and hence not something that is entirely “invented.” Instead, it has to be a phe-
nomenon that is fed from an already existing reservoir of cultural and political 
perceptions and notions.
It is this idea that the British sociologist Anthony D. Smith (1939–) focuses on 
in his studies of nationalism. Smith is the main proponent of the older conven-
tional approach, which is highly significant for Zionist historiography. According 
to Smith, nationalism appeals to a deeply ingrained human need to belong to a 
group. The term “ethnic groups” plays a central role here, as it takes on the func-
tion of an essential unit. The nation, notes Smith, has endured across all historic, 
economic and social developments since archaic times. Smith provides several 
criteria for identifying ethnic groups: the name of the group, the common myth 
of its origins, the actual common history and obviously a common culture, the 
connection to a commonly shared territory as well as the existence of a feeling of 
solidarity towards the group.17 
Viewed in this light, nationalism is explained as a survival strategy of the 
ethnic group against the threats that are posed to the group’s continued existence 
by the oncoming modern era. As Smith sees it, although processes of the ethnic 
group’s politization and secularization, of territorialization and of the appear-
ance of modern elites play an important role in all nationalisms, the ethnic roots 
are not to be neglected in a historical analysis of nationalism. According to him, 
this historic development of nationalism was based on the fact of a commonly 
17 Smith 1991: 170; id. 1986.
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shared past, even if the nations’ historical narrative may be subject to manipula-
tion or may be re-interpreted in a more flattering manner in the process.18
Thinkers and Critics of Zionism
Already early on, the initial, decidedly secular and assimilated thinkers of Zionism 
such as Moshe Hess (1812–1875) and Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) recognized the 
necessity of a “secular religion” for the Jews. When faced with a growing racist 
anti-Semitism, these thinkers realized that the legal emancipation and assimila-
tion of Western European Jews as initiated in the nineteenth century had failed. 
The Hungarian Jew Theodor Herzl referred to this problem in his work The Jewish 
State, which was published 1896: 
The Jewish question still exists. It would be foolish to deny it. It is a remnant of the Middle 
Ages, which civilized nations do not even yet seem able to shake off, try as they will. They 
certainly showed a generous desire to do so when they emancipated us. The Jewish question 
exists wherever Jews live in perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried by 
Jews in the course of their migrations19 
Disappointed by unsuccessful attempts at assimilation and in a fatalistic state of 
mind, Herzl developed a new understanding of the “Jewish question”: 
I think the Jewish question is no more a social than a religious one, notwithstanding that it 
sometimes takes these and other forms. It is a national question, which can only be solved 
by making it a political world-question to be discussed and settled by the civilized nations 
of the world in council. We are a people – one people.20
Herzl’s main idea was to remedy the precarious situation of European Jews that 
resulted from racist anti-Semitism by creating a politically sovereign state outside 
of Europe. What was eventually aimed for was a complete termination of life in 
the diaspora through a massive emigration of European Jews to their new national 
“homestead.” What essentially distinguished Zionism from other national mind-
scapes of its time was the fact its definition of the nation was neither connected to 
a unified territory nor to a common language. Rather, by the end of the nineteenth 
18 Wehler 2007: 36–37.
19 Herzl 1896; http://www.math.ias.edu/~boaz/JewishState/herzl1.html: Translated from the 
German by Sylvie D’Avigdor. This edition was published in 1946 by the American Zionist Emer-
gency Council.
20 Ibid.
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century, the integration factor for the Jewish national movement consisted in the 
sense of being under threat and of sharing a religious background.
But Herzl’s postulate of the radical cessation of life in the diaspora by means 
of a politically-nationalistically hued Zionism encountered a competitor from 
another Zionist school of thought. In the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Achad Ha’am (1856–1927), who was from Odessa, the metropole of an enlightened 
and secular Eastern European Judaism, voiced his skepticism with regard to the 
goal defined by Herzl in his Political Zionism. He harbored doubts over whether 
a categorical negation of the diaspora was right or, for that matter, even practi-
cable. In his view, the creation of a Jewish state could neither solve the Jewish 
question nor put an end to life in the diaspora.
What was possible in Achad Ha’am’s opinion, though, was a gradual settle-
ment by a small part of the Jewish people who would build up the national basis 
and “national culture.” This, thought Ha’am, would be the proper preparation for 
the “return of Judaism into history.” Committed to the historical-cultural spirit 
of nineteenth century Romanticism in which the nation state was understood to 
be the pinnacle in the historical development of a nation’s cultural resources, 
Achad Ha’am saw the revitalization and the unfolding of Hebrew national culture 
in Eretz Israel as a necessary preliminary stage on the path to statehood:
It needs not an independent State, but only the creation in its native land of conditions 
favourable to its development: a good-sized settlement of Jews working without hindrance 
in every branch of culture, from agriculture and handicrafts to science and literature. This 
Jewish settlement, which will be a gradual growth, will become in course of time the centre 
of the nation, wherein its spirit will find pure expression and develop in all its aspects up 
to the highest degree of perfection of which it is capable. Then from this centre the spirit 
of Judaism will go forth to the great circumference, to all the communities of the Diaspora, 
and will breathe new life into them and preserve their unity; and when our national culture 
in Palestine has attained that level, we may be confident that it will produce men in the 
country who will be able, on a favourable opportunity, to establish a State which will be a 
Jewish State, and not merely a State of Jews.21
Achad Ha’am left a lasting mark on Cultural Zionism that primarily consisted in 
reviving the volksgeist, the “spirit of Judaism” and creating a Hebrew culture. The 
creation of a state was intended to be a long-term “natural” development that was 
not to be forced. Ha’am’s main criticism of Herzl’s Zionism was aimed at the issue 
of the “Jewishness” of the Jewish state that was to be brought into being by means 
of diplomatic efforts with the Great Powers. 
21 Quoted from Avineri 1999: 135.
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As Achad Ha’am, who wrote in Hebrew, asked himself: In how far can one 
speak of a national Hebrew culture if, as Herzl had expounded in what would be 
referred to as the “cosmopolitan national concept”22 contained in The Old New 
Land (Altneuland, 1902), Jews would speak the language of their countries of 
origin, found a German theater, or build an Italian opera in their utopian state in 
Eretz Israel? The goal of Cultural Zionism was a spiritual and cultural Renaissance 
of Judaism, which gave rise to the question as to what the contents of the finally-
to-be-founded Jewish state, and also the role of and the relationship to diaspora 
Judaism, should be. As for the latter, it was to be inspired in its Jewish identity 
through a cultural Renaissance in Eretz Israel and at the same time be strength-
ened in its Jewish existence. Cultural Zionism saw the strength of a Jewish state as 
residing in Hebrew culture, which means that statehood as an end in itself would 
ultimately be a threat to the Jewish state.23
Whether their Zionism took on a political or a spiritual-cultural form, both 
Zionist thinkers based their definition of the Jewish people on a secular conception 
of the nation. The Jewish people were perceived to be secular-national subjects in 
the context of a secular undertaking. Jewish religion as a confession played only 
a subordinate role in these Zionist utopias and notions as they appeared in the 
heterogeneous currents of the Zionist movement (revisionist, democratic, liberal, 
Marxist or socialist). In fact, the Jewish national movement originated in an anti-re-
ligious tradition that was carried by the spirit of the socialist and progressive influ-
ences of the nineteenth century. In certain phases it even took a decidedly hostile 
stance towards religion. The Zionist ideology, based on the negation of the dias-
pora, rejected the traditional-religious way of life of the Torah schools. 
In turn, the religious orthodoxy subsequently opposed Zionist-activist aspi-
ration to a Jewish state in the strongest terms from the very beginning; it adhered 
to the axiom that redemption is to be granted by God, not to be brought about by 
men. But in how far can Zionism be understood as a secular national movement? 
What is meant by the “Hebrew national culture” in the context of Judaism? Which 
role does the Jewish religion ultimately play in the Zionist national idea? 
According to the Israeli-Marxist historian Moshe Zuckermann (1949–), a reli-
gious momentum was inherent in the Zionist nation-state movement from the 
outset. In contrast to the Western formation of national states, “Zionism […] in 
its very origins unfolded not in practice, but basically as an idea of a national 
state constituted within the context of a superstructure. The idea of a Jewish state 
existed before there was a territory for this Jewish state. The idea of a Jewish state 
22 Brenner 2002: 49; Brenner 2016.
23 Avineri 1999: 131–144.
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existed before the population who was supposed to inhabit that territory objec-
tively existed as such.”24
According to Zuckermann, all the ideological building blocks of Zionism – 
the negation of the diaspora, the creation of a “new Jew,” the assembly of all dias-
pora communities on a territory that had to be conquered and cultivated, and the 
mixing of all these diaspora communities, so that the “new Jew” may arise from 
their midst as the future Israeli – are, in the final analysis, all based on a religious 
momentum. After all, the selection of Eretz Israel – in itself an appellation of the 
diaspora Jews that is charged with religious connotations – was a significant con-
tradiction to the secular aspirations of Zionism from the start, considering the 
fact “that the formation of a nation state that was pre-shaped in a European-style, 
modern and therefore secular cast was based on a deeply religious momentum.”25 
After all, the ideological premise of the unpopulated territory stood in total 
contrast to the objective situation in Palestine. It was home to another collective, 
with whom Zionism and later also Israel had to fight for the land. This fight is ulti-
mately justified on religious grounds: “Zionism laid claim to a modern national 
home, but what was invoked as the underlying ideological rationale was that his-
torically it was Jewish land, land promised to the Jews.”26 
Thus, the national movement that is at bottom political in nature depends 
on the religious justification basis of a divine promise. Zuckermann also draws 
attention to another contradiction in Zionism, namely that the religious momen-
tum functions as the only connective link between the different segments of the 
potential population of the to-be-constructed state nation, “for on closer consid-
eration there is no connection whatsoever between the Baghdad merchant, the 
Polish carter, the German-Jewish Grunewald professor and the Yemeni cobbler.”27 
They all have nothing in common besides their religion, whether they actually 
practice it or not.
Jewish religion constitutes the core of Israeli nationalism, which finds expres-
sion in the Israeli right of return for all Jews. This is true despite the fact that this 
basis does not have a superstructure that includes all Jews. That is to say, for 
the time being the Jews of Arab countries do not exist in the perspective of this 
Western-modernist Zionism, just as they fail to make an appearance in Herzl’s 
vision. Neither the Baghdad merchant nor the Yemeni shoemaker is envisioned 
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Nevertheless, ethnicity is defined in religious terms in the realization of the 
Zionist project and determines the national self-image correspondingly. Seen 
from this angle, Zionism as a Western-secular “project of modernity” contains 
within itself a dialectic aspect: “Zionism is a project which on the one hand has 
considered the national state to be a constituent of the liberation of a people, but 
on the other hand has introduced into this very same constituent an element that 
is adverse to the concept of a civic nation.”28 
As a “project of modernity,” Zionism, too, has the goal of liberating the Jewish 
people by means of national state formation, but in the course of this process 
the collective which is already present on the to-be-conquered and to-be-culti-
vated territory is simultaneously cast as “the other,” the “enemy.” In this way it is 
excluded from the national project, even as it is officially naturalized, albeit only 
partly and under restrictions. Being based on ethnically-religious aspects, the 
political-nationalist Zionism that ultimately carried the day ensured that Israeli 
nationalism developed a self-image based not on citizenship but on ethnicity. This 
tendency was also observed by the German-Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt 
(1906–1975). As early as 1945 she detected the emerging apolitical and supra-his-
torical conception of the Zionist community in Palestine that was informed by 
Herzl’s Political Zionism:
It is nothing else than the uncritical acceptance of German-inspired nationalism. This holds 
a nation to be an eternal organic body, the product of inevitable natural growth of inherent 
qualities; and it explains peoples, not in terms of political organizations, but in terms of 
biological superhuman personalities. In this conception European history is split up into 
the stories of unrelated organic bodies, and the grand French idea of the sovereignty of the 
people is perverted into the nationalist claims to autarchical existence. Zionism, closely 
tied up with that tradition of nationalist thinking, never bothered much about sovereignty 
of the people, which is the prerequisite for the formation of a nation, but wanted from the 
beginning that utopian nationalist independence.29
Arendt also pointed out the ideologically-utopian dimension in Herzl’s The Jewish 
State which was fed by the desire to separate Jews from non-Jews as a response 
to a perpetual and fateful anti-Semitism, and which was also being projected on 
the situation in Palestine. According to Arendt, this separation principle defines 
the self-image and the practice of Zionism. In her opinion, this ahistorical or apo-
litical perception is as unrealistic as it is detrimental. To her, Herzl’s vision of a 
radical withdrawal of the Jews from a world perceived to be hostile, and the flight 
28 Ibid. 36.
29 Arendt 1945/1970: 241.
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to a “land without a people” where Jews would be able to thrive as a closed-off 
national-ethnic group, safe from their persecutors, seemed unworldly and naive. 
Arendt’s point was not only that such an empty land does not actually exist. 
She also maintained that the political philosophy of Jewish isolationism is misguid-
edly apolitical in a world characterized by complex mutual dependencies between 
different nations and states. In her assessment, Jewish nationalism, which she 
termed “pan-Semitism”30 in reference to anti-Semitism, meant nothing less than a 
withdrawal of the Jews from the world in the politically-pragmatic shape of found-
ing a Jewish state. She could neither see a guaranty for taming anti-Semitism nor 
for the rescue of the Jews from the “outside world” in this course.31
For Arendt, in 1945, Jewish reclusiveness and withdrawal were illusionary, 
utopian. For Israel of the early twenty-first century, it is an already realized fact. 
Half a century after the state’s founding, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 
October 2000 and the failure of political attempts to resolve the conflict over Pal-
estine are indicative of a historically grown, insidious alienation of Zionist Israel 
from “the world.” This process is closely connected to the inability of Israeli 
politics to grapple with the discrepancy between a longed-for Zionist vision and 
the bi-national reality in Palestine by political means. What is meant here by the 
Zionist vision is the Israeli reason or definition of state which has been invoked 
since the state’s founding, namely the notion of a Jewish and democratic state 
for the Jewish people in Eretz Israel. Since approximately half of the population 
living on this territory is non-Jewish, Israel’s concept of state remains a myth. Yet 
the Zionist utopia continues to be imagined and strived for.
In his book The Imaginary Voyage: With Theodor Herzl in Israel (2000), 
Shimon Peres takes the founder of Political Zionism on an imaginary excursion 
through the country he had been envisioning, at the same time taking stock of the 
accomplishments and shortcomings of the Jewish state that has been in existence 
for five decades. In his closing paragraph, Peres describes in a rather poetic tone 
the Zionist vision of the reunification of the “lost people” from all parts of the 
world in a Jewish nation state, just as Herzl had dreamed of a century earlier:
As night fell, a numberless crowd converged upon the shores of the lake. Joining us were 
the millions and millions who over the course of centuries have made up the Jewish people 
– generation upon generation upon generation. A nation is composed not only of those 
living in the present, but of those past and to come. In the crowd are the Zealots who lived 
in Palestine under Roman rule, the Essenes emerging from their sanctuary at Qumran, and 
the Sadduccees allied with Rome; joining us are Flavius Joseph, the historian who won 
30 Ibid. 236.
31 Ibid. 230–236.
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over Titus, and Rabbi Akiba ben Joseph, the bard of the Insurrection of 135; and the par-
tisan of the Kahena, the Judeo-Berber queen of the Aurès, and the Marranos, who secretly 
celebrated Judaism in Quinto or in Buenos Aires; and the proud Champenois rabbis of the 
eleventh century, and the poets from the Spain of three religions; and the Jews from distant 
China, and those from Vichneva; and the hāsīdh disciples of Ba’al Shem Tov and the clever 
mitnagdim and the believers in neo-orthodox Samson Raphael Hirsch; and the inhabitants 
of the shtetlachs of Eastern Europe, the mellahs of Morocco, and the harats of Tunisia; and 
the proud aristocratic owners of private residences in Paris, London, Vienna, or Berlin; and 
the partisans for world revolution, and believers in assimilation; and the believers and the 
nonbelievers and the agnostics; those who proclaim their Judaism, and those who have 
forgotten their origins; and the survivors of the massacres of Worms, Trèves, Fez, and Sijil-
massa during the Middle Ages, or the Warsaw ghetto in the modern age; and the uncount-
able victims of pogroms and of the Shoah; and the pious rabbis commenting forever on the 
Talmudic texts, and intellectuals absorbed by modernity and by new ideas.32
What becomes apparent here is that Peres’ ethnicity-based understanding of the 
state in keeping with Israeli nationalism and the invocation of a strong feeling 
of belonging to a group – in the sense proposed by Smith – form the basis of 
his Zionism. Interestingly, Peres also counts potential and declared opponents of 
Jewish nationalism among those agents who have contributed to the historic path 
he delineates here. The criterion for belonging to the Jewish nation is defined in 
the ethnic-biological sense; it is something that is determined at birth. 
For, it “matters little who they are and what they think,” which is why Peres 
includes a range of widely different groups and historic constructs: “They were 
all gathered at this vesperal hour to listen to Herzl recite this passage from the 
Bible: ‘If I forget you Jerusalem, may my right hand be severed’.” Hence, the 
relationship of the Jewish people as a group to Jerusalem, to Zion, is evidently 
ahistorical as well as apolitical in nature. It is not relevant what kind of religious 
understanding or which political orientation these people have adopted; it hardly 
matters what kind of personal experiences or inclinations they have, or what zeit-
geist the respective epoch was dominated by.
Instead, all of them form, be it consciously or unconsciously, the limbs of one 
single organism that is directed toward Zion and can experience its redemption 
only there: “For one timeless moment the world was still, suspended between the 
past, the present, and eternity. In the grace of that moment, all was finally order, 
calm, harmony, peace, prosperity, and happiness.”33
32 Peres 2000: 197–198.
33 Ibid. 198.
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Tranquility, harmony, peace, prosperity and happiness are hardly the attributes 
that spring to mind when it comes to Israel’s political reality. So what or who is it 
that stands in the way of the Zionist vision? How does Israel define its opponents 
and how does it act towards them? From its very beginning, Jewish nationalism 
has had to grapple with the fact that the territory which it cast as the “land of the 
forefathers” was already settled by another collective; one that was granted no 
room at all in the Zionist vision. Instead, over time the “Arabs of Eretz Israel,” as 
the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine are referred to in Zionist jargon, turned 
out to be the true Achilles’ heel of Zionist Israel. The so-called “Arab question” 
has been progressively shifting into the main focus of the Zionist movement since 
the beginning of the Zionist-motivated settlement of Palestine in the late nine-
teenth century.1 
So in what manner did the Yishuv – the Jewish-Zionist community in Pal-
estine prior to the founding of the state – treat the “Arabs of Eretz Israel”? What 
political stance toward the Palestinian collective did they deem to be most instru-
mental for their Zionist goals? The Zionist discourse in the Yishuv concerning this 
point was characterized by a wide gulf between the objective demographical situ-
ation as it existed up to the state’s establishment, and the political goal of a state 
with a Jewish majority as it was championed by most Zionist parties. 
With the establishment of the state and following the disastrous demograph-
ical and political consequences of the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948 – which 
resulted in the Palestinian Catastrophe (Nakba in Arabic) as well as the seizure of 
78% of the territory of Palestine/Eretz Israel – the Arab question was eventually 
also extended to the neighboring Arab states. As five Arab armies intervened in 
the battle over Palestine in May of 1948 with the goal of thwarting the establish-
ment of a Jewish state in the interests of the Palestinians, the local Palestine ques-
tion turned into a regional conflict. 
Then the Six-Day War of 1967 led to Israel seizing Palestinian territories, 
among other things, and marked a turning point in the conflicts’ history. From 
the Israeli point of view, the Arab question, which had pertained to the entire 
region, now went back to being a local “Palestinian question,” strictly limited to 
the occupied territories. 
1 Gorny 1986.
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The Perception of the Orient by “Modern Western Israel”
Although the ideological roots of Zionism lie in Europe and its nationalistic and 
colonialist tradition, its actual realization took place in the Orient. The question of 
the relationship between the Arab-Palestinian and the Jewish collective is closely 
entwined with the tradition-steeped intellectual issues of the relations between 
Orient and Occident, Islam and Christianity. According to the historian Amnon 
Raz-Krakotzkin, the orientalism thesis developed by the Palestinian-American lit-
erary scholar Edward W. Said (1935–2003) is indispensable for understanding the 
modern discourse of and about the Jewish people. One of Raz-Krakotzkin’s own 
studies on the Zionist discourse is based on this insight. In the “secularization” of 
the Jewish discourse as an aspect of the nationalization of Jewish life, he discerns 
a distancing from the old, religiously motivated Christian-Jewish polemics and, 
ensuing from there, a reformulation of the modern Jewish discourse in orientalist 
terms.2 What Said had defined as orientalism is
a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 
‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident.’ Thus a very large mass of writers, among 
whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial 
administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting 
point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts con-
cerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on.3‏
Said points out the historical rivalry between the two big religions, wherein a 
centuries-old image of Islam and the Arabs as “fanatical, violent, lecherous, irra-
tional” is reinforced. Another aspect of this perception was the Western desire to 
exert political control over the Orient. Said speaks of a “polemical character of 
the knowledge about Islam and the Arabs, which developed in colonial times and 
led to what I refer to as Orientalism, a form of knowledge in which the study of the 
Other is strongly connected to the control and dominance of Europe and the West 
in general over the Islamic world.”4
In Raz-Krakotzkin’s view, the Zionist discourse was based on an orientalist 




4 Said and Barsamian 2003/2006: 111.
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Despite the Zionist rejection of ‘assimilationist trends,’ it can be read as an extreme expres-
sion of the desire to assimilate the Jews into the Western narrative of enlightenment and 
redemption. [...] Generally, Zionist thought, in spite of very important differences from 
assimilationist ideologies, did not challenge the dichotomy between Europe and the Orient; 
rather, it was based on the desire to assimilate into the West. […] Zionists developed a range 
of attitudes toward the Orient and toward the Arabs, from romantic desire to a total denial; 
but all of them remained within the framework of orientalist dichotomy, and served to create 
the ‘new Jew,’ whom Zionism wished to define as a new European, and not an oriental.5 
Consequently, an orientalist element is firmly established within the Zionist dis-
course. The “negation of exile” contained in itself the impulse of negating the 
“exile Jew,” as he was understood in orientalist terms. According to this percep-
tion, the negation of the diaspora involved the abrogation of everything that was 
considered “oriental” by the Jews, whilst at the same time expressing the wish of 
the Jews to return into Western history: “The act of immigration was perceived 
as the transformation and regeneration of the Jew; that is, the overcoming of ori-
ental elements.”6 Zionism as it has been asserted in Israel is orientated towards 
the West, fully distancing itself from its immediate environment. The Zionist per-
ceives the Orient as “the other” to such an extent that Zionist Israel feels almost 
eerily out of place in the region.
Zionist Thinkers and the “Arab Question”
When pondering the question of territory in The Jewish State, Herzl barely gave 
any consideration to the population living in Palestine, or to how they may react 
to this Jewish-European colonization. Instead, his focus was on the dominant 
powers that needed to be coerced into giving Palestine to the Jews. While Herzl 
offered the Ottoman sultan “financial services” for the settlement of his empire’s 
financial matters, he proposed the following return service to the West: “We 
should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of 
civilization as opposed to barbarism.”7
What is so remarkable about this often quoted sentence, and also the further 
remarks concerning a “return service” being offered by the Jews, is that Herzl 
does not actually specify what or who he is referring to when he uses the expres-
sion “barbarism.” He reverts to “Asia” and “barbarism” as a contrastive pairing to 
5 Raz-Krakotzkin 2005: 166.
6 Ibid. 166–167.
7 Herzl 1896/1997: 41; https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html.
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“Europe” and “culture,” but does not outline the “great other.” It remains utterly 
faceless. And although there is further mention of a “guard of honor around the 
holy sites of Christianity” in Palestine to be warranted by the Jews, the other great 
religion of the Muslims from which Christianity and its sites are to be protected 
does not make an appearance here, with no mention of terms such as “Islam,” 
“Arabs,” or even “Orient.”8
In the utopian novel The Old New Land (Altneuland, 1902), in which Herzl 
sketched his ideas of the new Jewish society in Eretz Israel, the author does ded-
icate several pages to the Arabs who are already living in that region. But the 
main viewing direction of these passages remains fixated on the firm belief in 
the positive effects that a Jewish settlement would have on the development of 
the country, and thus presents a fixed conception that the Jewish presence would 
elevate the living standard of the Arab population. 
As such, Herzl thought that they would be grateful to Zionism. The novel is 
written from the perspective of the Jews as Europeans or European modernizers, 
bringing culture and progress to the underdeveloped terra incognita that was still 
lingering in a state of barbarism. It is the very notion of a “Europe in the Orient” 
that is the focal point of The Old New Land. As Herzl perceived it, the integration 
of Arab Palestinians into the new society depended on their ability to adapt to 
Western civilization.9 Likewise, Herzl’s fellow campaigner Max Nordau (1849–
1923) advocated the concept of the Jewish nation as a part of Western civilization.
Retorting to Achad Ha’am’s criticism of The Old New Land, which was aimed 
at the fact there were no Jewish but rather just European elements in Herzl’s new 
society, Nordau offered the following argument: “The Old New Land is indeed 
supposed to be a European unit in the Orient. […] We wish that the Jewish people 
continue being a cultural nation after their liberation [from Europe] and unifica-
tion [in the Orient].” He further emphasized his position by stressing: “We would 
never allow that the return of the Jewish people to their homeland is accompa-
nied by a relapse into barbarism […] The Jewish people shall unfold their intrinsic 
characteristics within the framework of Western culture, just like all other civi-
lized peoples, and not outside of it in a feral, uncultured Asianism of the kind that 
Achad Ha’am seems to desire.”10
At the World Zionist Congress of 1907, Nordau gave a speech in which he 
confirmed his perception of the Zionist vision and agitation as a purely West-
ern-inspired phenomenon, and stressed his wish that Zionism would continue 
8 Ibid. 41.
9 Gorny 1986: 36–38; Herzl 1902.
10 Gorny 1986: 38.
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to be informed by European ideas. He also cleared up any concerns regarding 
a possible “Asianization of the Jews”: “We will endeavor to accomplish in the 
Middle East what the English have done in India: We will come to Eretz Israel as 
the missionaries of culture and extend the moral borders of Europe all the way to 
the Euphrates.”11
The Zionist-Israeli historian Yosef Gorny (1933–) clearly identified Nordau 
as a representative of the group that intended to solve the ongoing Arab ques-
tion – as it had been arising repeatedly in the Jewish Yishuv and in the Zionist 
discourse since the beginning of the Zionist settlement and increasingly in the 
wake of the First World War – by means of a nationalist-separatist approach. This 
school of thought rejected any attempts to integrate Jewish society into the orien-
tal region, striving instead for an unchallenged hegemony over Eretz Israel. In the 
light of this predominant attitude towards the Orient that was characterized by 
contempt, a total separation of the two societies was aspired to. And so a national 
confrontation seemed inevitable.12
The alternative approach to the Arab question was what Gorny calls the 
“altruistic-integrationist” one. Here, the realization of Zionism is predicated 
upon the Jewish capacity to integrate into the Orient. Yitzhak Epstein (1863–1943) 
is regarded as a major proponent of this position. In 1907, he published an essay 
entitled “The Hidden Question,” in which he addressed what he saw as the 
crucial problem of Zionism, namely whether it was able or willing to integrate 
into the region. He criticized the prevalent Zionist approach of blocking out the 
Arab question and advocated instead for its active integration into Zionism. 
Epstein believed this to be the right course for the Zionist objective, from the 
moral as well as the realpolitik point of view. A favorable reception of the Jews by 
the Palestinians would benefit both. It would mean progress for the latter while 
the Jews would be given a homeland. He saw the shared Semitic origins of both 
peoples as a basis for such cooperation and actually considered it counterpro-
ductive to Zionist goals that the new immigrants to Palestine take a colonialist or 
repressive stance. Furthermore, Epstein didn’t think that the Arab nationalism of 
the early twentieth century was necessarily an adversary of Jewish nationalism. 
Rather, he endorsed a policy geared towards balance and compromise with the 
objective of advancing the national development of the Arabs, which would be in 
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The first half of the twentieth century also saw socialist-influenced concepts 
for a solution being advocated by Eastern European Zionists. The proponents of 
such approaches belonged mainly to the labor movement or the party “Workers 
of Zion” (Achdut Haavoda, 1919–1930). But this model was characterized by ten-
sions from the outset, namely between the underlying universalistic-socialist ele-
ments versus the particularistic-national, if not even nationalistic ones. In 1910, 
David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973), at that time the coeditor of the “Workers of Zion” 
newspaper Ichud (“unity” in Hebrew), pointed out the dangers which arise for the 
Zionist cause by linking class conflict to nationalism. Rather than making sense 
of the hostility that the country’s Arabs felt towards the Jews in the context of a 
class struggle, he tied it to a national context.14
As a result, the notion became increasingly prevalent in labor movement 
circles that class-conflict solidarity in its conventional socialist sense was not 
conducive to Zionist goals in Eretz Israel. The integration of Palestinians into the 
new settlements was seen as having an adverse effect on the Zionist cause. Even-
tually, the labor movement even adopted a guideline under the slogan “Fight for 
Hebrew Work,” which excluded Palestinians from entering the labor market that 
was being created in the Yishuv at that time. 
So the separation of both markets – and thus the creation of an independent 
national market for the Jews – was already in place long before the actual found-
ing of Israel occurred. The segregation policy in the Yishuv, and later in Israel, 
was understood to be an inevitable measure in establishing the necessary politi-
cal and economic power basis for the Jewish people in the country. This basis was 
in turn seen as a precondition for the future coexistence of both peoples. Given 
that at the time of the Yishuv the objective power relations were clearly in favor of 
the Arab Palestinians, especially with regard to demographics, the realization of 
Zionism was to guarantee future peace. 
Jewish nation statehood should come first, and only after that might follow a 
possible reconciliation. In contemporary Israeli jargon, this formula has come to 
be referred to as “Security and Peace.” According to this view, a basis for negoti-
ations can only advance after the balance of power has fundamentally shifted in 
favor of the Jewish people in Palestine, or after Zionist ideology has achieved an 
appropriately stable power base. Seen from this vantage point, the possible coex-
istence of both peoples depends on a socio-economic separation policy, which in 
turn continues to intensify the tensions in Palestine.15
14 Ibid. 80–81.
15 Ibid. 91.
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Berl Katznelson (1887–1944) ranks among the leading ideologists of the 
Jewish labor movement, and he influenced an entire generation through his opin-
ion-forming function as editor-in-chief of the union newspaper Davar; a position 
he held from the paper’s founding in 1925 until his death in 1944. The said gen-
eration also included Shimon Peres who emigrated as a boy from Belarus to Pal-
estine in 1935, to later become a prominent Labor Party politician and, once the 
state had been established, a realizer of Political Zionism. 
Katznelson’s grappling with the Arab question had a lasting influence on 
Israel’s founding generation in the formative years of the pre-statehood period. 
His take on the problem, according to his biographer Anita Shapira (1940–), can 
be identified as exclusively Zionist, with his stance towards the new “Arab goy” 
being informed by his deep-seated distrust in general of non-Jewish people that 
originated in his background experience of the traditionally hostile relations 
between Russia and its Jews. 
Mixed tactics of stalling and blanking out characterized Katznelson’s 
approach to the demographic question, the main obstacle standing in the way of 
Zionism. Faced with the factual demographical situation and proceeding from the 
vantage point of “maximalist Zionism” – Shapira’s term for Katznelson’s claim to 
the territory of Palestine –, Katznelson adopted a stance according to which “the 
focus [of the Zionist discourse] should not be on the ‘Arab question,’ but rather 
on the Jewish cause.” The Zionist policy of the Yishuv, represented by the three 
maxims of immigration, land acquisition and settlement, was to be moved to the 
center of the debate. In this way Katznelson sought to provide a long-term solu-
tion to the Arab question.16 
In line with “constructive Zionism” (Gorny), Katznelson as well considered 
the creation of an economic, political and social power basis to be the answer to 
the burning Arab conundrum, which was conceived of as a purely demographic 
problem. The decisive aspect here was not so much that a socio-political regu-
lation was sought, but rather the fact that Katznelson chose to see the solution 
of the Arab question as a long-term process based on “the change of the (demo-
graphical) situation in Eretz Israel.” 
In keeping with this approach, the strategy that had to be adopted under 
the objectively given current circumstances was to employ stalling techniques 
towards the Palestinians, or to blank out the entire Arab question altogether. Yet 
when it came to explaining why the actual reality was a far cry from this pretense, 
Katznelson found himself in a difficult situation to be still backing the central 
goal of a Jewish homestead in the “land of the forefathers.” Although he did not 
16 Shapira 1980/1983: 307–308.
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explicitly deny the Palestinians’ right to the land they were settled on, he did 
affirm that they “have no right to keep the Jews from re-shaping Eretz Israel. They 
may still be the majority in the country, but that can be changed in the long run 
through immigration, land acquisition and settlements.”17
What is significant here is the “blank space” created by the gap between aspi-
ration and reality, which the local population is left to “fill out.” While Katznel-
son conceded these people a right to the land they settled on – after all, they 
were de facto living there – and thus adopted a realpolitik position, his Zionism 
nevertheless kept aspiring to change this very situation to the disadvantage of 
the native population who had “no right to keep the Jews from re-shaping Eretz 
Israel.” In other words, reality had to be subordinated in favor of the aspiration. 
Not only is it presupposed here that the Palestinians would have to acquiesce to 
the “re-shaping of Eretz Israel” – in the form as Katznelson imagined it mind you 
– it is also assumed that any rebellion against this form of Zionism is illegitimate. 
It is not least such maximalist-Zionist notions by which the ongoing relocation of 
Palestinians into regions outside of Palestine is actively encouraged.
In the assessment of his biographer Shapira, Katznelson supported the sep-
aration principle for two reasons, one of which was pragmatic. Put simply, a 
political cooperation based on the demographic conditions of that time would 
have given the Palestinians a considerable advantage over the Jews. The rules of 
democracy would not have served the interests of the Jewish minority because 
they would have reaffirmed the status quo, which is why Katznelson decidedly 
rejected any political-constitutional regulation. The other reason for Katznelson’s 
insistence on a strict separation of both peoples and his rejection of any kind of 
political integration, according to Shapira, was fed by his orientalist worldview. 
Based on his conviction that Arab culture and society was downright backward, 
technologically as well as socially speaking, he opposed any attempt at integra-
tion as an obstacle to his own society’s advancement.18
Accordingly, the “others” with their “peculiar” traits are given hardly any 
attention. Rather, Katznelson’s main focus was on the “Jewish question,” which 
was to be solved by creating two units in Palestine which should be “completely 
separated from each other, not influencing each other, each respectively develop-
ing according their requirements and their own rhythm.”19
Shortly before his death in 1944, Katznelson did admit that problems were 
arising for the native population as a result of the Zionists’ ambitions. As he 
17 Ibid. 306.
18 Ibid. 307; Gorny 1986: 287.
19 Shapira1980/1983: 306.
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remarked, it was hard to reconcile the Zionist objective with a “formal morality,” 
but he saw it as compatible with what he called an “actual, real morality.” For just 
as a poor person has no less right to acquire possessions than a rich person, “a 
people without country and without land have the right” to soil and territory just 
like all other peoples of the world – even if Zionism had to fight its way against 
the current and reach its goals even in defiance of the will of the majority or the 
course of history, and therefore it was subject to “other standards” than “formal 
morality.”20
Insofar the existence of a national state of one’s own hinges upon the ability 
to act according to “one’s own rules,” to comply with self-imposed moral stan-
dards. This form of existence, worded in the ideological language of maximal-
ist Zionism, could ultimately only be brought about by displacing the other col-
lective – indeed not only from the country, but also from one’s consciousness. 
This notion translates into relocation as it was anticipated by Katznelson, which 
seemed like a feasible option during the Second World War.21
Torn between his own maximalist-Zionist aspirations and his understanding 
of Zionism as a moral movement with apodictic moral goals, Katznelson found 
himself in a trying dilemma when confronted with the very real, but consistently 
suppressed Arab question. This is what led him to make contradictory state-
ments. Shortly before his death, he said: “In the Jewish state, the Arabs will have 
equal rights and no Arab will be expropriated, expelled or deported. Should they 
wish to emigrate, however, we will not stand in their way. We will even help them 
do it.”22
More than half a century later, Shimon Peres, who had been Berl Katznel-
son’s student in the 1940s, regarded the Palestinian question at a time when it 
was actually being acknowledged by Israeli politics. The Jewish state had already 
been established, and Israel had seized the whole country in two wars of con-
quest (1948 and 1967). The new state had put the “Arabs of Eretz Israel” mutatis 
mutandis under the control of the military, so that the Zionist project within the 
meaning of maximalist Zionism had largely been realized.
In late 1996, Peres offered his view of the “other collective” from the winner’s 
perspective, so to speak. At this point, the Labor Party government had entered 
into talks with the PLO as a legitimate political representative of the Palestinian 
people, and had made some concessions in the course of the two Oslo Accords 
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figured as a co-initiator of the Oslo Peace Process that was set in motion in 1993. 
Asked to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinian people, 
the then president of the Labor Party gave this reply: 
Undoubtedly they [the Palestinians] are a talented people, and under the right circum-
stances they can become a modern people – as modern as any other people in the world. 
They have several shortcomings. One is that they have never been a people – there never 
was a Palestinian people until very recently. They have never experienced the taste of state-
hood – there never was a Palestinian state. And they were eaten up by violence and terror, 
as well as tribal and family divisions, which makes it very hard for them to unite. But then 
I think they are fast learners – they can be quite ingenious. I mean, they could excel in 
all walks of life if they were to come to normalcy. They are on their way to normalcy. To 
compare them with the Jewish people would be apt if you remember that the Jewish people 
didn’t have normalcy either. By normal, I mean running a state and becoming responsible. 
Another shortcoming is their sensitivity to respect and honor. They are very sensitive to 
their self-respect. This is [for them] almost consideration number one. But having land is 
their highest priority. This in an age in which science is more important than land, which is 
something they haven’t grasped yet.23
In order to better understand such an irritating statement by a leading Israeli pol-
itician, one has to be aware not only of Katznelson’s take on the Arab question, 
but also of what the historian Raz-Krakotzkin understands to be a basic charac-
teristic of Israeli political culture: its fundamental tendency to separate the two 
histories. As a consequence, the history of the Zionist settlement is explained 
apart from the history of the conflict or the history of the Palestinians. In this 
context, Raz-Krakotzkin indicates the division of labor of Israeli historians, as it 
is referred to by the Israeli sociologist Gershon Shafir (1947–), namely between 
those who address the history of Zionism, the Jewish people, and the Jewish set-
tlement in Palestine, and the so-called “orientalists” who study the “Arabs” and 
the “Orient.”24
What is striking about Peres’ description of the Palestinians and their history 
is that he blocks out the history of Zionism and the Jewish settlement, outlining 
Palestinian history with an omission of the Zionist-Israeli connection. Even as 
Peres compares the nonexistent nation statehood of the Jews prior to the found-
ing of State of Israel to the present situation of the Palestinians, the actual Zion-
ist-Israeli context is by and large left out. It is therefore impossible to gather from 
his remark just who the opponent of this “talented people” could possibly be, or 
in which concrete historic context they were not able to unfold their talents. 
23 Peres and Littell 1998: 79–80.
24 Raz-Krakotzkin 2000.
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When, in the very same interview, Peres’ attention was called to the fact that 
Israel also values land as a precious commodity and that all the different govern-
ments have in fact supported the settler movement, his brief response was that 
the settlers were also in the wrong. He then immediately returned to talking about 
Palestinian history, which he explained as being separate from the Israeli-Zion-
ist one.25 Regardless of in what form Peres may express criticism of the Jewish 
settler movement, for him it always falls under the category of the “holy history” 
of Zionism, and as such cannot have any contact points with the history of the 
Palestinians.
In the Peres quote cited above, orientalist tendencies are palpable. A key 
feature of this attitude is the paternalistic stance towards the Palestinians. In 
a seemingly benevolent tone that strikes one as colonialist, they are ascribed a 
number of positive traits. They are called “a talented people” who “under the 
right circumstances” could have become “a modern people.” Even though they 
“have several shortcomings” when it comes to a couple of things, they “are fast 
learners.” They are described as “ingenious” and as having the potential to “excel 
in all walks of life.” If only it wasn’t for the one obstacle to all of this, namely the 
lacking nation statehood. 
After all, deliberates Peres, “if they were to come to normalcy,” they would 
be able to live under the “normal” conditions of nation statehood. This is the 
point where the train of thought on Palestinian history abruptly ends, because 
it threatens to come into contact with the history of Israel. It is here that the con-
ciliatory language is aborted and the attempt to explain the lacking nation state-
hood of the Palestinians begins – completely detached from Israeli history, mind 
you. What is created here is, in Raz-Krakotzkin’s words, a “distorted historical 
picture.” By blocking out a rather important perspective of Palestinian history, 
Peres falls into line with a historical understanding that yields only a fragmented 
picture also with regard to one’s own history.26
After all, Peres explains the Palestinians’ lack of nation statehood as being 
based exclusively on their “intrinsic traits”: First of all, they are a young nation as 
“there never was a Palestinian people until very recently.” What remains unclear 
is at what point in their history the Palestinians can actually be considered a 
“people.” Peres rates the traditional way of life practiced by the Palestinians as 
a “test of statehood.” But they are also described as being still consumed “by 
violence and terror” and separated by “tribal and family divisions,” which are 
“hard [...] to unite.” What is more, they are extremely sensitive when it comes to 
25 Peres and Littell 1998: 80.
26 Raz-Krakotzkin 2000: 187.
 Zionist Thinkers and the “Arab Question”   29
“respect and honor” and “very sensitive to their self-respect.” It is of particular 
significance here that Peres reduces the question of territory, mentioned at the 
end of the passage, to merely “having land.”
Of all things, Peres chooses to take out of context in a rather baffling manner 
the very territory that has been at the center of the hundred-year-long conflict. 
He labels the desire to own land a specifically Palestinian problem, denounc-
ing it as an anachronistic intrinsic trait. By doing this he not only omits the very 
thing that connects the two histories, but he uses the reference to the special rela-
tionship of the Palestinians to the contested land to corroborate his assumption 
that the Palestinian people live in a pre-modern age. What they “haven’t grasped 
yet” is that we live in “an age in which science is more important than land.” 
Because “having land is their highest priority,” Palestinians are still trapped in 
an allegedly backward state.
A rather remarkable feature of this text from 1996 is the separate understand-
ing of history and, explicit therein, the rejection of any responsibility for the fate 
of the Palestinians on the part of Zionism. The “traits” of the Palestinian people 
that are listed here and that supposedly represent the sole defining factors of 
their destiny are conceived entirely independently of Israeli history, which is also 
why they seemingly cannot pose any risk to its continuation. 
Even at the end of 1996, a politician of many years from the midst of Israeli 
society does nothing less here than blatantly contend that Israel has virtually 
no share in the current situation of the Palestinians, so that it really is “none of 
its concern.” But how is it possible to profess such a casual lack of concern in 
view of the Zionist-Arab confrontation over Palestine/Eretz Israel? Are the Pales-
tinian people the unadmitted archenemy of Zionist Israel? Or are they a defeated 
or smashed enemy here, one that is very unlikely to endanger Israel’s existence? 
Since its initial founding, Israel has been looking at the “Arab enemy” and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict within two contexts. On the one hand, it is perceived in 
the domestic-local, Palestinian context; hence as the old Arab question. On the 
other hand, the larger context of a regional pan-Arab-Israeli conflict is invoked. 
Although Israel does not see these two conflict spheres as completely separate 
– after all, the “Arabs of Eretz Israel” are considered a part of the “Arab world” 
–, the danger that is emanating for Zionist Israel from these two conflict spheres 
has been respectively viewed and evaluated in quite a different manner over the 
course of the Arab-Israeli and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. 
All in all, this phenomenon can be outlined as follows: In the first three 
decades it was primarily the “Arab world” or Arab nationalism that was cast as 
the dangerous enemy by Israel. The unification of the Arab armies with the goal 
of “annihilating the Zionist project” posed the greatest challenge to the coun-
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try’s security-political leadership. Historic examples for this danger are the first 
Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s under the 
leadership of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), and the Egyp-
tian-Syrian attack on the Jewish Day of Atonement Yom Kippur in 1973. 
In this period, the problem of the “Arabs of Eretz Israel” more or less receded 
into the background. After all, following Israel’s victory of 1948 with its demo-
graphic and geopolitical significance for Zionism, it initially appeared as if the 
Palestinians would be controllable by military means. This became even more the 
case when another territorial victory over the Palestinians followed in 1967. Thus, 
from the security-political perspective, up until the late 1970s Israel’s attention 
was drawn to the larger regional conflict with the world of Arab states.
Only in the course of the 1980s, as the tensions of the regional conflict 
decreased to a more reasonable degree as a result of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
treaty of 1979, did the old Arab question inevitably shift back into the focus of 
Israeli politics in the form of the Palestinian question. And due to the following 
chain of events, namely the failure to achieve an autonomy for the Palestinians 
according to the Camp David Accord of 1979, followed by Israel’s fight against 
the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 with the exact goal of obstructing the realization of 
this very same autonomy, among other things, followed by the First Palestinian 
Intifada against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories (1987–1992), the 
ensuing 1990s peace process with the Palestinians and its ongoing failure, and 
finally the outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000–2004), it continues to dominate 
Israeli security policy to this day. 
As such, the Palestinian question inevitably made its way into the politics 
and collective consciousness of Israel, increasingly becoming the weak point 
of Zionist Israel. At the very latest since 2000, following the ultimate failure of 
the only attempt from 1993 to 2000 to solve the Palestinian question by political 
means, it has proven to be an unsolvable problem for Israel. 
The term “Palestinian question” is true to the Israeli understanding of this 
question actually being about Palestine, since Eretz Israel represents a territo-
rial unit for Zionist Israel, the basis of the Zionist project. The “Judaization” of 
the country was and remains a basic principle of Israeli politics, before and after 
1967. This is why, according to the official Israeli reading, Palestinians are not 
understood to be a national collective but rather individuals who have different 
statuses under Israeli supremacy. The Zionist-Israeli term of the “Arabs of Eretz 
Israel” (referring to the inhabitants of Palestine up to the establishment of the 
state, as well as to the naturalized Palestinians of Israel after 1948) has an exem-
plary significance here. The next section explores how the Israeli perspective on 
the “internal enemies” has developed over the course of the years.
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Israel and the “Palestinian Question”
In 1948, the Zionist movement succeeded in dramatically shifting the geopolit-
ical and demographical relationship between the two collectives in Palestine 
through war. This was a significant step along the path to realizing the Zionist 
goal of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. After all, during the British mandatory period 
(1917–1947) and up to the first Arab-Israeli armed encounter (1948), roughly 
half a century after the First Zionist Congress (1897), the Zionist movement had 
managed to acquire little more than six percent of Palestine’s land area, mainly 
by means of land acquisition.27 
Then, in the course of the war of 1948, the Israeli armed forces occupied 
seventy-eight percent of the total territory, and in the armistice talks of 1949 
in Rhodes between Israel and the neighboring states involved in the war the 
so-called armistice borders were determined. The remaining twenty-two percent 
of the land area passed to Jordan (West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip), before they 
were finally captured by Israel in the Six-Day War. It should be pointed out here 
that the UN Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947 actually stipulated a division 
of Palestine in which fifty-five percent of the land was allotted to the Jewish and 
forty-five percent to the Arab state. 
Apart from this geopolitical shift, 1948 also saw a demographic one in the 
relationship between Jews and Palestinians. During British rule, the Jewish share 
in Palestine’s population increased from ten percent in 1900, sixteen percent in 
1929, i.e., 156,000, to a third of the total population in 1947, amounting to about 
two million people.28 The most drastic demographic transformation took place 
during the war of 1948–1949 when approximately 750,000 Palestinians left the 
territory on which the State of Israel would finally be created in a mass exodus, 
and as a massive Jewish immigration from European and Arab states occurred 
before and after the founding of Israel. 
While approximately 160,000 Palestinians remained in the heartland of 
Israel, a majority of the refugees found refuge in the former mandated territory 
of Palestine; that is, in the Gaza Strip that was occupied by Egypt and in the 
West Bank controlled by Jordan. Accordingly, 1.4 million Jews and approximately 
1.2 million Palestinians were living throughout the entire territory of Palestine 
in 1952.29 Over the course of the Six-Day War another exodus of approximately 
200,000 Palestinians from the West Bank into Jordan took place. So in 1967 an 
27 Wasserstein 2003: 45.
28 Ibid. 12, 18, 26.
29 Ibid. 26.
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overall number of 1.2 million Palestinians remained in the territories now occu-
pied by Israel, with Jews making up two-thirds of the total population. In 2003, 
3.3 million Palestinians were living in the occupied territories and 1.3 million 
Israeli Palestinians were settled in the heartland of Israel, while the number of 
Jews rose to 5.1 million.30 As of 2015, 6.4 million Jews and 2.0 million naturalized 
and over 4.0 million non-naturalized Palestinians are living in the territory of 
Eretz Israel/Palestine.31
And so the Palestinian question is something that Israel constantly has to 
deal with, even as its Political Zionism has been realized. By pursuing the Zionist 
goal of nationalizing the Jewish people by means of land seizures and Jewish 
settlements, Israel since its very founding has been pursuing a policy of de-na-
tionalization and fragmentation of Palestinians. Already shortly after the war of 
1948, a Palestinian state in accordance with the UN Partition Resolution 181 of 
1947 became a taboo topic. Accordingly, in 1949 Israel was confronted in the main 
by three distinct groups of Palestinians: refugees, returnees – called “intruders” 
in Israeli jargon – and Palestinians who had remained in the country after 1948 
and were naturalized by Israel in 1949. 
From its very beginning, Israel’s policy has been determined by three factors: 
the goal of a Jewish state, the claim of representing a democratic political system, 
and the intention of coming to grips with the permanently simmering Arab-Is-
raeli conflict.32 The state’s Jewish character is fostered by population-political 
means through a prohibition of return for the Palestinian refugees while at the 
same time supporting Jewish immigration. In July 1950, the Knesset enacted the 
“Law of Return.” In its first paragraph, the new state grants every Jewish person 
the right to an Israeli citizenship.33 In parallel, a legally institutionalized, insid-
ious expropriation of Palestinians who have either fled or stayed is pursued.34 
Besides this, the educational system of those Palestinians who have remained in 
the country is controlled as an instrument for excluding them from all centers of 
power; that is, for marginalizing them politically and economically.35
The legal basis for confiscating Palestinian land and property after the 
establishment of the state is based on a series of Israeli laws. According to “The 





34 Ozacky-Lazar 1998: 356–357; Golan 1995: 403–440.
35 Ozacky-Lazar 1998: 349–350; Cohen 2006.
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is transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture in order to guarantee its proper use. 
According to the “Absentees Property Law” issued in 1950, the entire property 
of Palestinian refugees (who are referred to as “absentees” here) is assigned to 
a state custodian. The category of “absentees” includes all people who have left 
their house or land since the beginning of the war on November 29, 1947, and 
comprises Palestinian refugees living outside as well as inside (so-called “present 
absentees”) Israeli state territory. 
The “Land Acquisitions Law” of 1953 regulates the lawful transfer of the 
confiscated land into state ownership, including the land of those Palestinian 
citizens of Israel who have been declared “present-absent,” wherein their legal 
claims to compensation are also specified in that law. Above all, the still appli-
cable emergency laws give Israeli authorities considerable leeway when it comes 
to declaring particular areas “protected” and confiscating them for “security 
reasons.”
Israel’s claim of being a democratic state entailed that Palestinians living on 
Israeli state territory should receive Israeli citizenship as well as voting, social 
and educational rights.36 And shortly after the fighting ceased in 1949 Israel did 
naturalize approximately 160,000 Palestinians. This was done in connection with 
the new state’s admission to the United Nations on May 11, 1949. Nevertheless, 
these “Israeli Arabs” as they are called in Israeli jargon were subjected to a strict 
military government that was only lifted in December 1966. 
Its primary purpose was, for one thing, to secure access to the country’s 
resources for the Zionist project, and, for another, to ensure the political-social 
control of the Palestinian population. The goal was to prevent any cooperation 
between Israeli Arabs and the neighboring Arab states,37 with the military gov-
ernment being authorized to administrate the territories inhabited by the Pales-
tinians in the heartland of Israel. This included, among other things, the issuing 
of work, building and entry permits. Another objective was to limit the freedom 
of movement as well as the settlement possibilities available to the Palestinians 
within the country. Moreover, the military government enforced a curfew of nine 
p.m.
Initially, the legal basis for the military government was provided by emer-
gency and defense decrees (“Defence Regulations Emergency”) of the British 
mandate administration of 1945, being adopted first by the provisional and later 
by the elected Israeli governments. According to these laws, the military, autho-
rized by the minister of defense, may exert legislative, judicial and executive 
36 Ozacky-Lazar 1998: 361.
37 Ibid. 349–355.
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power over certain areas of the population’s life. This regulation is founded on the 
conviction that the country is in a continuous state of defense, rendering extreme 
measures necessary. This means that a military commander has the legal power 
to, for example, initiate legal seizures, conduct house searches without search 
warrants, order the destruction of buildings, or impose arbitrary curfews.38 
The military government that ruled from 1949 to 1966 has almost been extin-
guished from the collective historical awareness of Jewish Israelis. One reason 
for this may be the incapability to deal with the humanitarianly and politically 
aggravating question of the military occupation of the Palestinian territories since 
1967, which is still on the political agenda.39 Faced with the more acute problems 
of this ongoing occupation, the chapter concerning the nineteen-year-long mili-
tary governance over Israeli Palestinians is allowed to fade into the background 
of political and historical perception. This blanking out of the “first experience 
with occupation” may further be interpreted as a denial of the salient fact that 
the State of Israel has de facto never really experienced any other situation than 
that of military rule over the Palestinians. This is in turn is taken as a clear sign 
they are indeed the antagonists of Zionist Israel and must be fought against, kept 
in check.
While the naturalized Palestinians were thus kept under control, the Pales-
tinian refugees of 1948 were completely banned from Israel’s consciousness by 
means of enacting a strict prohibition to return.40 When the war of 1967 came 
along, however, the Arab question was once again on the Israeli agenda, and the 
conquest of Palestinian territories in the Six-Day War turned the old Arab question 
into the “Palestinian question.” Yet the claim that Eretz Israel was the possession 
of the Jewish people and thus a Zionist tenet remained unshaken. Instead, the 
issue that was seen as being in need of clarification was what status the Palestin-
ians living on this territory were to be given in the expanded Jewish state. 
After the Six-Day War, Israel unleashed the apparatus of military government 
into the newly gained territories and considered them “occupied” for the time 
being. In practice, though, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and 
the Sinai Peninsula were treated as “liberated” Jewish territories. This is why 
Jews settled them, and especially the Palestinian population was affected by this 
slowly advancing Israeli occupation. While the population of the Golan Heights 
could flee or was expelled to Syria, and that of Sinai to Egypt, the majority of 
the Palestinian population remained in the Palestinian territories taken over by 
38 Hofnung 1996: 50; Benziman and Mansour 1992: 33.
39 Azoulay and Ophir 2008.
40 Morris 1996: 136–151.
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the Israeli military – referred to as “Judea, Samaria and Gaza” in Israeli-Zionist 
jargon. 
No longer on the agenda after 1967 was the naturalization of the “new Pales-
tinians.” After all, the integration of several millions of non-Jews into the Israeli 
state corpus would inevitably run counter to the Zionist goal of a Jewish state. 
From 1967 on, the Palestinian question remained an open dilemma that consis-
tently dominated security policy and politics in Israel. 
After the Six-Day War, it took only a decade until the question of the Pales-
tinian territories conquered in 1967 was brought back to the political agenda in 
earnest in connection to the Camp David peace negotiations with Egypt of 1977 
and 1978. The main question was how Israel was to proceed with the Palestinians 
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. For the first time, an autonomy solution for 
the Palestinians was negotiated. Yet, even as in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
the government headed by Menachem Begin (1913–1992) did succeed in reaching 
a peace treaty with Egypt under the leadership of Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat 
(1918–1981) – namely at the cost of returning to Egypt the Sinai Peninsula con-
quered in 1967 – Israel still failed to realize the agreed upon autonomy for Pales-
tinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
In the early 1980s, political Israel was simply not willing to lose its power 
status in the Palestinian territories and instead gave the highest priority to con-
solidating the Jewish presence. In that decade, more precisely from 1984 to 1990, 
Israel was governed by a grand coalition of two big Zionist camps: the Likud and 
Labor Party. One way of securing the Jewish presence was through the massive 
settlement of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, but the constant fight against the Pales-
tinian national movement and its representatives served the same purpose. 
Shortly after the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty stipulat-
ing Israel’s pullout from Sinai, the Israeli leadership under Menachem Begin and 
Ariel Sharon (1928–2014) sent military into Lebanon. June 1982 saw the begin-
ning of a war that was also supported by the Labor Party, – then constituting the 
opposition – and that had as its proclaimed goal the righteous fight against Leb-
anon-based PLO terrorism. The true objective of the war, however, was to shape 
a new geopolitical order in the Middle East, one in which Israel would be able to 
preserve its strategic interests. 
Above all, the motivation was to avert the autonomy of the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories since that would challenge the Israeli claim to parts of Eretz 
Israel. Minister of Defense and war initiator Ariel Sharon tried to convince PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat (1929–2004) to create a Palestinian state in Jordan, which 
would entail the fall of the Kingdom of Jordan. Arafat declined this suggestion. At 
that, Israel forcibly expelled the PLO leadership as well as hundreds of Palestin-
ian activists from Lebanon in the summer of 1982. 
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In any case, by thus removing the Palestinian leadership from the neighbor-
ing country, Israel only managed to buy a couple of years before the Palestinian 
question was back on the table. In December 1987, the first so-called “Intifada of 
Stones” broke out when the civilian population of Palestine rose up; brandishing 
the most primitive of weapons against an occupying force equipped with highly 
sophisticated arms. But political and military Israel was confronted with a new 
kind of situation when the images of their military oppression of the civilian 
uprising went all around the world. More and more, Israel was being perceived as 
“Goliath” in this conflict, while the Palestinians gained the attention and respect 
of large swaths of the world’s public for being the oppressed “David.”
After the East-West break of 1989 and the Second Gulf War of 1991 – a trau-
matic event for Israel41 – the international community under US leadership finally 
pressed for the Madrid Conference that took place in October 1991. Israel, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians were brought to the negotiating table in 
order to try and jointly settle the Middle East conflict with international support. 
The Palestinian question was at the center of the talks, which is why the Zionist 
Right government headed (from 1990 to 1992) by Likud party leader Yitzhak 
Shamir (1915–2012) took part in the conference only very reluctantly. As was to be 
expected, this peace summit failed to achieve any results.
Only after a changeover of power had occurred in Jerusalem could a notewor-
thy breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations be achieved. As the Labor Party 
took over power in 1992, a peace process with the Palestinians was set in motion. 
In the so-called Oslo Peace Process of 1993, Israel recognized the rights of the 
Palestinian people for the first time in history, and accepted the PLO headed by 
Yasser Arafat as its legitimate leadership and Israel’s dialogue partner. 
The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in two treaties (1993, 1995), 
and with this framework in place it was assumed that the basic conditions for 
a permanent solution of the Palestine question had been created. This gave rise 
to the hope that Israel might now be actually willing to put Eretz Israel up for 
political debate, and to divide the country between both peoples. Furthermore, it 
seemed that Israel had come to accept that the two-state solution would be in the 
best interests of Zionism. (The Oslo Peace Process and its failure will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5).
There are several reasons why the first serious attempt to end the centu-
ry-long conflict over Palestine failed. Taking into account the broad historic 
context, I would like to offer the following explanatory approach: By the end of 
the 1990s, Israel is in a precarious political situation, if not a total dead end. On 
41 Zuckermann 1993. 
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the one hand, Israel is unable to carry through with the division of the country 
due to ongoing domestic political reasons and due to its reason of state. Such an 
action continues to be regarded as blasphemous not only by the Zionist Right and 
by religious Zionism who have fought and will continue to fight such a measure 
by all available means, but to no lesser extent also by the Zionist Left, commonly 
referred to as the Israeli “peace camp,” that principally refuses to share sover-
eignty over the country with the Palestinians. 
After all, the camp of the Zionist Left equally embraces the Zionist principle 
that Eretz Israel is the land of the Jewish people. This remains true even as the 
Zionist Left attempts to respond to the dilemma of the so-called demographic 
question, meaning the bi-national reality in Palestine, with the rhetoric of a two-
state solution. The unshakable fact is that all Zionist parties have been actively 
taking part in the implementation of the Zionist project in Eretz Israel for a long 
time, and they have done so from a position of firm conviction that Zionism is the 
ultimate answer to the so-called “Jewish question.” 
This is linked to another key aspect, namely Israel’s Orientalist attitude 
towards the “Arab” and consequently towards the regional Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This kind of perspective forms the historically grown basis for the civilian-mil-
itary dominated Israeli order. An important consideration with regard to the 
failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s discussed herein is the fact 
that political Israel is simply not up to the task of dividing the country owing to 
domestic-political and ideological reasons. And what is more, Israeli politics is 
extremely skeptical when it comes to the question of whether a resolution of the 
local Palestine question would indeed result in regional peace. In the following, it 
will be scrutinized how political or Zionist Israel perceives the Arab environment 
in which it is inescapably located.
Israel and its View of the Arab World
Examining the texts of an establishment man such as Shimon Peres from the first 
three decades of Israel’s existence, one can detect in them a marked Orientalist 
image of the enemy that is closely connected to the central topos of these texts, 
namely the security question or the Arab-Israeli conflict. In those years, Peres 
(Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Defense from 1953 to 1965, and Min-
ister of Defense from 1974 to 1977, among other offices) showed a tendency of 
referring to those he identified as enemies of the Jewish state by the generalized 
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terms “Arab world” and “the Arabs.” In some instances he even talks of a conflict 
between “the Arab and the Jewish people.”42 
Peres perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict in the context of the long historic 
tradition of the persecution of Jews. As he said in 1965: “We are a people under 
constant threat and siege.”43 Elsewhere he stresses, “Israel is a state under siege, 
with nothing less than its naked existence being at stake.”44
The motif of being “alone amongst the peoples” (Am levadad Ischkun) is 
equally applied to the situation in the Middle East. Similarly, the metaphor of 
a “giant banana” that Peres uses to illustrate the difference in size between the 
small Jewish state and the dangerous and malicious enemies it is surrounded by 
– “Syria in the northern corner, Egypt in the south, threatening to suffocate it”45 
– reflects the Israeli sense of being threatened and isolated in that region. A key 
text with regard to Peres’ enemy image is the opening chapter of his book David’s 
Sling published in 1970, entitled “Conflict at the Abyss.” 
Two things are relevant here. Firstly, the time when this text was written was 
right after the great victory of Israel over three Arab armies in the Six-Day War. 
Secondly, it should be kept in mind that the deliberations expounded in the book 
could – apart from their immediate ideological-political intentions in view of the 
new geopolitical situation – also be regarded as a résumé of Peres’ conflict or 
security concepts after serving more than a decade in the Ministry of Defense 
(1953–1965). As he himself has stated, Peres wrote this book after resigning from 
that ministry. Accordingly, his statements may be understood as reflections on 
the formative years of Israeli sovereignty:
Israel’s security problem is unique. It is compounded of several ingredients, all of them 
unusual. Its prime feature is the totality of Arab hostility. This is both publicly proclaimed 
and actively practiced, prevails in the entire Arab area, embraces the bulk of its inhabitants, 
is conducted in the military, political and economic fields, and is unceasing.
Except for its sea coast on the west, Israel is surrounded by Arab States: Lebanon and Syria, 
and beyond them, Iraq, in the north; Jordan in the east; Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 
the south, Enmity towards Israel is the official and operative policy of all these States, and 
it is all-embracing. It includes economic boycott and blockade; political pressure and pro-
paganda; closed frontiers and passage; military attack by regular units and official encour-




45 Peres 1970: 143; Peres 1965: 65.
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The aims of this policy are not confined to one particular area of Israel life or territory. The 
Arabs do not seek just one particular portion of Israel’s land, sources of water, oil wells; 
they are not interested only in political advantage of economic domination. The Arab 
purpose is all-absorptive – the destruction of Israel and the annihilation or banishment of 
her inhabitants. […]
The second special feature of the Arab-Israel conflict springs from the present mentality of 
the Arab world. Its source does not lie necessarily in the establishment and existence of the 
State of Israel. Soon after World War One, when the Zionist ideals began to be realized on a 
large scale, there were friendly and fruitful meetings between the leaders of the Jewish and 
the Arab peoples. In the Weizmann-Feisal Agreement signed in the Autumn of 1918, Article 
4 stated that ‘all means will be taken to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine on a 
large scale’; and Article 7 recorded that ‘the Zionist Movement proposes to send to Palestine 
a committee of experts to survey the economic possibilities of the country and to report on 
the most suitable means to develop it.’
The source of the conflict and of its widespread nature is to be sought not in issues between 
the Arabs and the Israelis, but in events and developments within the Arab States them-
selves. It is not so much that Israel-Arab relations are the fruits of misunderstandings, but 
that these misunderstandings are a reflection of the internal tensions which have struck the 
Arab world. 
These tensions are expressed in a warlike mood which pervades the whole region. In their 
extreme from, they are expressed in full scale military action. In the last twenty years there 
have been seven wars in the Middle East, four of them among the Arabs themselves, and 
three between Israel and Egypt. […]
The constant instability had its impact on life in the entire region and gave a special char-
acter to the social regimes in the Middle Eastern States. Of all the Arab States who border, 
or are close to, Israel, only one, Lebanon, has tasted democracy. All the others have been 
subjected throughout the entire period to a military or quasi-military regime. 
The Arab States have in fact become a caricature of the slogan of Frederick the Great: they 
are not States who have armies but armies who have States. Military considerations are 
overriding in all their decisions affecting civilian life in these countries. 
They have no system of ‘checks and balances,’ no institutions with the power to approve, 
restrain, or delay for further reflection items in the fashioning of policy. They have no free 
press, no independent political parties, no freely elected parliaments, no truly represen-
tative trade union movements. They lack a middle class which tends to recognize social 
obligations – their own and the regime’s. 
There is also something singular about Arab communication – the way they communicate 
with others and also among themselves. The Arab form of expression is given to using words 
in a decorative manner, with emotional connotations, rather than as precise instruments 
of exact meaning. This is reflected in vague formulations of obligations. Arab argument, 
instead of being fashioned with the ingredients of cogent and sober reasoning, tends to fit 
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the mould of propaganda and incitement. Truth finds it difficult to wend its way through the 
thickets of Arab communication not only with the outside world but also within the Arab 
world itself.46
Thus, the two features of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the characteristics of the gen-
eralized image of the “Arab world” and the “Arab states” are, on the one hand, 
the “totality of Arab hostility” towards Israel and, on the other hand, the “present 
mentality of the Arab world.” In contrast to the statements Peres would make 
about the Palestinians in 1996, the above passages from 1970 contain a clear 
message of the acute peril for the Jewish state being posed by the Arab world. 
Peres’ unambiguous language, especially when referring to the all-engrossing 
Arab hostility, as well as the double emphasis of the “Arab purpose” of annihi-
lating Israel being made already on the first page of his book, hardly leaves any 
doubt as to the significance which he ascribes to this danger. 
Furthermore, the enumeration of the Arab states by name, even including 
those that are not direct neighbors of Israel and hence not involved in a direct 
conflict with it, and also the mention of a series of anti-Israeli measures, are all 
meant to support his theory of an archenemy alliance between the entire Arab 
world against Israel. The main message of this 1970 book is that there is no basis 
for negotiations whatsoever between Israel and its neighboring states, and a fact 
that is alluded to in a rather ostensible manner is that peace based on territorial 
concessions made by Israel cannot possibly be achieved in this particular histor-
ical phase. 
An interesting contradiction comes to light when it becomes apparent that 
the chief characteristic of the “all-absorptive” hostility is rooted in the strong 
interconnection of the two histories; the Israeli-Zionist one and that of the other 
side. On the one hand, the “Arab world” as a clearly defined unit is fixated on 
the goal of “the destruction of Israel” and “the annihilation or banishment of 
her inhabitants.” This is pursued by very concrete political measures, namely 
through “economic boycott and blockade; political pressure and propaganda; 
closed frontiers and passage; military attack by regular units and official encour-
agement to sabotage and terror by irregular forces.”
On the other hand, the history of Israel is depicted as that of a victim of the 
malevolent intentions and policies of the Arab world, which is why Israel has no 
choice but to take security-political measures to ensure its own future existence. 
In this sense, it is clearly conveyed that the attribute of an all-encompassing 
hostility is rooted in a strong connection of both histories. In the last paragraph, 
46 Peres 1970: 10–12.
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however, Peres develops a reversed argumentative strategy that relies on the sep-
aration of both narratives. Thus he dehistoricizes and depoliticizes the conflict. 
As he goes on to explain: “The Arabs do not seek just one particular portion of 
Israel’s land, sources of water, oil wells; they are not interested only in politi-
cal advantage of economic domination. The Arab purpose is all-absorptive – the 
destruction of Israel and the annihilation or banishment of her inhabitants.” 
This kind of reasoning, aimed at excluding any option of negotiation, con-
tains both momentums. On the one hand, there is the obviously conjunctive 
aspect, namely the intention of destruction that one side harbors against the 
other which is understood as an apodictic axiom not requiring any further expla-
nation. On the other hand, there is a refusal to treat as an issue that which actu-
ally connects the two histories, namely the subject matter of the conflict – in this 
case particularly the territory  – to which a solution may in fact be found together. 
The territory is quasi expunged from the conflict.
It has been argued that Peres per se denies that the territory is the central 
conflict issue. In reality, he is very much aware that the land is at the center of 
this clash. It is only that he chooses to put the accent on the fact that it is “all 
or nothing” when it comes to this conflict item. He sees this conflict as being 
governed by the logic of the zero-sum game – wherein it is alleged that the other 
side is not interested in any kind of compromise, whether concerning the land or 
other things – but wants nothing less than the whole territory, which means the 
annihilation of the Jewish state. 
Even if the Palestinian question remains decidedly unmentioned, it always 
looms just below the surface in such contexts, especially by virtue of the fact that 
during the years in question Peres conceived of the “Arabs” or the “Arab world” 
as one entity, firmly unified in its hostility towards Israel. One may speak of a 
decoupling of both histories insofar as Peres grasps the conflict in the fundamen-
tal terms of “to be or not to be,” which a priori prohibits concrete compromises 
over “just one particular portion of Israel’s land” or “sources of water, oil wells.” 
Rather, any such concessions appear pointless, even downright dangerous. 
This discourse implies not only the historical but also the spacial severance 
of one’s own history from that of the others. Consequently, based on the conflict 
feature of the all-encompassing hostility of the Arab world alone, Peres draws the 
following pessimistic conclusion: 
This comprehensive hostility has been maintained without pause since the day of Israel’s 
establishment, and it has been kept at boiling point throughout. It is reflected in the condi-
tion of Israel. She has no powerful patrons who may, on the political plane, help to achieve 
a compromise which could prove an effective turning point. Her military victories are 
always overshadowed by the thought that they do not necessarily mark the end of warfare. 
Every success is countered in the Arab mind by the knowledge that they enjoy overwhelm-
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ing superiority in the numbers of their populations, the size of their territories, the scale of 
their armies, and by the belief in their historic capacity for the long pull.
No compromise can satisfy them. It is the Arab goal to abolish Israel, not to change a politi-
cal situation. Israel must surely be the only State since the Second World War which has had 
to face so stark a situation, with no alternative on the horizon.47 
Even after such decisive military victories of the Israeli army (IDF: Israel Defense 
Forces) over the Arab armies like the one in 1967, Israel cannot heave a sigh of 
relief because – given the demographical superiority of the Arabs in a region 
being seen as threatening – the hazard is far from eliminated. After all: “No com-
promise can satisfy them.” The reduction of the conflict to an all-encompassing 
Arab hostility towards Israel contains an irreconcilable contrast within itself. 
While linking the narrative of the two collectives, where one respectively refuses 
to accept the other and thus banks on the disappearance of its opponent, this very 
connection is not addressed any further because the mutual hostility is absolutized. 
The “comprehensive hostility” of the Arabs towards Israel remains unsubstantiated 
and therefore becomes depoliticized and dehistoricized. Political events notwith-
standing, it is perceived as a given, unchangeable and inevitable fact. 
Peres follows this dehistoricization or depoliticization discourse by drawing 
on a separation rhetoric and blaming one particular Arab character trait for the 
Arab-Israeli conflict: namely the “present mentality of the Arab world.” It is seen 
as a unique conflict feature and is of great importance for the enemy image that is 
being discussed here. The expression “present mentality” contains two contrary 
components. On the one hand, the term “mentality” points to something that is 
ingrained, constant, and hence hard to change. On the other hand, the reference 
to the “present” alludes to its transient character, thus qualifying it. By tracing 
“the source for the conflict” not to “issues between the Arabs and the Israelis,” 
but to the current system of the Arab states themselves, Peres clearly continues 
to pursue his political argumentation according to which peace simply cannot be 
negotiated at the present time.
Two points are merged in this characterization of “Arab mentality,” one being 
the Arabs’ “warlike mood,” the other the “backwardness of most Arab states.” 
In her 2002 study on Peres’ view of the Arab world, Israeli historian Yael Krispin 
states that what we have here before us is a rather obvious enemy image. Up until 
the late 1960s, Peres saw Arabs as “malicious, inferior, not willing to compro-
mise” and prone “to twisting [the truth] and aggressive agitation.” Also, they are 
47 Ibid. 9–10.
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“primitive and extremely concerned about their dignity, aggressive, uneducated 
and socially backward.”48
That these two aspects of socio-cultural regression coupled with aggressive 
tendencies form the basis of Peres’ Arab enemy image is also confirmed in the 
text of 1970. At its very beginning, the “internal tensions” that lie at the core of 
the Arab world as well as the combative tendency lingering therein is mentioned. 
Peres takes a descriptive approach here by elaborating in some detail on the 
numerous wars and military coup d’états in the region. He speaks of a resulting 
“constant instability” in these states, which are informed by the particular char-
acter of their dictatorial regimes, and refers to the Arab governments as “mili-
tary” or “quasi-military regimes.”
Peres fails to produce an explicit analysis of this inner instability, however. 
It is barely associated with the region’s colonial history and its still perceivable 
impact. Instead, it is ascribed to a characteristic trait exhibited by Arab societies. 
For example, Peres links the militant tendency of Arab states – with the exception 
of Lebanon – to a lack of civil institutions in these countries. After all, they have 
“no free press, no independent political parties,” and also “no freely elected par-
liaments, no truly representative trade union movements.” Likewise, there is “no 
middle class which tends to recognize social obligations.” To him, Arab states are 
“not States who have armies but armies who have States.”49
To underline his hypothesis of the Arab world’s regressive culture, Peres 
goes on to include the Arabic language in the overall picture. He, who has hardly 
any knowledge of Arabic, alleges that the enemy has insufficient communica-
tion skills, portraying Arabic as a reflection of a backward and bellicose culture. 
As he says, Arabic shows the tendency of “using words in a decorative manner, 
with emotional connotations.” This implies that expressions are generally of a 
non-binding nature, and hence no great importance is attached to the word in 
Arab culture. 
Not least, Peres charges the Arabic language with being violent in nature: 
“Arab argument, instead of being fashioned with the ingredients of cogent and 
sober reasoning, tends to fit the mold of propaganda and incitement.” Here, Peres 
underpins his theory that peace is not negotiable by pointing out the inadequacy 
of the enemy’s means of communication. Arabic is simply unsuitable for discern-
ing truth, which is why “[t]ruth finds it difficult to wend its way through the thick-
ets of Arab communication.” 
48 Krispin 2002: 196–197.
49 Peres 1970: 11.
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As a result, any attempt at communication is doomed to failure. Peres stresses 
the fact that these communicational features not only impact foreign policy but 
also inform the inner-Arab relations. Put another way, even amongst themselves 
Arabs cannot help but communicate in a “peculiar” manner. This line of argu-
ment is not only aimed at confirming Peres’ message that peace is out of reach at 
this point in time, it also implicitly locates the source of the conflict “on the other 
side.” 
True, after his harsh, curt judgment, Peres does goes on to soften his tone: “I 
do not cite this to draw a sweeping judgment of the character of the Arabs, or to 
claim that it is immutable, but simply to show how this character is used by the 
current regimes to which the Arabs are at present reconciled.” But this relativiza-
tion does little to mitigate the postulate of the “peculiar nature of the Arabs,” as it 
still implies that it remains prey to easy manipulation by Arab regimes.
In Peres’ estimation, it is these regimes that are to blame for taking advantage 
of this general mentality. He may express the future-oriented, optimistic posi-
tion that the current situation can be altered, not least because “the Arabs have 
known more enlightened regimes in the past” and “far-reaching social change 
is already knocking on the historic door of the Arabs, and if indeed there is such 
change, the destiny of the region will be completely transformed.” But despite 
this fact, in Peres’ understanding the destiny of the region depends entirely on the 
change of the political history of the Arabs.50
The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the topos Peres is addressing here, is 
explained based exclusively on Arab history, with the solution being hinged on 
an inner-Arab shift: “At all events, until there is change, Israel feels rather like a 
State planted in an international suburb which is torn by constant disturbances, 
a suburb in which neither law nor order, logic nor peace, plays any role in the life 
of its inhabitants.”51
Here, Peres is projecting his Eastern European experience, his personal per-
spective, on the Middle Eastern context. In the original Hebrew version of the 
same text he even uses the term “pogrom”52 to describe the Arab outbursts of 
violence, a term rooted in the history of the Jewish diaspora, highlighting his 
sense of a parallelism between the Arab-Israeli relations and the situation of the 
Jewish minority within an inimical Eastern European environment. With regard 
to the two other conflict features invoked by Peres, namely the “superiority in the 
numbers” of the Arabs over the Jews in the region and the frequency of violent 
50 Ibid. 12.
51 Ibid. 12.
52 Peres 1970: 4. (Hebr.)
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outbreaks, his explanations are restricted to quantitative aspects, referencing 
data, population size, territory and military power.53
The Arab world is an unknown territory to him; it inspires in him feelings 
of fear. Consequently, an integration of Israel into the Arab region is downright 
unimaginable in the years before 1970. As early as the mid-1950s, in his function 
as Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres formulates 
the so-called “Periphery Doctrine,” also known as the “Border State Doctrine.” 
It is aimed at overcoming Israel’s clearly felt and unsettling regional isolation by 
means of an Israeli alliance with non-Arab or non-Muslim states and minorities 
in the Middle East. 
From the historical perspective, this line of thought constitutes the founda-
tion for the mainly military forms of cooperation between Israel and states such 
as Iran, Ethiopia and Turkey, as well as with minorities like the Christians in 
Lebanon or the Kurds. As co-developer of this doctrine and also given his posi-
tion in the Ministry of Defense, Peres had a key role in shaping Israeli relations 
with states in Africa and Asia that are subject to a high security rating and about 
which little is known due to their mostly military nature, including arms trade 
and military training.
The logic of the Periphery Doctrine, arising out of a deep sense of isolation, 
contains the “activistic” approach that consists in retorting to perceived rejec-
tion from the immediate environment by “activistically” shutting-off from it. An 
important aim of this doctrine, developed after the Suez War of 1956 in reaction 
to Israel’s political defeat, was to counter the Arab nationalism lead by the Egyp-
tian President Nasser. The Suez War boosted his position considerably as it was 
extremely alarming to Israel.
The fear of a spread of hostilities fostered by Arab nationalism – in particular 
the 1958 Syrian-Egyptian military unification into the United Arab Republic gave 
reason for concern – also finds expression in Peres’ book of 1970. He underscores 
the necessity of putting a stop to the process in which Arab neighbor states are 
infecting the entire Arab world and the Muslim religious community with their 
enmity towards Israel, lest it grab hold of the whole region.54 
Pursuant to the Periphery Doctrine, Israel was supposed to confront Arab 
nationalism, perceived to be the archenemy, by providing military support to 
non-Arab and non-Muslim forces within the region. The hope was to weaken Arab 
nationalism in this way, and hence its member states. This concept contributed 
to the establishment of the notion that one has no choice but to resign oneself 
53 Peres 1970: 12–14.
54 Peres 1970, Chapter 13 “Israel and the Arab Word”: 258–280.
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to the existing regional situation of besiegement. And this view was ultimately 
solidified as the main focus was averted from the near environment  – but only in 
a political-diplomatic, certainly not in a military and secret-military sense. 
In 1958, Peres justifies this way of thinking as follows: “We are looking to 
draw nearer to an environment that will cooperate with us, and not one that is 
capable of exterminating us.”55 Following this logic, the immediate neighbor 
states have to be partially ignored and removed from one’s consciousness, as they 
are obviously not adequate to the task of cooperation.
Arab Nationalism as Israel’s Archenemy
Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser was the enemy par excellence for Israel 
from 1952 until his death in 1970, particularly between the armed encounters of 
1956 and Egypt’s defeat in 1967. This decade is considered to be a period of relative 
calm after the devastating years that followed the establishment of Israel right up 
until the Suez War in October 1956. From Israel’s point of view, however, the calm 
was pregnant with tension as Arab nationalism was at its peak during this time.
In these years, Arab nationalism, with the charismatic Egyptian president 
as its figurehead, was seen as a highly dangerous phenomenon for the young 
state. Following his military defeat in the Suez War, Nasser scored an important 
political victory when Israel was not able to celebrate its military success due to 
international pressure and was forced to withdraw from the conquered land, par-
ticularly the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, by March 1957.
At that time Arab nationalism gained new momentum through the broad-
ening of support in the Arab world for a secular national movement of the Arab 
states as they were gradually being freed from imperialism. The unification of 
Syria and Egypt in 1958, the reinforcement of Palestinian forces in Jordan, the 
founding of the Palestinian organization “Fatah” in 1964 with Nasser’s help, and 
Nasser’s general support for the Palestinian cause – all contributed to the process 
in which Nasser was stylized as Israel’s nemesis.
In 1970, Shimon Peres analyzed Nasser as a person and as a politician, taking, 
as it were, a retrospective view of the Nasser era. He described Nasser’s dilemma 
as follows: “Nasser’s regime is also torn by two conflicting purposes. It would 
like to establish a reform movement which will grapple with the grim realities of 
55 Peres 1965: 68.
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Arab life; but it also wants it to be a messianic movement, pursuing mystical aims 
inspired by Arab history.”56
Among Nasser’s reform goals Peres lists the fight against the Muslim reli-
gious extremists such as the “Muslim Brotherhood,” and the implementation of a 
socialist policy; even if the respective reforms in the fields of education, economy 
and lifestyle were mostly of a merely symbolic nature. The messianic aspect, com-
ments Peres, drives Nasser to “create the kind of army which Egypt is incapa-
ble of establishing at present”57. Finally, Peres explicitly states what he sees as 
the actual conflict: namely the wish to become an “Egyptian Kemal Ataturk” 58, 
“securing a place in Arab history as the modern Saladin”59 at the same time.60
Peres basically assumes that as a result of the ambivalence of the two ambi-
tions – statesman and messiah – Nasser ultimately falls prey to the Arab salva-
tion movement in the form of Arab nationalism. Especially following Nasser’s 
promising rise to becoming the leader of the country on the Nile as it was being 
liberated from British imperialism, Peres sees him as “a grave disappointment – 
to the world, to Egypt itself, to the Arabs and to Israel.”61 
Arab nationalism, understood mainly as pressure to solve the Palestine ques-
tion, caused Israel great anxiety between 1956 and 1967. In the years after the 
founding of the state up until the “liberating” Six-Day War, Israel relied on secur-
ing and consolidating the demographic and geopolitical successes of 1948–1949. 
The local border or retaliation wars of 1952–1956 and the regional armed encoun-
ters of 1956 and 1967 were an expression of these attempts to permanently pre-
serve Israel’s achievements of 1948. The fear of a powerful Arab nationalism can 
be clearly perceived between the lines of Peres’ retrospective account of this time. 
Such a movement would force Israel to solve the Palestine question in the 
interests of the “Arabs of Eretz Israel,” which would pose a real threat for the 
Zionist project. Although Peres does address, even if only very sporadically and 
briefly, the interconnectedness of the Israeli-Palestinian and the pan-Arab-Israeli 
conflicts, the fear of consequences ultimately leaves him speechless. He briefly 
mentions the hope of the Arabs of Eretz Israel, inspired by the strengthening of 
the Egyptian president and his desire to become an Arab Saladin. But he does not 
fail to mention what a disaster Nasser has ultimately brought on the Palestinians 
56 Peres 1970: 263.
57 Ibid. 263.
58 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), founder of the modern state of Turkey.
59 Yusuf Ibn Ayyub (1138–1193), called Saladin, first sultan of the Ayyubid Dynasty. In 1187 he 
conquered Jerusalem, ending the 88 years of Christian rule for the time being.
60 Peres 1970: 263.
61 Ibid. 265.
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through his policy of war, “a bigger catastrophe than they [the Palestinians] have 
experienced under King Farouk and the Mufti of Jerusalem put together.”62
Even when looking at the Palestine question from this angle, Peres omits 
Israel and its role as if it was purely “an Arab affair.” In order to understand how 
Zionist Israel perceives the “Arab environment,” “the Arab world” or “the Arabs,” 
it is useful to employ the separation discourse hypothesis according to which 
Israel’s political culture has cultivated a discourse over the years that is drawing 
on an isolated perception of the two histories, with the Jewish-Zionist or Israeli on 
one side and that of “the Arabs” on the other.
Conclusion: Between Regional Conflict and the Question of 
Palestine
The implementation of Zionism in the Orient threw Israel into a clash with the 
“Arab enemy.” Political Israel conceives of and deals with the so-called Middle 
East conflict on two different planes: on the one hand as a local Palestinian ques-
tion, on the other as a regional conflict with the “Arab world.” The traumatic inva-
sion in May 1948 of five Arab armies into Palestine to fight against the creation 
of the Jewish state marked a turning point in the conflict history, as it meant the 
spacial expansion of the Arab question. From Israel’s point of view, the “Arab 
world” and not only the Arab population of Eretz Israel had now become a dan-
gerous adversary, and as Peres’ texts reveal, even an archenemy. This enemy 
image of the Arab environment soon consolidated in Israel, and lastingly shaped 
the Israeli understanding of the conflict.
Numerous armed encounters with several neighboring states on different 
fronts – the so-called War of Independence in 1948, the Suez War in 1956, the 
Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition in 1967–1969, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, 
the Lebanon War in 1982–2000, the Gulf War in 1991 and other military operations 
– all served to solidify this image. Up until the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement 
of 1978, Egypt was considered the most dangerous antagonist. As the leading state 
of Arab nationalism and as the major opponent in the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 
and especially 1973, it had been the state most feared by Israel up to this point. 
In the 1980s, the war theater shifted from the south to the north. As a civil war 
broke out in Lebanon in 1975, the country became increasingly attractive for inter-
ventions by neighboring states like Syria, with whom Israel has been engaged in 
a territorial conflict since 1967. Israel intervened in Lebanon as early as 1978 and 
62 Peres 1970: 144. (Hebr.)
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then again in 1982 to 2000, in order to shape the geopolitical order according to 
its own interests.
Tense relations with other Arab countries apart from Syria – such as Iraq 
(1991, 2003), Jordan (despite the peace treaty of 1994) and Iran (since 1979) – are 
still a part of political reality. Thus the regional constellation of the “all-absorp-
tive hostility,” as portrayed by Peres in 1970, seems to have been confirmed from 
the historic perspective. 
But what is ultimately at the heart of these conflicts on different fronts is 
the shift of borders that occurred in 1948 and 1967, in other words, the Palestine 
question. This in turn is linked to other entanglements of the regional conflict 
and has profound historic reasons. Over the years, Israel’s understanding of the 
Palestinian question has directly led to the impasse in which it currently finds 
itself locked. The fear of grappling with this question by political means is caused 
by the fact that this would mean calling into question a pillar of Zionism: Eretz 
Israel as the country of the Jewish people. 
Since this myth is a constituent of the Israeli reason of state, there is no real 
dispute over Palestine in Israel’s political discourse. It is not the Palestine ques-
tion but rather the Palestinian question that is on Israel’s agenda. This agenda 
has been discussed mainly in security-political and military terms (through the 
military government before 1967 and the military occupation afterwards), which 
has resulted in the depoliticization of the conflict. Ensuing from this, Israel has 
gradually developed an understanding of the conflict according to which the con-
frontation with the Palestinians or the neighboring Arab states is not really about 
the land or other material resources, but rather about a general aversion against 
the Jewish state as such – in other words about the “all-absorptive hostility” of 
the “new Goyim.” 
If one draws on Yosef Gorny’s typology of the Zionist schools of thought that 
dedicated themselves to the Arab question during the time of the Yishuv before 
1948, then historically Israel has been trying to realize the concept of a Political 
Zionism as it has been formulated by Theodor Herzl, or a Zionism of maximal-
ist-separatist orientation as proposed by Berl Katznelson, with the main focus 
being on the establishment and preservation of a Jewish state for the Jewish 
people in Eretz Israel. This entailed displacing “the others,” the Palestinians 
living in the area, not only physically (as soon as the opportunity arose) but 
also mentally. The Palestinians were forced into the role of an “out group” of the 
Zionist vision as they were de facto living on the “land without a people” that was 
understood to be the “promised land” meant “for a people without a land.”
Israel’s view of the Palestinians, however, is highly ambivalent. On the one 
hand they appear as the beaten enemy given the devastating defeats they sus-
tained in 1948 and 1967. Over the course of Zionism’s dramatic victory, especially 
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in geopolitical and demographic terms, the old Arab question came to seem less 
precarious than at the time of the Yishuv. Now it was thought to be either solvable 
by limited concessions, or controllable by military means. Indeed, the Palestin-
ian “refugees” or “intruders” as well as the Palestinian “citizens” have been kept 
in check by the Israeli military since 1948. This is also true for the Palestinians 
who have been living under Israeli hegemony since 1967. And although the mili-
tary rule over Israeli Palestinians was officially suspended in 1966, they factually 
remained under the observation of the domestic intelligence service, and they 
continued to be denied a truly equal status.
On the other hand, the Palestinians have slipped from total control. Because 
not only are they living on the territory of Eretz Israel and thus pose a permanent 
demographic and (security) political challenge for Zionist Israel, they also see 
themselves as a nation and claim nation statehood on the territory of Palestine. 
Still, Israel continues to fight their right to self-determination throughout and 
without compromise, all the while falling into a more and more difficult position 
on the global as well as on the regional stage. For by denying the Palestinians 
their right to autonomy and statehood, Israel is thrust into an ever-escalating con-
flict with the Arab world. 
Israel has always been apprehensive of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spread-
ing into the entire Middle Eastern region, and the example of May 1948 when five 
Arab armies got involved in the conflict over Palestine, fighting together to bring 
down the new state, is seared into Israeli consciousness. The same is true for the 
war of 1973. A united “Arab nation” would essentially force Israel to bring the 
Palestine question to the negotiating table, among other things.
The pan-Arab backing of the Palestinians translates into a direct threat to 
Israel’s state concept. The notion of an all-encompassing hostility emanating 
from the Arab world is closely connected to the Israeli view of the conflict over 
Palestine. Continuing to ignore the Palestinian enemy by excluding this problem 
complex from the political discourse for many years is an expression of this 
ongoing pushing-aside tactic. It is exactly because it is believed that the Palestin-
ians are a defeated enemy that the Palestinian question has become depoliticized 
and delegated to the military. In this way, the issue disappeared from the Israeli 
public’s general awareness for many years, until the First Intifada broke out in 
late 1987.
Only in the early 1990s did the willingness emerge in the Israeli Zionist Left to 
take on the Palestinian question by political means, and to accept the hated PLO 
as the political representative of the Palestinians. Negotiations with the PLO had 
been unthinkable in Israel up to the Oslo Peace Process in 1993, and as of 1985 
the law had even prohibited them. It is precisely because the Palestinians had 
been systematically eliminated from the Israeli consciousness and made out to be 
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nothing more than a defeated yet still dangerous “out-group” over time that the 
peace process of the 1990s could not lead to a true settlement. 
For Israel kept insisting, even during the Oslo Peace Process, on its maxims of 
“military dominance,” “Jewish freedom of settlement in Eretz Israel” and “open 
borders” throughout the region. This is why, despite the fact that the PLO has 
been officially recognized and negotiations with it – difficult to carry out and 
extremely controversial as they are in Israel – have been taken up, the core of the 
conflict, Eretz Israel, has remained untouchable through these years. 
Israel’s refusal to split the country is very closely related to the fear of ques-
tioning the Zionist reason of state. In view of the existing bi-national situation, 
Israel’s understanding of the Zionist project as a Jewish state for the Jewish people 
in the land of the Jews will inescapably lead to an order of violence as it is inher-
ent in the system itself. Indeed, the historically grown political order represents 
the “consequent” practice of Political Zionism because it ultimately makes the 
separation of both peoples in the Holy Land necessary. 
Closely linked therewith is Israel’s orientalist view of the “Arab world” as the 
great “Other.” Just as with the entire “Arab world,” the Palestinians are also alter-
nately ascribed the role of archenemy and patient opponent, with whom negoti-
ations are possible to a certain extent but by no means on a plane of equality. An 
honest rapprochement or a real integration into a “backward and violent” region 
is at no time even aspired to, which is why mechanisms of dissociation and exclu-
sion have been established in the course of time.
This regional isolation, whether it is self-imposed or forced on the Jewish 
state from the outside, finally leads to the conflict being integrated into the polit-
ical order; hence to an understanding of the conflict in which the state of strife is 
interpreted as a given, unchangeable fact and in which that conflict is ultimately 
depoliticized. What is meant by the depoliticization of the conflict is the refusal 
to locate its core within one’s own politics, be it war, settlement or population 
policies. Rather, it is thought of as residing exclusively in the “universal hostility” 
that is an integral part of the “mentality of the others.”
In the Israeli consciousness it is “the violence of the others” or the “Arab will 
to annihilation” that remain the pivotal factors for the emergence of Arab-Israeli 
animosities. Whether it is Egypt under Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, or under 
Sadat in 1973, or fundamentalist Iran since the late 1970s supporting the religious 
Palestinian Hamas movement and Hezbollah in Lebanon since the mid-1980s – 
they all fall into the category of the relentless archenemy. This provides an expla-
nation for the historically grown, depoliticized perception of the conflict, which 
in turn forms the basis of the political order and the political culture as well as 
the self-image of Zionist Israel. All three issues will be the subject matter of the 
next chapter.
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Given its Zionist self-conception as a Jewish state on the one hand and the 
bi-national reality in Palestine/Eretz Israel on the other, the question as to what 
form of government the Israeli state was to take arose from the very moment of 
its establishment. Israel defines itself as a “Jewish and democratic state.” The 
tension immanent in a definition of state that contains both these aspects already 
becomes apparent in the founding document. Thus, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of May 14, 1948 states the following with regard to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Jewish state:
The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; 
it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be 
based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure 
complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, 
race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and 
culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the princi-
ples of the Charter of the United Nations.1
This passage outlines the conflicting priorities of the task of Eretz Israel’s “Juda-
ization” as it is contained in the Zionist project and the aspiration of the new state 
to democratic and liberal values. The Declaration of Independence wishes to see 
universalist concepts such as “freedom, justice and peace” as compatible with 
the Jewish-national raison d’état of demographically reshaping the country. The 
Zionist project is supposed to be based on liberal principles, while at the same 
time drawing on biblical sources of the visions “of the prophets of Israel.” 
The Declaration of Independence is often seen as a liberal-democratic basis 
for the coexistence of Jewish and Palestinian citizens. But the “Jewish Code” – a 
term coined by Baruch Kimmerling (1939–2007) – still remains the main pillar 
of Jewish society and the Jewish state. Traditional Israeli social and political sci-
ences invoke the Declaration of Independence when they label the Israeli politi-
cal system a liberal democracy, even though they do not fail to stress the deficits 
which are attributable to its specific historical origins.
Israeli democracy is therefore defined in different ways. Some writers stress 
the “democratic” element in the self-conception of the “Jewish and democratic 
1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/
declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx.
DOI 10.1515/ 9783110498806-004 ,  © 2017 Tamar Amar-Dahl, published by De Gruyter Olden-
bourg.  This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
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state,” and refer to its constitution as a liberal2 or constitutional democracy3, but 
also as a concordance democracy4 such as the ones of Switzerland or Belgium, 
where the aim is to include as many social agents as possible into the political 
process and to arrive at decisions by bringing about consensus. 
Other voices underline the “Jewish-ethnic” aspect and conceive of Israel as 
an “ethnic democracy”5, or even as a “Jewish democracy” or “theo-democracy”6. 
Basically, all these research opinions assume that the Israeli body politic is dem-
ocratic in principle. This premise is also shared by relatively critical researchers 
who point out the considerable defects of this democracy, even as they make only 
the core country of Israel, i.e., the territory within the so-called armistice borders 
of 1949–1967, the object of their studies.
In contrast, other researchers insist that the entire area of Palestine/Eretz 
Israel is relevant when it comes to the question of the political constitution since 
the State of Israel has exerted almost continuous political-military and socio-eco-
nomical hegemony over this territory from 1967 on. These writers arrive at the 
conclusion that the Israeli state can hardly be called a democracy in the light of 
these two considerations: Firstly, the country has declared the policy of “Juda-
ization of the country” to be its reason of state. And secondly, this policy keeps 
restricting the living conditions of non-Jews, with the term “non-naturalized pop-
ulation” being used to refer to the occupied Palestinian territories. This line of 
research uses terms such as “apartheid”7, “herrenvolk democracy”8, “a hybrid of 
democracy and military occupation”9, or “ethnocracy”10 in reference to Israel. 
If the term “liberal democracy” is taken in the meaning of the French Revo-
lution, according to which the same civil rights are to be granted to all citizens 
regardless of them belonging to a particular social group, Israeli democracy 
hardly qualifies. After all, Jews are automatically guaranteed privileges as com-
pared to non-Jewish citizens in consequence of the Israeli self-definition as a 
“Jewish” state. Here, the principle of civil rights collides with the raison d’état of 
a “state of the Jewish people,” which by definition prefers Jews, whether they be 
Israeli citizens or not.
2 Neurberger 1998.
3 Eisenstadt 1985.





9 Azoulay and Ophir 2008.
10 Yiftachel 1999.
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Israeli Democracy: “Ethnic Democracy” or “Ethnocracy”?
Two concepts of democracy that were being discussed in the Israel of the 1990s 
epitomize the tension between the antidemocratic policy and democratic self-con-
ception that is contained in the Israeli self-definition as a “Jewish and democratic 
state.” These were the hypotheses of the “ethnic democracy” developed by the 
Israeli political scientist Sammy Smooha (1941–), and the model of “ethnocracy” 
proposed by the Israeli geographer Oren Yiftachel (1956–). When Smooha applies 
the model of an ethnic democracy to Israel, this serves as an alternative concept to 
the national-state liberal democracy that is based on equal rights for all citizens. 
Likewise, it creates an alternative to the concept of the concordance democ-
racy that is based on the equal status of various ethnic-national and religious 
sections of the population.11 The ethnic democracy describes states and societies 
that are characterized by pronounced ethnic-national divides while still having 
democratic organizational forms. In an ethnic democracy, the political power is 
not distributed between the pluralities of ethnicities living in the state territory. 
Rather, the state is dominated by only one of the hostile ethnic-national collec-
tives, so that the interests of that single group are catered to as a matter of priority.
Based on this definition, Smooha identifies Israel as an ethnic democracy, in 
which the Jewish ethnic group has been able to preserve its group-related inter-
ests (national, demographic, economic, social and cultural) by appropriating the 
state apparatus. Although individual rights are granted to the ethnic democracy’s 
non-Jewish, Palestinian citizens, they are subjected to the mechanisms of a struc-
tural group hierarchy.
According to Smooha, the ethnic democracy model applies to ethnically 
divided or hostile societies. Despite the fact that political and civil rights may be 
due to all citizens in a democracy thus constituted, the hegemony of the state’s 
dominant ethnic group is ultimately institutionalized. In Israel, the refusal to 
recognize Israeli Palestinians as a national minority is justified by invoking the 
obligation to the Zionist master narrative. For Smooha, one motive for doing so 
is of a historic-legal nature, namely that the recognition of the national rights of 
Palestinians would undermine the exclusive right of the Jews to Eretz Israel. 
Another reason is that a minority status would grant the Palestinians a claim to 
autonomy, and hence create the danger of territorial separation. As a third aspect, 
Smooha points out a security-political motive: “According to the opinion of many 
Jews, such a recognition of the Arabs in Israel as a Palestinian national minority 
could lead to them being defined as an enemy, so that the hostile relations between 
11 Smooha 2002.
 Israeli Democracy: “Ethnic Democracy” or “Ethnocracy”?   55
them and the Palestinian people [living in the territories occupied by Israel] would 
be quasi reinforced, thus encouraging the Palestinians to sabotage the state.”12
Given the structural discrimination against inferior groups in an ethnic 
democracy, this model is understood as a compromise concept in which the two 
contradicting elements of the Israeli definition of state, namely the “Jewish” and 
“democratic” aspects, can be more or less reconciled. However, on a subtextual 
level the term “ethnic democracy” – no less than the self-definition as “Jewish” 
and “democratic” – actually serves to deny the bi-national political reality, i.e., 
the presence of two ethnic groups and the discrimination of one by the other. 
After all, what does this combination of “Jewish” and “democratic” mean if 
not the blocking out of the fact that the Israeli state not only exercises the hege-
mony over another, non-Jewish nationality, but also that an undemocratic situa-
tion arises, and indeed cannot but arise, in the course of this process, if what is 
aspired to is a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. 
Having a “state of the Jewish people” as its reason of state, Israel traditionally 
opposes the model of a “state of all its citizens,” that is, the bi-national option 
as a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As for an equal status within the 
meaning of a concordance democracy, that too is rejected in the ethnic democracy 
model. And as the national right to self-determination continues to be denied to 
Israel’s Palestinian minority, the distribution of public power resources is clearly 
unfolding to their disadvantage. 
Considering all this, the problem of Smooha’s line of argument does not least 
lie in the fact that he wishes the ethnic democracy to be understood as a stable, 
sustainable model. He seeks to bridge the contradiction between a truly demo-
cratic status of equality and favoritism towards one ethic group contained in the 
term of the ethnic democracy by means of an intellectual balancing act; main-
taining that the “dominance of the majority group” is made up for by “democratic 
terms” for all citizens.13 Smooha’s criterion for the distinction between the differ-
ent kinds of democracy is the constitutional relationship between the dominant 
ethnic group, the state and the ethnic minority groups. 
In an ethnic democracy the “ethnic nation, not the citizenry, shapes the 
symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit of the majority. This ideol-
ogy makes a crucial distinction between members and non-members of the ethnic 
nation.”14 Thus, Smooha relies on the procedural or constitutional elements of 
12 Smooha 1996: 296.
13 Ibid. 303.
14 Smooha 2002: 477; http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1893/pdf/working_paper_13.
pdf, 39.
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a democracy according to which the majority principle and the civil liberties of 
the individual must be respected. But the core question as to how much legal 
inequality an ethnic democracy is supposed to tolerate still remains unanswered. 
When it comes to this special type of democracy in a divided society, Smooha’s 
goal here is to differentiate it from the model of a “herrenvolk democracy” at all 
costs. 
He argues that the latter, unlike an ethnic democracy, grants “the dominated 
groups no democratic rights whatsoever,” acts “against universal norms and the 
world public,” and thus represents a “non-democratic, extreme, rare and unsta-
ble regime.”15 By contrast, the ethnic democracy is cast as a stable construct and 
therefore a success model. This stability is ascribed to the “democratic tradition 
of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv,” the “pronounced Western orientation 
of the Jews in Israel,” and the “external dependencies on the democratic-western 
world.”
In stressing that the continual inclusion of the Palestinian minority in Israeli 
democracy is warranted by the democratic purpose of Israel as well as the demo-
cratic orientation of Zionism, Smooha asserts the democratic aspect of the ethnic 
democracy concept. Consequently, the ethnic democracy is seen as representing 
“a realistic compromise between ethnic national state and democratic regime.”16 
When Smooha calls the ethnic democracy a “realistic compromise”17, one reason 
for this is that its “ethnic” aspect is understood to be a mainstay of the Zionist 
self-conception. Another explanation is the fact that security-political consider-
ations serve as a rational method to implement and preserve this self-conception. 
In other words, what we have here is a “realistic model” with regard to a state that 
is “Jewish” and “democratic.”
While Smooha applies his model to the sovereign state territory of Israel 
within the pre-1967 borders, thus drawing a clear dividing line around the occu-
pied – or “disputed,” as they are termed in the jargon of the Zionist Left – territo-
ries, the geographer Oren Yiftachel bases his model of ethnocracy on a different 
area of research. In his analysis of the Israeli political constitution, conducted 
against the blueprint of a conception of democracy which properly also includes 
civil equality, civil rights and the protection of minorities, Yiftachel refers to all 
territories under Israeli control, that is, the entire area of Palestine/Eretz Israel. As 
Yiftachel observes, the power distribution in the region has remained unchanged 
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the limited Palestinian autonomous areas are still being subjected to Israeli-mil-
itary hegemony.18
Just as in the model of the ethnic democracy, in the ethnocracy model the 
“dominance of one ethic group” with respect to the other ethnic groups of the 
state serves as the basis for the body politic. In contrast to the ethnic democracy, 
however, the ethnocracy is judged to be undemocratic as by definition it puts the 
dominant ethnic group into the center of its contemplation. Its hegemony inevi-
tably goes hand in hand with the control and supervision of other ethnic groups 
in the state. As Yiftachel goes on to explain:
An Ethnocracy is a non-democratic regime which attempts to extend or preserve dispropor-
tional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic territory. Ethnocracy develops chiefly 
when control over territory is challenged, and when a dominant group is powerful enough 
to determine unilaterally the nature of the state. Ethnocracy is thus an unstable regime, 
with opposite forces of expansionism and resistance in constant conflict.19‏
When it comes to the conflicting priorities of a “Jewish and democratic state,” 
the ethnocracy makes the interests of the Jewish-ethnic elements its main prior-
ity. Yiftachel demonstrates this by referring to the Knesset legislation by which 
the Jewish character of the state is ensured, such as the right of return of 1950 
and the citizenship law of 1952, both of which favor Jews over non-Jews when it 
comes to the entitlement to citizenship. Another reinforcement of the Jewish-eth-
nic element, says Yiftachel, is a 1964 ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court in which 
the “Jewish character of the State of Israel is constitutionally” prescribed, as well 
as in the amendment made to the Basic Law in 1985 according to which no party 
may be accepted into the Knesset that seeks to change Israel’s definition as a state 
of the Jewish people.20
But for Yiftachel, the main issue when it comes to defining Israeli democracy 
is not only a matter of the legal level. Rather, he stresses that the actual state prac-
tice should be examined. As he points out in this context, a double process has 
been underway ever since the establishment of the state: namely the “Judaiza-
tion” of the land on the one hand and its “de-Arabization” on the other, meaning 
the expropriation and displacement of the Palestinians. These dynamics of the 
political geography have led to a radical demographic change, hence to the 
modification of the structures of ethnic-territorial control, the break-up of state 
18 Yiftachel 1999: 369. 
19 Ibid. 367–368.
20 Ibid. 370.
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borders, the inclusion of the Jewish and exclusion of the Palestinian diaspora, 
and also to a close interlacing of religion, territory and ethnicity.21
According to Yiftachel, the main obstacle on the way to a true Israeli democ-
racy is the non-existence of a clearly definable Israeli demos. What he alludes 
to here is the abstract definition of the “national population” that is indispens-
able for a democracy, in this case “the Jewish people.” According to the “right of 
return,” Jewish citizens of other states have more rights in the State of Israel than 
non-Jewish citizens born on Israeli territory. 
Moreover, Yiftachel finds it problematic that exterritorial, non-civic Jewish 
organizations influence political decisions inside Israel. This includes exterri-
torial Jewish organizations and groups such as the “Jewish National Fund,” the 
“Jewish Agency” and the “Zionist Federation,” which, although not being elected 
by the Israeli people, have an effective political power in Israel. Yiftachel also 
mentions the extensive system of donations by wealthy Jews abroad, as well as 
lobbies of Jewish communities on the international stage. He perceives them as 
an integral part of the exercise of political power by exterritorial organizations. 
From Yiftachel’s point of view, it is not only the lack of a clearly defined dis-
tinction between the rulers and the ruled that is standing in the way of terming 
Israel a democracy, but also the hazy lines of demarcation of the Israeli state 
territory. Yiftachel’s term of “geographic dynamics” is central here, alluding to 
the Israeli transgression of borders by promoting the settlement of Israeli-Jewish 
citizens outside the sovereign, internationally recognized state territory. In this 
geographic space of the occupied territories, Israel pursues an ethnic segregation 
between Jewish citizens and disenfranchised Palestinians by military means, 
which collides with democratic principles. Yiftachel draws the conclusion:
‘Israel,’ as a definable democratic-political entity, simply does not exist. The legal and polit-
ical power of extraterritorial (Jewish) bodies and the breaching of state borders empty the 
notion of Israel from the broadly accepted meaning of a state as a territorial-legal institu-
tion. Hence, the unproblematic acceptance of ‘Israel proper’ in most social science writings 
[…] and in the public media has been based on a misnomer.22
From this consideration Yiftachel develops his main hypothesis according to 
which it is the Jewish ethnos as opposed to the Israeli demos that rules the Jewish 
state, so that the latter has to be defined not as a democracy but as an ethnoc-
racy. In 2007, the Israeli political scientist Yoav Peled (1947–) argued that since 
the beginning of 2000, within its internationally recognized borders of 1949–1967, 
21 Ibid. 371–373; Yiftachel 2006: 114.
22 Yiftachel 1999: 377.
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Israel has been continuously developing from an ethnic democracy to a form of 
government which comes very close to an ethnocracy.
In this context, Peled points out two crucial processes in Israel’s relation-
ship to its Palestinian citizens: for one thing, Israel’s “denial of the right to family 
reunification between Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Palestinians from 
the occupied territories”; for another, he speaks of “the formulation of a plan to 
move westward the border between Israel and the West Bank in the so-called 
‘Arab triangle’ of Galilee, whereby 150,000 to 200,000 Israeli Palestinians would 
lose their Israeli citizenship.”23 Peled concludes:
In the current context, the restriction of the Palestinians’ civil rights is not really a price that 
has to be paid to achieve other goals such as security, democracy or other things, regardless 
of whether this price is justified or not. The curtailment of rights is in itself the actual goal of 
the aforementioned measures. Denying the right to family reunification to the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel and stripping some of them of Israeli citizenship are partial measures on 
this path. […] a course which implies a turn from an ethnic democracy into an ethnocracy.24
The “Jewish Code” and Israeli Democracy
In the two state models that have been discussed above, the primacy of the Jewish 
ethic group in the Israeli reason of state is not contested. Rather, the central point 
of dispute when it comes to labeling the Israeli form of government is the ques-
tion as to what kind of relationship the two components of the definition of state, 
“Jewish” and “democratic,” have to each other in a bi-national political reality. 
The Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling investigates this matter in his essay, 
“Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel.”25 Therein, he develops the 
concept of a specifically Jewish cultural code, the “Jewish Code,” as a central 
pillar of the Israeli political and social order, i.e., Israeli democracy. His analysis 
of the relationship of the three factors of religion, nation and democracy provides 
an insight into the special features of the Israeli understanding of democracy. 
Kimmerling’s central argument is the taken-for-granted equation of the reli-
gious and national aspect of Jewish identity that Zionist ideology is based on. 
Thus, in contrast to other Western democracies, Zionist Israel defines itself not 
as a “state of its citizens,” but as “state of the Jewish people.” This means that 
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are granted, so that although Israel may indeed function according to democratic 
principles and boast free elections, parties, a division of powers as well as a 
free press, these democratic institutions and processes are strictly limited to the 
framework that is prescribed by the Zionist hegemony, with privileges only being 
ensured to the Jewish ethic group. Therefore, Kimmerling calls Israeli democracy 
a “theo-democracy” or a “Jewish democracy.”26 
To explain the genesis of the Israeli body politic, Kimmerling turns first to the 
Yishuv time before the establishment of the state. As he observes, undemocratic 
developments were looming already at this early stage, even though the question 
of the political constitution was not yet on the table. It was of secondary impor-
tance prior to the founding of the state, in a time when a secular Jewish society 
was in the process of emerging and more important and pressing political, mili-
tary, social and economic issues had to be solved. Moreover, the different Zionist 
orientations – liberal, socialist, nationalist and national-religious – held highly 
diverse ideas on the form of rule, so the intention was to avoid any intensification 
of the already existing tensions within the Jewish-Zionist collective.
In this situation, the “Jewish basis” seemed a promising fundament for a 
future society with a broad consensus. As for non-Jews, they were already per-
ceived as an “out-group” anyway. The electoral system that was introduced in 
the Yishuv for the national or Jewish-Zionist institutions (such as the parties, the 
“Jewish Agency,” the “National Committee” and the Jewish labor union appara-
tus Histadrut) served as a legitimizing factor towards justifying the rules of the 
game within the Jewish community. 
These elections had at least some external features of a democracy, which 
Kimmerling refers to as “processual democracy,” with a certain degree of social 
and individual autonomy still being guaranteed within the different socio-polit-
ical groups and parties.27 Thus, the Yishuv functioned on a Jewish-Zionist basis 
while representing the collective identity, and, among other things, providing 
the organizational principles for warranting legal protection to the individual 
community members. These rights were not universal in the civil sense, but were 
grounded on belonging to the Jewish community.28
With the establishment of the state, however, the question of the political 
constitution inescapably arose. The basis of the new state was the strong, insep-
arable connection between religious and national elements. Characteristic for 




 Choosing the Western Model   61
ment between the Jewish Agency (the executive institution of the Yishuv) and the 
non-Zionist Orthodox Party Agudat Israel, in which the religious status quo was 
made the fundament of the future Israeli order. And although the Halacha (the 
Jewish-religious legislation) was not adopted in its entirety or as a legal basis of 
the state, Shabbat as a day of rest as well as the observance of kosher command-
ments were stipulated by law in all public and government institutions. Likewise, 
family law (marriage, birth and death) was to be determined according to Hal-
akhic legislation.
Upon the founding of the state, it de facto withdrew from the realm of family 
legislation, devolving it to the religious administrative authorities by law. This 
legal situation represented an adoption of the legal framework in the Yishuv 
according to which the Jews as a “religious millet” (a religiously defined nation 
of believers in the Ottoman Empire) had submitted to religious jurisdiction (1922–
1947). At the time it had been left up to the individual in the Yishuv whether or 
not they would submit themselves to civil law, a choice that was no longer avail-
able with the establishment of Israel. And finally, the agreement had conceded 
full autonomy to the various currents within the Jewish religion when it came to 
matters of education.29
Choosing the Western Model
The new state’s directional decision for a Western-style democracy was by no 
means a matter of course in the founding period. After all, the dominant political 
and social powers defined themselves as socialist; some of them – like Mapam 
and the communist party Maki – even had a distinct Soviet orientation. What 
is more, in 1948 the Soviet Union advocated the founding of the State of Israel 
and also ensured important arms supplies via Eastern European countries when 
Israel faced an American weapons boycott. 
According to Kimmerling, Israel ultimately orientated itself towards the West 
for the following reasons: Firstly, because organized American Judaism was con-
sidered a long-term political and economic supporter of Israel; secondly, due to 
David Ben-Gurion’s growing admiration for the strength and diversity of Ameri-
can society; and thirdly, because the Israeli political state elites sought to distance 
themselves from the Middle East region which they considered “backward.” 
Especially in a situation where several hundreds of thousands of Jews from 
the Arab countries of the Middle East as well as from North Africa were being 
29 Ibid. 121–123.
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received into the country, the political leadership felt compelled to demonstrate 
and codify the Western-European orientation. Besides, there would have been 
no room for a genuinely religious Jewish self-conception in an Israel embracing 
an atheistic-communist orientation. And after all, it was Judaism in its religious 
sense that soon became indispensable for the ultimate legitimation of Zionism, 
which is why the religious camp had to be included in the national project. For 
it was by appealing to expressly religious symbols and values that the Zionist 
movement succeeded in winning the support of Jews as well as non-Jews. 
The Israeli Declaration of Independence of 1948 reflects the problematic roots 
and the controversial legitimation of the new state, attesting to the linking and 
blending of religious and secular elements, and of religion and nation. Jewish 
history, which is described in detail and traced all the way back to the biblical 
epoch, as well as the mention of the UN Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, are 
meant to underpin the “natural and historic right” of the Jewish people to their 
political sovereignty in Eretz Israel.
The new state was supposed to be based “on liberty, justice and peace,” that 
is, on universal values, while also being grounded in the spirit of “the prophets of 
Israel.” Moreover, a direct appeal is made to the Jewish people of the diaspora, “to 
rally around the Jews of Eretz Israel in the task of immigration and development.” 
Simultaneously, the religiously connoted goal of “the redemption of Israel” is 
mentioned. According to the declaration, the state is supposed to “uphold the full 
social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or 
sex.” All this is underscored by the addition of the religiously charged phrase of 
“our trust in the rock of Israel.” 
In 1949, David Ben-Gurion preferred the religiously oriented parties (Hamis-
rachi or Hapoel Hamisrachi) as coalition partners to the secular-socialist Mapam 
or the liberal “General Zionists.” His goal was to vest the new society composed 
of immigrants and settlers with a kind of legitimation through the religiously ori-
ented parties, groups and individuals.30
The Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir (1951–) also perceived the tension between 
religious and national-collective identity features present in the Israeli Declara-
tion of Independence. Although the document is not of a legally binding nature, 
it does fulfill a symbolic or legitimation-like function for Israeli democracy that is 
not to be underestimated. Ophir points out the sometimes-contradictory legitima-
tion patterns that the Declaration of Independence is based on.
On the one hand, it refers to a metaphysical, that is, ahistorical, relationship 
of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel. On the other hand, it points out the bitter 
30 Ibid. 123.
 Choosing the Western Model   63
experience of the Jews in Europe, that is, the Jewish history of suffering; at the 
same time asserting the Jewish right to self-determination on a universal basis 
and the aspiration to a normalized situation in the context of a Jewish national 
state. The political choice between the Jewish-particularist and the universalist 
path, in other words between adhering to the maxim of the uniqueness of the 
Jewish people and the Zionist aspiration to a “normalization” of the living condi-
tions of Jews – meaning their reconciliation with the Goyim – is considered to be 
a matter still undecided.31
But in how far is there really a contrast between the Zionist Right and the 
Zionist Left with regard to this “open” question of the “Israeli path”? After all, it 
was no other than the “Father of the Nation” and leader of the Labor Party who 
shortly after the establishment of the state pushed through his opinion against a 
written constitution for Israel. The “Zionist Leftist” David Ben-Gurion mobilized 
his Mapai party against such a document, even though the opposition parties 
Mapam, the General Zionists, Herut and the communist party Maki advocated 
it. All of them argued in favor of a constitution and for civil rights with a view 
to warranting the protection of minorities and limiting the power of the ruling 
Mapai party.32 
Ben-Gurion’s reasons for opposing a constitution lie in the fact that, firstly, 
forming a coalition with the religious party block (Agudat Israel, Poalei Agudat 
Israel, Hamisrachi and Hapoel Hamisrachi), his favored option, would not have 
been politically viable because these parties would have rejected a secular polit-
ical constitution from the outset. Secondly, such a constitution would have 
restricted the dominance of the Mapai party, and hence the leeway of the gov-
ernment or ruling party that held a majority in the Knesset together with its coa-
lition partners. Ben-Gurion considered the majority principle combined with the 
principle of the rule of law to be sufficient for legitimizing the Western character 
of the Jewish state. And thirdly, Ben-Gurion saw a constitution as a substantial 
obstacle to nation building by means of immigration, settlement and the genesis 
of a people still in the process of emerging. 
All things considered, the demographic and geopolitical projects pursued 
by the Israeli political and security-political establishment of these first years 
were not compatible with a written constitution. After all, in such a document 
the borders of Israel as well as the status of the Palestinian citizens – in other 
words the question of lawfulness of a military government in the state territory 
(1949–1966) – would have had to be clarified and determined. 
31 Ophir 2001: 245–255.
32 Bechor 1996.
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In January of 1949, Ben-Gurion presented before the Knesset his argument 
against a constitution: “Our state is the most dynamic in the world and is being 
reshaped daily. Every day new Jewish people come into the country and every 
day abandoned land is liberated. These dynamics cannot be submitted to a pre-
defined frame or artificial bonds.”33 
During the same Knesset discussion about a constitution, another party 
member, David Bar-Rav-Hei (1894–1977), summed up the matter in a way that 
corroborates Yiftachel’s hypothesis of the geographic dynamics: “A constitution 
[…] is not enacted at the beginning of a revolution, but at its end. Every consti-
tution aims at codifying and perpetuating certain principles. Most of the consti-
tutions formulated in the course of a revolution had to be modified or dismissed 
altogether. This is to say that it is necessary to reach a certain stability first.”34
Shortly after the establishment of the state it was mainly by continuing to 
promote Jewish immigration and settlement that this “stability” was to be guar-
anteed. Religious coalition member Mordechai Nurok (1884–1962) stressed the 
vital importance of immigration for Israel. After all, only ten percent of Jewish 
people were living in Israel by 1949. With the majority of Jews still living in the 
diaspora and therefore not able to participate in the decision, at this point in time 
a fixed constitution was objected to as being undemocratic.35 With this in mind, 
a constitution seemed to run counter to Zionist tasks and national values such as 
state building, Jewish immigration and territorial gains.
On June 13, 1950, the Knesset decided to commission the Knesset Constitution, 
Law and Justice Committee to prepare a constitution based on the basic law. They 
did not, however, determine a date for the conclusion of the procedure. Only as 
late as 1992 did the Knesset enact a basic law that honored human rights. This 
means that the basic law articles for human dignity and freedom and for freedom 
of employment were issued as much as forty-five years after the state had been 
established. Even more importantly, these and most other basic law articles have 
no constitutional status, which means they can be modified or even abolished by 
a simple majority in the Knesset.36
So a written constitution for Israel has been successfully averted and does 
not stand in the way of the Zionist project. The new state took up the dynamic 
concept of the country’s “Judaization,” with immigration, settlement and secu-
rity becoming the leitmotifs of Israeli policy. Israel absorbed Jewish immigrants 
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from European and Arab countries and provided for their settlement on Israeli 
state territory as it had been internationally recognized in 1949. In all of this, the 
military and the security apparatus played a central role. Conquering the country, 
securing its resources for the Jewish state, protecting the borders, and exerting 
control over the Palestinians living in the state – all these tasks fell under the 
scope of the military’s competence. As such, military and security forces were 
increasingly viewed as the guardians of the Zionist project.
Already in the ten years between 1948 and 1958, the Ministry of Defense rose 
to be the most powerful and politically significant department of the cabinet. 
To this day it holds a special status and an extremely strong position of power. 
Among other reasons this is due to the fact that the conflict with the Palestinians 
and the neighboring states kept on escalating over the course of the years. The 
evolution and establishment of an Israeli democracy with a specifically securi-
ty-political orientation is the subject of the next chapter. What shape the political 
culture of the country is in will be explored by taking a look at two examples of 
historically significant security-political affairs. 
Military and Politics in a “Jewish and Democratic” Israel
In his book David’s Sling, published in 1970, Shimon Peres, who very much con-
tributed to shaping the Ministry of Defense in the years from 1953 to 1965, offered 
the following reasoning concerning the relationship of military and politics in 
Israel:
Occasional observers have expressed surprise that the Israel Army has never at any time 
sought to weaken or challenge the democratic civilian processes of the State by direct or 
indirect intervention or by an outright coup d’état. The fact is that there is hardly a democ-
racy in the world which is more secure. If the Israel democracy faced any danger at all, it 
would be from perverted civilians and not from a misguided soldiery. Israel’s troops – civil-
ians temporarily in uniform and subject to military discipline – are as varied in their ideas 
and political allegiances as all other civilians. […] The falsity of the analogy with Israel of 
the two historical examples – the Crusades and Sparta, is easily exposed. The idea of the 
army’s influencing the political life of Israel is purely fanciful. […] As a nation, we tend to 
be extreme individualists, and we suffer from a chronic multiplicity of political views and 
parties. Army service educates us to a discipline which is foreign to our character and our 
experience.37
37 Peres 1970: 255.
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With this statement, a man of the establishment explicitly propagates the com-
patibility of militarism and democracy, thus decidedly dismissing the possibility 
of a military coup. In keeping with the maxim of the “nation in arms,” the notion 
of the indispensability of the military and the view of Israeli society as pluralist 
and democratic, Peres’ confidence in the stability of Israeli democracy appears 
unshakeable. He fails to recognize any contradiction between the emergency-like 
situation in Israel and the aspiration to a pluralistically oriented, free society. But 
is Israel really so immune against a military coup?
Scholarship has attempted to explain the relationship between military and 
politics in two ways. A first approach, the paradigm of the interconnectedness of 
the civil and military spheres, assumes a fundamental dichotomy between these 
two areas. Consequently, military coups are interpreted as a result of some kind 
of “malfunction” within the political-civilian system or the various mechanisms 
of civic control of the military.38 
Traditional Israeli sociology generally draws on this paradigm to describe 
the specific situation in Israel. In this, it follows the American sociologist Morris 
Janowitz (1919–1988) who sees the “civilianization of the military” and the elimi-
nation of the strict separation between the two areas as a safeguard against coup 
attempts.39 The Israeli sociologists Dan Horowitz (1928–1991) and Moshe Lissak 
(1928–) argue that Israel resembles ancient Athens rather than Sparta, being as 
a balance between a partially militarized society and civilianized army charac-
terized it. Because the army is strongly involved in matters that are originally 
non-military, such as nation-forming and modernization processes, a “reversal 
of roles” has occurred between the Israeli army and the civilian entities.40 Due to 
the widely internalized paradigm of the dichotomy of military and politics, and 
because of a principally apolitical conception of the military, a military coup is 
deemed unlikely by Israeli political science and historical research. To the con-
trary, the Israeli army is thought to be averse to political and civil tasks.41
A second line of research describes the relationship of military and politics by 
referring to the model of a “nation in arms.”42 In contrast to the paradigm of the 
dichotomy of military and politics, this approach stresses the close connections 
and common features of both spheres. The national state as an organizational 
principle and dominant basic structure requiring a high degree of political par-
38 Edmonds 1999.
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ticipation is the precondition for enabling the masses to war or mobilizing them 
for other national goals. In this sense, the state armies are mass organizations.43 
The model of a “nation in arms” focuses on a centralistically ruled state, and is 
committed to an understanding of national statehood that originates in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Along these lines, Israeli sociologist Uri Ben-Eliezer (1951–) identifies four 
characteristics of the “nation in arms”: Firstly, the existence of a state army; sec-
ondly, a close cooperation between military and political elites based on a com-
monly shared ideology; thirdly, obscure boundaries between the two spheres; 
and fourthly, the self-image of the national army as apolitical and non-partisan, 
representing the values of the nation. Ben-Eliezer’s conclusion is that Israel is 
indeed a nation in arms. Ben-Gurion popularized the maxim of Mamlachtijut 
(“statehood”) which resulted in a professional mass army, legally anchored by 
the Military Service Act that was enacted in 1949.44 
But which of these models matches the Israeli understanding of politics and 
military: the concept of a state with a “civilianized military” or that of a “nation 
in arms”? What is the nature of the relationship between politics and military, 
and what position does security policy take regarding the rule of law in the face 
of a permanent state of war? What significance does the Middle East conflict have 
for Israeli democracy? And what kind of security-political culture is ultimately 
created in Zionist Israel? 
Let us first turn to the so-called Lavon Affair. Originally a purely security-po-
litical and military matter, it eventually escalated into a full-blown domestic and 
party political crisis. The Lavon Affair began in 1954 and the split of the ruling 
Mapai party marked its endpoint in 1965, as brought about by its leader of many 
years, the state founder David Ben-Gurion. 
Similar to the Lavon Affair, the second conflict that will be examined, the Shin 
Bet Affair, starts out as a security-political, military problem, but later turns into a 
profound crisis of government and the rule of law. The main point of dispute was 
the democratic principle of the division of powers. In how far should the execu-
tive – that is, the government and the state security apparatus – be amenable to 
the law? The Shin Bet Affair dragged on for two years, from 1984 to 1986, during 
which time Shimon Peres held the office of prime minister.
43 Vagts 1959.
44 Ben-Eliezer 1998A: 318–320.
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The Lavon Affair 1954–1964
The background to the Lavon Affair is the July 1954 military operation undertaken 
in Egypt by Unit 131 of the Information Department of the IDF Aman. Its goal was 
to undermine the relations between the USA, Great Britain and Egypt. The opera-
tion was carried out by the military without the authorization of Israel’s political 
leadership. Only after the arrest of the involved Unit 131 members by Egyptian 
police did Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett (1894–1965), Min-
ister of Defense Pinchas Lavon (1904–1976) and the rest of the Israeli government 
learn about the scale of the operation, which would soon be referred to in Israel 
by the code name Esek Bish, meaning “bad business” in Hebrew. 
In early 1953, the newly elected American government under Republican 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower exerted pressure on Great Britain to pull out of 
its military bases in the Suez Zone. Israel followed the British-Egyptian negotia-
tions with concern because the matter was also related to the handover of British 
arms depots and military facilities to Egypt. It was speculated in some military 
and political circles that an act of violence directed against the Brits in Egypt 
would suspend the negotiations, or even thwart the pullout plans.45 
And thus Unit 131 was activated. In May 1954, the head of Aman, Benjamin 
Gibli (1919–2008), sent the commander of the unit to Paris where he met up with 
contact man Avri Elad (1925–1993) and gave him instructions for the activation of 
the sabotage unit in Egypt. The operation began on July 2, 1954, with small fire 
bombs that were deposited in different mail boxes in Alexandria. Two days later, 
rather harmless explosive charges were set off in American cultural centers in 
Cairo and Alexandria. On July 23, the Egypt’s Revolution Day, Philip Natanson 
(1933–2004), a member of the unit, set out to place explosive charges in various 
cinemas in Cairo and Alexandria and in the Alexandria railroad yard; but one 
charge exploded prematurely in his pocket, leading to his arrest. 
In the very same night the Egyptian security police arrested the other 
members of the unit, most of whom were Egyptians of Jewish faith. The court pro-
ceedings against them began on December 11, 1954 in Cairo. One member com-
mitted suicide in prison and two were sentenced to death and duly executed in 
late January 1955. The other agents received prison sentences.46
The “bad business” of 1954–1955 became a state affair the moment high-rank-
ing officers of the army, the Chief of General Staff among them, intentionally – 
and for some time also successfully – covered up the incident. The secret inves-
45 Kafkafi 1998: 235–236; Eldar 1990.
46 Black and Morris 1994: 177, 180.
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tigative commission that was appointed in early 1955 by Sharett in consultation 
with Lavon was not a juridical or parliamentary committee because Israel did not 
officially admit to the operation in Egypt. A “two-man commission” made up of 
the President of the Supreme Court Yitzhak Olshen (1895–1983) and the ex-Chief 
of General Staff Yaacov Dori (1899–1973) was appointed to investigate the ques-
tion as to who was responsible for the operation. 
Initially it looked like the military would be able to dodge accountability 
because the evidence led the “two-man commission” to the conclusion that it 
was impossible to determine who was accountable for the order. What is more, 
Minister of Defense Lavon resigned as a consequence of this finding, even though 
his responsibility for the “bad business” could not be established and his involve-
ment in the matter seemed unlikely given the conditions in the security establish-
ment. 
It says a lot that the events surrounding this failed military operation in 
Egypt of mid-1954 and its aftermath lasting well into 1965 were generally referred 
to as “The Affair”; such was the significance of the Lavon Affair’s long-term and 
far-reaching consequences. Since all this took place during Israel’s formative 
years, the affair had a considerable impact on the political culture of the new 
state. It is a powerful example of the relationship between politics and military in 
a state in which the army was progressively gaining in significance. 
This complex and multi-faceted story has all the ingredients of a full-fledged 
state affair, including the deception of a prime minister and minister of defense 
by the military as it executed a military plot in a neighboring state without any 
political authorization, intrigues in the highest echelons of the security organs, 
forgery of documents, cover-up of mistakes and false testimonies given to the 
investigation committee, as well as conspiracy against a minister and betrayal of 
one’s own people. 
In its second phase, the affair developed into a party-political matter. As 
details about the first phase became known to the affected individuals, the 
struggle to expose the entanglements of 1954 lead to an intense personal dispute 
within the Mapai party between David Ben-Gurion and Pinchas Lavon, who 
was dismissed as Minister of Defense in 1955 as a result of the occurrences of 
1954. This dispute was a continuation of the political power struggle which had 
already been seething between the two camps of the ruling Mapai; namely the 
“Old Guard” and the “Ben-Gurion Boys,” which included Ben-Gurion’s protégés 
Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan (1915–1981). From the time of the failed military 
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operation in July 1954 right up to the split of the Mapai party in 1965, the affair 
repeatedly boiled up and became the subject of numerous publications.47
The Security Establishment of the First Years
When David Ben-Gurion resigned as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in 
late 1953, he appointed Pinchas Lavon as Minister of Defense and Moshe Dayan 
as Chief of General Staff. New Prime Minister Moshe Sharett met this with some 
reservation. Meanwhile, Shimon Peres was given the post of Director-General in 
the Ministry of Defense. With these three changes of staff in the field of defense, 
Sharett’s attempt to push through a moderate course with respect to security 
policy was considerably complicated. 
As secret exploratory talks were held with Egypt in the course of the year 
1954, not only Dayan and Peres but also Minister of Defense Lavon took a critical 
attitude towards the new prime minister because of the latter’s allegedly “weak 
stance.” They had doubts when it came to Sharett’s political authority since he was 
maneuvering between different positions regarding retaliation policy. Despite a 
supposedly shared ideology, a power struggle concerning security-political ques-
tions soon ensued among the three new heads in the Ministry of Defense. 
Tensions developed in the course of time between Peres and Dayan about the 
respective areas of competence of ministry and army, but they soon identified a 
common enemy. The times when Peres and Dayan could enjoy generous freedom 
of action in ministry and army under the aegis of Ben-Gurion – not least thanks 
to the latter’s double responsibility as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense – 
were a thing of the past. As Lavon intensively immersed himself in ministerial 
issues, his two subordinates found it difficult to get used to his methods which 
were meant to exhibit accountability and transparency towards the political elite. 
They also found it hard to accept his authority. 
For Peres, it meant a restriction of the freedom of action he had enjoyed as 
Vice Director-General (1952–1953) under Ben-Gurion. Differences of opinion in 
ministry matters, such as the purchase of weapons or the structure of the army, 
were growing between Lavon and Peres. And so Peres, together with Dayan, often 
chose to consult with the former Minister of Defense Ben-Gurion about ministe-
rial issues. According to Lavon’s biographer Eyal Kafkafi (1941–2002), Ben-Gu-
rion de facto continued to rule during his “hiatus” in the south Israeli kibbutz 
47 Hasin and Horowitz 1961; Arieli 1965; Harel 1979/1982; Eshed 1963/1979; Teveth 1994/1996; 
Kafkafi 1998; Shahar 1989; Kafkafi 1998; Uri Avneri 1975; Elgazi 1997; Arye Avneri 2004.
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of Sde-Boker by proxy through his two protégés, whereby he effectively circum-
vented Sharett. This constellation is habitually referred to as the “Sde-Boker gov-
ernment”48, and the question arises as to how far this government was involved 
in the conception of the sabotage operations in Egypt.
Dayan’s actions in the wake of the undercover maneuvering, including the 
cover-up strategy before the “two-man commission,” were aimed at denying any 
responsibility whatsoever for his failure as Chief of General Staff. Dayan left it up 
to the head of Aman, Benjamin Gibli, as to whether he would assume responsi-
bility for the military operation himself or “transfer” it to the minister of defense. 
Secretly, Dayan pursued the second option, without seriously examining the 
state of affairs. Therefore he bound himself, as it were, to aligning with Gibli’s 
side, even as signs were subsequently adding up that Gibli’s version rested on 
shaky ground.49 
Soon Peres ranged himself with Dayan. For him, the mentioned conflicts con-
cerning the area of competence in the Ministry of Defense were in themselves an 
obvious and sufficient motif to testify against Lavon before the “two-man com-
mission.” But there were also fundamental differences of opinion about the role 
of military in a democratic society coupled to this personal power struggle. The 
Director-General of the Ministry of Defense was skeptical of Lavon’s suggestions 
for the reorganization of the ministry. 
These comprised the following items: Clear delimitations of the supervision 
areas of minister, chief of staff and director-general, so that the range of compe-
tence of the three positions would be unambiguously defined; the formation of 
a defense council comprised of representatives from the civilian as well as the 
military sphere; the introduction of the office of vice minister of defense (under 
Ben-Gurion this office did not exist, which provided the precondition for Peres’ 
position of power); subordination of the army spokesperson under the minister 
of defense rather than the chief of general staff; and the regulation of all matters 
concerning military purchasing being under one roof.50
All these measures were aimed at politically controlling the military. In fact, 
Peres should have found little fault with this concept as a high-ranking civil 
servant in the Ministry of Defense. But then, these plans would have meant the 
curtailment of his political elbow room, since now he would not only have to 
accept an independent minister but also a vice minister as his superior. What is 
more, Lavon’s intention to submit the military to political authority represented a 
48 Kafkafi 1998: 197–199.
49 Arieli 1965: 46, 55.
50 Ibid. 113; Kafkafi 1998: 280–281.
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rival concept to Peres’ idea of the Ministry of Defense being a “closed structure of 
a separated security empire.”51 
Peres’ notion was perfectly aligned to Ben-Gurion’s understanding of the 
tasks and work methods of the minister of defense, in which the political level 
determines general guidelines but leaves the actual implementation up to the 
military or the “security experts.” As a consequence, the security establishment 
developed into a closed-off kingdom that enjoyed such a high degree of authority 
and autonomy that the political institutions – Knesset, government and judicial 
power – had little way of supervising it; a situation that was already noted in 1961 
by Israeli journalists Eliyahu Hasin (1927–2008) and Dan Horowitz.52
The further course of the affair suggests that Peres’ rivalry with Lavon was 
of a personal, power-political nature. His idea to help bring Ben-Gurion back 
into power in 1955 in order to improve his own political career prospects became 
increasingly obvious. As the Israeli historian Yehoshua Arieli (1916–2002) sug-
gests, it was already at this point that Peres and Dayan saw their future in politics 
coupled to Ben-Gurion’s political power. Lavon’s disempowerment along with 
an unstable government under Sharett would propel them closer towards their 
goal.53 
As the affair continued to unfold through late 1960 and early 1961, Ben-Gurion 
and his Boys in the Mapai party kept antagonizing Lavon until they succeeded 
once more in bringing about his dismissal from his post as secretary general in 
the trade union confederation Histadrut. Hasin and Horowitz see the reason for 
this campaign in the fact that Lavon was still fighting for his rehabilitation in the 
Lavon Affair, the clarification of which might have endangered the Boys’ not yet 
secured political power position within the Mapai.54 
As it were, the Lavon Affair was reignited in 1960 because of a series of events 
gradually bringing the truth to light. Bit by bit, Lavon learned about the 1955 
conspiracy against him, but had little solid proof. In 1957, however, he got more 
evidence following the arrest of the Aman officer Avri Elad. The secret lawsuit 
against Elad, who turned out to be a double agent, is surrounded by rumors 
regarding his contribution to false testimonies made by officers before the “two-
man commission,” also concerning Lavon’s role in the affair. Lavon turned to the 
head of government and party leader demanding elucidation, and henceforth his 
rehabilitation. Ben-Gurion commissioned his military secretary Chaim Ben-David 
51 Arieli 1965: 114; Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 214–215.
52 Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 214–215.
53 Arieli 1965: 24.
54 Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 219.
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(1919–1967) to investigate the matter based on the existing evidence, including 
the body of evidence Lavon had compiled over the years. 
By mid-June 1960, Ben-David concluded his investigation with the suspicion 
that documents had been forged or made to disappear.55 In late August 1960, 
Ben-Gurion appointed another investigative commission, this time headed by 
Justice of the Supreme Court Chaim Cohn (1911–2002). The findings corroborated 
the results of the previous investigation. Moreover, they confirmed the suspi-
cions regarding the destruction of documents, false testimonies and coercion 
of witnesses before the “two-man commission.” Based on these results, Lavon 
demanded his political rehabilitation from Ben-Gurion but was refused. The situ-
ation spun out of control and the details became known to the public.56
From this point on the affair increasingly turned into a duel between Lavon 
and Ben-Gurion, or the “Old Guard” and the “Boys,” both of who were members 
of the Mapai party. Much to Ben-Gurion’s dismay, Lavon appealed to the Knesset’s 
Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. But his statement before this commit-
tee on October 17, 1960 turned out to be his own downfall. Lavon reported on 
the intolerable state of affairs in the security establishment of 1954, which up 
until that point had only been known within a small circle. For example, he drew 
attention to a budget meeting of the Ministry of Defense that had been held by 
Ben-Gurion during Lavon’s term of office and in his absence, by which the par-
liament’s power of the purse was bypassed.57 Ben-Gurion reacted with outrage 
and condemned Lavon’s statement as “an intrusion into his empire,” and a direct 
attack on the military: “The officers […] must not be convicted before their guilt 
has been proven. This falls under the authority of the court of law alone.”58 
Faced with the imminent escalation of the affair into an outright crisis, the 
Mapai leadership sought to withdraw responsibility for uncovering the events 
from the Knesset Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. A commission of min-
isters consisting of seven ministers from different parties was appointed as the 
investigation committee.59 Hired by the commission, State Prosecutor Gideon 
Hausner (1915–1990) uncovered another piece of evidence. The then Aman sec-
retary Dalia Carmel-Goldstein testified that a letter dated July 19, 1954, in which 




58 Quoted from Arieli 1965: 155–156.
59 According to Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 144, the investigation had been comprehensive and 
intensive.
60 Segev 1989.
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findings, on December 25, 1960 the “seven-man commission” arrived at the con-
clusion that Lavon neither gave the order for the operation in Egypt nor did he 
have any knowledge of it.61
But Ben-Gurion refused to accept this verdict as well. Quite the reverse, in 
that same cabinet meeting of December 25, 1960 he gave a speech that has been 
figuratively called the “raised hatchet” by Hasin and Horowitz.62 He accused 
Lavon of “dangerously hawkish” tendencies, which cannot be reconciled with 
“the honor of the military.” He maintained that high-ranking officers of the Israeli 
army could hardly have come up with a plan like the sabotage operation in Egypt 
all by themselves. Thus, Ben-Gurion refused to accept the conclusions reached 
by investigative committees he himself had appointed. And so Pandora’s box 
remained open as the Boys kept opposing Lavon’s rehabilitation contrary to the 
decision of the commission of ministers by which Lavon was exonerated, and 
also against public opinion.
But Lavon found well-known spokesmen for his rehabilitation among Jeru-
salem intellectuals who, when faced with Ben-Gurion’s conduct, assembled on 
January 11, 1961, to express their concern regarding the democratic values of 
Israel in a petition. They pointed out the following aspects as particularly con-
cerning: Firstly, Ben-Gurion’s demand to retract the decision of a government 
commission; secondly, the insistence on Lavon’s dismissal despite his exoner-
ation – as should this claim be complied with the credibility of the rule of law 
would be seriously damaged; thirdly, the argument brought forward by Ben-Guri-
on’s Boys that the country depended on the leadership of a single person, which 
is irreconcilable with democratic principles; and fourthly, the endangerment of 
democracy not only through words, but also by the methods of the Boys. Further, 
these Jerusalem intellectuals criticized the opinion of the Boys that the credibility 
of the military is based on its sacrosanctity, on “the honor of the military.” They 
regarded such a thought as alien to democracy.63 
All this public and intra-party pressure notwithstanding, Ben-Gurion and his 
Boys not only succeeded in forcing the Mapai party to dismiss Lavon from his 
Histadrut post, but also in having his name removed from the party list for the 
Knesset election. These had been Ben-Gurion’s conditions if he was not to resign 
from his offices.64 By early 1961, the anticipated final line under the affair was still 
61 Arieli 1965: 148–149; Kafkafi 1998: 386; Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 150.
62 Hasin and Horowitz 1961: 156.
63 Ibid. 174–175.
64 Kafkafi 1998: 398.
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not drawn; just as reconciliation within the internally divided government party 
had still not been reached.65 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense was busy preparing the official version of 
the affair. In October 1962, the journalist of the union newspaper Davar, Chagei 
Eshed (1928–1988), was commissioned to investigate the affair.66 Apparently it was 
not enough for Ben-Gurion and his Boys to get their way, they also wanted to be in 
the right. In early 1964, Ben-Gurion, who had by then left his offices, judged that 
Lavon “had sole responsibility for the affair” based on Eshed’s conclusions.67 He 
demanded that the inquiry into the events be reopened within the framework of 
a “juridical investigation” based on the claim that a commission of ministers was 
unlawful. But the government under Levi Eshkol (1895–1969) declined Ben-Gu-
rion’s request. At a party congress on November 11, 1964, Ben-Gurion repeatedly 
expressed his opinion of Lavon, yet his words were aimed mainly against his suc-
cessor Levi Eshkol and his government.
Now that Lavon was banned from politics once and for all, Ben-Gurion 
attempted to remove the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Levi Eshkol. 
Dayan and Peres, who both held ministerial offices in the Eshkol government, 
supported him in the endeavor. This time, however, Ben-Gurion failed to reach 
his goal. Instead, on December 14, 1964, Eshkol handed in his notice of resig-
nation to the president of the state. On the following day he was elected by the 
Central Committee of the Mapai party as their candidate for the office of prime 
minister.
Eshkol also managed to assert himself within the party concerning the ques-
tion of the “juridical investigative commission” repeatedly demanded by Ben-Gu-
rion. Thus, the prime minister closed the Lavon Affair with the conclusion of the 
“seven-man commission,” in other words, with Lavon’s exoneration. Faced with 
defeat, Ben-Gurion deserted his own party. During a meeting of his party sup-
porters in June 1965 he declared the necessity of “purges” within the party due to 
“insecurity and deception” as well as “distortion of judgment.” In late June 1965, 
he founded a new party named Rafi, Israel’s Labor List, and forced his protégés 
Peres and Dayan to follow him into the opposition.
65 Arieli 1965: 149–150; Teveth 1996: 268.
66 Kafkafi 1998: 401.
67 Eshed 1963/1979.
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The Lavon Affair as a Battle between Generations
The sociologist Baruch Kimmerling interprets the Lavon Affair as a power-polit-
ical struggle between two generations who respectively established their power 
bases in different state institutions. The so-called “Old Guard” – comprised of the 
second generation of the Mapai party – exerted influence via the party and the 
strong union organization Histadrut. Among the people belonging to this group 
were Lavon, Eshkol, Sharett and Golda Meir (1898–1978); all in their sixties. In 
contrast, the younger generation that was supported by Ben-Gurion was in the 
fourth decade of their lives. This group of politicians saw the security department 
as the main pillar of state leadership, and consequently sought to reinforce it as 
their power base.68 For them, the 1965 split from the Mapai mother party and 
the loss of power that accompanied it marked only a temporary power-political 
defeat.
The “necessity of war” and the resulting increased significance of security 
soon helped the Boys regain state leadership. Dayan and Peres returned to the 
Ministry of Defense. In the course of the crisis of May/June 1967, on the eve of the 
Six-Day War, Ben-Gurion’s new party Rafi formed part of the government in the 
grand coalition. Dayan became minister of defense in Eshkol’s stead. This change 
facilitated the decision to enter into the military conflict of the June War. In 1974, 
in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the domestic political crisis that 
followed because of the high number of dead and injured Israelis, Peres took over 
the Defense Department from Dayan, holding this office until the Labor Party’s 
electoral defeat and changeover of power in 1977. 
The Mapai party had already been dissolved in 1968 and unified with the 
labor parties Achdut Haavoda and Rafi, and later also the Marxist Mapam party, 
to form the Israeli Labor Party. Thus, the “Old Guard” was already considerably 
weakened by 1974, when the Golda Meir government fell as a consequence of the 
Yom Kippur War debacle. In 1977, the Labor Party lost its state leadership for the 
first time, and the Likud party, led by Menachem Begin, came to power. After 
seven years in the opposition, the Labor Party returned to government responsi-
bility in 1984, this time with Peres as party leader and prime minister, in a grand 
coalition with the Likud. Shortly after his assumption of office, Prime Minister 
Peres was forced to deal with a string of serious security-political matters that 
dominated the political agenda and increasingly thrust Israeli democracy, includ-
ing its concept of an open society, into a quandary.
68 Kimmerling 1993: 346.
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The Shin Bet Affair of 1984–1986
Two decades after the end of the Lavon Affair, the special significance of the mil-
itary-territorial security had long been cemented into the political culture of the 
country. Still in a state of war, Israel had to come to grips with the conflicting pri-
orities of “security” (understood as national-state existence) and the rule of law 
as an imperative feature of democracy. A number of affairs dominated the politi-
cal agenda. This time, the illegal methods of the internal security service Shin Bet 
as well as the foreign intelligence agency Mossad were the focus of the debate. 
It all began in April 1987, when details of the Nafsu Affair surfaced. In short, 
the Shin Bet had tortured Izzat Nafsu (1955–), a lieutenant in the Israeli army, 
and accused him of treason and espionage. By the time the public finally gained 
knowledge of it, the Circassian lieutenant had already served seven years of an 
eighteen-year prison sentence. In reaction to these events, the so-called Landau 
Commission took on the task of examining Shin Bet investigation methods in 
cases of “hostile terrorist activities,” also with the goal of developing recommen-
dations for the future.69
The second scandal, the Pollard Affair of November 1985, revolved around 
John Pollard (1954–), an American of Jewish faith and a convinced Zionist, who 
had worked for the US Navy and the “Anti-Terrorist Alert Center” (ATAC). He had 
offered Israel his services as a spy and provided the Mossad with vast amounts 
of valuable secret documents from the beginning of 1985 up until the time of 
his arrest.70 The Mossad also had a hand in the Iran Gate Affair, which became 
known in late 1986. As it was uncovered the secret arms deals between the USA 
and Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini came to light. And then there was the 1986 
Vanunu Affair, which led to the unraveling of the Israeli “policy of ambiguity” 
with regard to its nuclear capacity.71 
The many scandals of the 1980s offer deep insights into the political culture 
of Israel as they disclose the characteristic structures of the “Israeli order.” The 
Shin Bet Affair serves to illustrate this in an especially poignant manner, because 
it shows what happens when there are people who are not willing to play by the 
specific rules of the Israeli order. The term “Israeli order” refers to the relationship 
between the respective state institutions and the associated historically grown 
political culture that is committed to the Israeli reason of state. The term also 
covers the habitus of the political and military elites with regard to the Zionist 
69 Black and Morris 1994: 591–595.
70 Ibid. 601–614.
71 Cf. pages 121–127 of this book.
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project of the “Judaization” of the country and the closely related task of state 
security. Another facet of the Israeli order is the democratic and constitutional 
conception of the state, meaning its respective institutions and laws. The Shin 
Bet Affair provides a glimpse into the conflicting priorities of law and security 
within a security-political order dominated by war, fear and loss of control in a 
time when the war that had started on the northern front in 1982 had become the 
“Lebanon quagmire.”
Similar to the Lavon Affair, the Shin Bet Affair was about the illegal conduct 
of the leadership within a security authority, in this case Avraham Shalom (1928–
2014), who, in an attempt to cover up his own responsibility undermined the work 
of state investigative commissions. Innocent people were held accountable while 
the real culprits seemed to be able to dodge responsibility. Despite the attempts 
to sweep the matter under the rug, it unleashed political discussions and finally 
led to inquiries by prosecuting authorities.
The conflict between politics and law that unfolded in the course of the Shin 
Bet Affair had a far-reaching and profound impact. In contrast to the Lavon Affair, 
the focus in this scandal was not on the ruling party or the government. Rather 
it was on the quarrels between the executive represented by the protagonists of 
security politics and the secret service Shin Bet on the one side, and the judicial 
power, particularly the prosecuting authorities, on the other. In this affair, law 
fought against politics. And by Israeli standards the success it managed to score 
is not to be underestimated.
The Shin Bet Affair is the subject of numerous publications.72 Especially 
worth mentioning in this context is the “Maariv Special Report – Shin Bet Affair” 
published in the daily newspaper Maariv on July 18, 1986. It elaborates on various 
issues of the operational, political, legal and medial level, and also discusses 
aspects of the political culture. Explosive details about the affair were also dis-
closed by the journalist Nahum Barnea (1944–) in his article “The Shin Bet Way” 
(June 4, 1986) written for the newspaper Koteret Rashit, and later in “We Were at 
War” (June 25, 2004) for Yedioth Ahronoth. 
72 Barnea 1984; Baron 1986; Ben-Porat 1986; Azoulay-Katz 1986; Oz 1986; Zertal 1986; Rosental 
1997; Bar-Josef 1997. In their work Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services, 
Ian Black and Benny Morris provide a concise overview of the events. The Israeli political scien-
tist Michael Keren also includes the Shin Bet Affair as he tries to analyze Peres’ legislative term 
from 1984 to 1986 from a political-science angle. In his book Professionals Against Populism, 
The Peres’ Government and Democracy, Keren points out Peres’ dilemma and explains his view 
of things in the chapter “Law and Democracy.” In his biography, Bar-Zohar also devotes several 
pages to Peres’ conduct in the course of the affair. A detailed but still pointed description is pro-
vided by Yechiel Gutman in his 1995 book A Storm in the G.S.S.
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The Shin Bet Affair became publicly known on May 24, 1986, but had actually 
begun two years earlier with an assault on a group of Israelis. On the evening of 
April 12, 1984, four Palestinian teenagers from the Gaza Strip hijacked a bus on 
the 300-line, which was on its way from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon. They forced the bus 
driver to head towards Gaza instead. As they let the passengers know, their inten-
tion was to have their comrades released from Israeli prisons. A pregnant woman 
was allowed to disembark near Ashdod, at which point she alerted police.73 
Israeli security forces managed to stop the bus on the outskirts of Deir 
al-Balah, south of Gaza City. During a blitz operation by storm commandos, one 
female passenger and several members of the security force were killed. Seven 
passengers were injured. Two hijackers were shot during the rescue operation 
and the other two were overpowered. Following a brief interrogation by Brigadier 
General Yitzhak Mordechai (1944–), they were handed over to Shin Bet and exe-
cuted illegally on the orders of Shin Bet Chief Avraham Shalom who was on site. 
All this occurred in the presence of the press.74
Photo evidence showing the hijackers still alive led the army and press to ask 
questions about the course of events. Finally Minister of Defense Moshe Arens 
(1925–) initiated the elucidation of the case and appointed a secret commission 
headed by Reserve General Meir Zorea (1923–1995) to investigate the incident. As 
Arens was well aware, being the highest-ranking person present at the scene on 
the evening of the execution, he himself could be suspected of having given the 
order.
Shalom, who had been trying in vain to avert the investigation, ultimately 
persuaded Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Arens to accept his demand that 
one of his own men, Yossi Genossar (1946–2004), be included in the commission 
as a representative of Shin Bet. Shalom considered this appropriate given the ten-
sions between the army and Shin Bet. To Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir (1931–), 
however, the new member of the investigation committee seemed highly suspi-
cious. And indeed, Shalom used Genossar as a Trojan horse in the investigation 
so the truth might be kept from emerging.75 What the chief of Shin Bet ultimately 
wanted was to cover up his own responsibility for having given the command to 
kill, and in this he was successful.
The Zorea commission determined that the two Palestinian hijackers died as 
a result of skull fractures, and that unidentified members of the security force 
were guilty of this offense. The commission recommended that the Attorney 
73 Black and Morris 1994: 579–590.
74 Ibid. 579–581; Gutman 1995: 16–18.
75 Gutman 1995: 24.
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General persevere in the case, at which point Shalom put Zamir under consid-
erable pressure to terminate the all inquiries. In spite of this, on June 4, 1984, 
Zamir appointed an investigation team headed by State Attorney Yonah Blatman 
(1929–2012).76 This time Shin Bet managed to throw suspicion of having commit-
ted homicide on Brigadier General Yitzhak Mordechai, since he was the only one 
who had admitted to the Zorea Commission that he had beaten the bus hijackers 
after their arrest.
In the end, Mordechai was successfully framed as the main suspect through 
Shin Bet’s statements. On August 12, 1985, the Blatman Commission concluded 
there was no sufficient proof to charge Mordechai with having murdered the kid-
nappers. But it recommended putting him and other members of Shin Bet, as well 
as three police officers, on trial for assault and battery. On the orders of Zamir, 
Mordechai was subjected to a disciplinary procedure by the army in which he was 
acquitted on August 18, 1985 after a seven-minute hearing. Shortly after that, he 
was promoted to major general.77 The five other members of Shin Bet that were 
involved in the case were likewise acquitted of their assault and battery charges 
in a special disciplinary procedure.78 
At this point, the “Bus Line 300 Affair” would have been the end of it had 
not high-ranking Shin Bet members turned it into the Shin Bet Affair. Although 
Shalom’s deputy Reuven Hazak (1938–) had been privy to the cover-up scheme of 
the Shin Bet, with Shalom intimating to him that it had been agreed to by then 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Hazak soon discovered that Shalom had acted on 
his own initiative. Thereupon, on October 14, 1985, Hazak asked Shalom to resign. 
Two high-ranking Shin Bet representatives, Rafi Malka (1943–), head of the 
operations division, and Peleg Radai (1938–), head of the protection and secu-
rity department, joined in supporting Hazak. They were of the opinion “that the 
service’s tradition of honest reporting was crucial to the Shin Bet’s efficient func-
tioning both internally and externally in its relations with the Ministry of Justice 
and the courts.”79 When Shalom refused to comply with Hazak’s demand, Hazak 
turned to the new Prime Minister Shimon Peres.
Peres commented on his meeting with Hazak, who had already been 
described to him by Shalom as an “over-ambitious deputy80, on October 29, 1985: 
“He [Shalom] said that action is being taken against him from within the service. 
76 Ibid. 27.
77 Black and Morris 1994: 584.
78 Ibid. 584–585; Gutman 1995: 28–32.
79 Black and Morris 1991: 405.
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Naturally the leader has to be protected. […] The leader is constantly facing con-
spiracies. […] Three people within the organization have attempted to proceed 
against him. I cannot tolerate such conduct in such an organization.”81 Peres 
interpreted Hazak’s accusations against Shalom as a “coup attempt” within the 
Shin Bet, even though he had been informed by Shalom that Hazak was prepared 
to accept the possibility of having to resign.82 Peres’ coup hypothesis is also 
untenable for the reason that Hazak would have acceded to Shalom’s post in only 
a matter of months had he not made the issue known to outside circles.
The Maariv journalist Avi Betelheim notes that the meeting with Hazak made 
Peres very apprehensive for the secret service that he had politically supported 
for over a decade. For patriotic reasons, Peres preferred “to extinguish the fire 
as quickly as possible” instead of getting to the bottom of the issue.83 A few days 
after their first discussion, Peres let Hazak know:
I have pondered the matter. I have no judicial authority […]. After the various judicial pro-
ceedings that have already been undertaken, I have arrived at the conclusion that I will 
believe the leader. Because you [Shalom and Hazak] are at strife, and such a situation won’t 
work in an organization like this one, you have to go. […] I do not convict you, of course; 
I respect your rights. But because of the conflict between the head and his deputy, and 
because I have no reason to dismiss the head, I suggest that you go on educational leave. 
The matter is herewith settled.84
The events soon sparked a fierce controversy between the Prime Minister and the 
Attorney General, escalating into a serious state affair. At the core of the dispute 
was the question as to whether Israel’s existing laws were sufficient for serving the 
special security requirements of the country, or whether there were cases that had 
to be dealt with outside of the law in a silent arrangement between the respective 
state institutions. While the Attorney General and Law Professor Yitzhak Zamir 
held up the law and saw it as sufficient for the security requirements of the state, 
Prime Minister Peres took a conspicuously uncritical stance towards the Shin Bet. 
For Peres, the secret service and all other state security apparatuses had an 
almost sacral character and were not to be touched under any circumstances. 
Whereas Zamir intended to hold the Shin Bet responsible for their alleged crimi-
nal act, Peres did everything in his power to shield them from the law. He totally 
ruled out the possibility that the secret service might have indeed acted unlaw-
81 Gutman 1995: 36.
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fully. In Zamir’s eyes, the affair was much more than a purely security-political 
matter. It was not just the murder of Palestinian prisoners in the “Bus Line 300 
Affair” that worried him, but also the conduct of the Shin Bet members towards 
the investigative commissions. For Peres, however, the highest precept remained 
to prevent any investigation into the Shin Bet Affair. This repeatedly brought him 
into conflict with the law. Initially, Peres relied on dealing with the affair inter-
nally by means of personnel decisions. In doing so, the Prime Minister unleashed 
an avalanche of events over which he almost failed to regain control.
After Hazak, Malka, too, was fired. He appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking 
to push through his own reappointment as well as Shalom’s dismissal by way of 
legal action. A little later, Radai voluntarily handed in his resignation, as he was 
no longer willing to support the policies of Shin Bet. These occurrences had not 
yet come to the public’s attention, but they did cause some anxiety within Shin 
Bet and the prosecuting authorities.85 
Finally, Hazak himself contacted the Attorney General and his staff to provide 
first-hand information about the cover-up. After secretly questioning the three 
Shin Bet dissidents for days, Zamir came to be convinced that their statements, 
according to which Shalom intentionally misled the two investigation committees 
to evade responsibility for having issued the order to kill the two captive Palestin-
ians, were indeed truthful. 
Zamir prompted Peres to dismiss the four people directly involved in the 
attempted cover-up – Shalom, Ginossar and the two legal advisors of the secret 
service – but Peres refused. He insisted on an internal settlement of the conflict, 
and suggested that the Attorney General appoint a former Shin Bet member – 
Josef Harmelin (1922–1994), the Shin Bet Chief from 1963 to 1974, and eventu-
ally Shalom’s successor from June 1986 to March 1988 – as investigator. Zamir 
declined, feeling that as a partisan of Shin Bet, Harmelin would contribute little 
to finding the truth.86 
Shortly before Zamir left office he managed to initiate further investigations 
into the affair. This move once again brought him into conflict with Prime Minister 
Peres as the latter strictly opposed any inquiries. Peres remained convinced that 
state security would be endangered by the investigations because Shin Bet, one 
of the pillars of the Israeli security systems, would be moved into the spotlight. 
He countered Zamir’s demands with stalling tactics. As commander in chief of 
Shin Bet, Peres hesitated for some weeks before responding and finally granting 
a meeting to the Shin Bet dissident. He quoted “state security” and the “welfare 
85 Gutman 1995: 40–41.
86 Ibid. 43.
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of the state” as reasons for his decision to avoid an investigation at all costs.87 He 
was downright appalled by the idea of seeing the secret service caught up in a 
police investigation as this amounted to a heresy in his eyes:
As head of state, it is my duty to protect this organization [Shin Bet] as it grapples with 
secret and complex matters and requires this protection. After all, its people – in contrast to 
other people in uniform – act in a legal gray area, which is why I must grant it the necessary 
defense […]. It is an excellent organization. I believe the Chief and defended him because 
he should not appear before the public. […] In the event of a court case, he would need the 
support of attorneys. And also previous cases would have to be discussed. Therefore, it is 
my security-political objective to leave the matter alone. […] This could do serious harm to 
the service.88
The central motive of this argumentation is the security of the state, in this case 
epitomized by an Israeli internal security service that is supposed to remain 
untouchable despite allegations being brought against it. Similar to Peres’ com-
ments on the Lavon Affair, published in 1995, the actual events are shifted into 
the background.89 Instead, Peres applies a victim discourse when talking about 
Shin Bet, portraying its strengths – its secret mode of operation and its ability to 
act within a grey zone – as weaknesses in order to justify the special protection of 
Shin Bet from the law. He is concerned that a court trial might expose question-
able methods applied by the secret service. Accordingly, his final resolution is “to 
leave the matter alone.” 
In reply to Zamir, Peres invokes that judicial procedures against Shalom 
would seriously impair the struggle against terrorism: “My duty is to fight ter-
rorism, and for this purpose I need the best man. This man is Abrum [Avraham 
Shalom], so let him do his work.” Zamir and his team were put under enormous 
pressure by this statement that a judicial inquiry would endanger “one’s own 
people” and paralyze important security-political structures.90
In April and May 1986, before the dismissal of the Attorney General on June 
1, 1986, an unprecedented contention about the status of the Israeli secret ser-
vices and their relationship to the law flared up between Zamir on the one side, 
and Peres, his closest “cabinet of ministers” (Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
and Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, 1922–1995) and the Israeli government 
on the other. Were the circumstances of the Palestinian hijackers’ deaths to be 
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assumed immunity from the law due to the national task of fighting terrorism that 
is entrusted to them? And should they accordingly be spared any investigation 
that concerns civil offenses falling under civil law, such as in the present case of 
alleged wrongful deaths?
The Attorney General initially insisted that the investigation be continued, 
but relenting in the course of the controversy and being willing to forego any 
further inquest – provided that the four Shin Bet suspects were removed from 
their offices. But they, with the support of their political allies, continued to insist 
on their immunity from being investigated or, for that matter, from suffering 
any further consequences. Zamir declared: “Things have been done for which 
someone must be held accountable, so that something like this does not happen 
again. Such cover-up maneuvers before the judicial branch must never happen 
again.”91 
But Peres remained adamant. On the occasion of a no-confidence vote against 
his government following the Shin Bet Affair, he declared before the Knesset on 
June 30, 1986: 
Rule of law means that not only the accuser but also the accused is granted rights. Each may 
defend themselves as is allowed by the law. […] I have arrived at the conclusion that there 
are weighty security-political reasons [against the investigation]. In the event of an investi-
gation I would have to allow the service to present precedents which the entire state [what 
is meant is Israeli society] wishes to see treated as secret matters. […] And because the gov-
ernment is not able to grant the defendant [the Shin-Bet] the same position as the accuser 
[attorney], a situation of inequality [before the law] to the disadvantage of the defendant 
arises. This is why I am fully convinced that fighting terrorism is essentially impossible 
without secrecy. This is by no means an attempt to use the argument of security merely as 
a pretext.92
Peres maintains that in cases such as this one the rule of law cannot be satis-
fied, because given their special tasks the accused persons are not in a situation 
where they can let themselves be defended. The government cannot allow such a 
lawsuit to happen, as this would mean that state secrets would be disclosed. For 
Peres, the work of the secret service has a special status within the law, even if 
he does not explicitly state this. He also fails to describe in any more detail what 
such special status actually involves. 
In any case he is convinced that strict secrecy is the only means of guaran-
teeing national security, which holds the highest priority in his political thinking. 
91 Gutman 1995: 48.
92 Ibid. 50.
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Consequently, the security authorities, including their methods of operation, can 
neither be subjected to the principle of rule of law nor to any universally valid 
legislation. For Peres, the secret service with its “special task of fighting terror-
ism” should be the concern of a very small circle of “security experts” within the 
executive. 
Zamir, however, who had experienced intelligence methods first hand93, took 
the view that in this case the security argument is merely a pretext, misused for 
the purpose of covering up questionable intelligence practices. He felt obliged 
to bring this matter before the court and filed a suit with the police, presenting 
evidence against Shalom and other Shin Bet members. On May 30, 1986, right 
before his dismissal and only a short time after the affair had gone public, Zamir 
presented his position to the press, the majority of which were soon on his side:
Peres said that I was put under no pressure whatsoever [to refrain from an investigation]. 
Perhaps one should ask what exactly he means by ‘pressure on the attorney.’ […] I cannot 
accept that [military] censorship prohibits the affair from being made public. […] I do not 
believe that a publication painting a comprehensive picture of the affair will endanger 
national security. It may cause certain people some embarrassment. I think it would be 
appropriate to first inform the public of the facts, so that we can have a more intelligent 
debate. I am firmly convinced that even then some would demand no action be taken 
against the people against whom such serious allegations have been made. But it is beyond 
question that essential aspects of democratic rules are being violated by withholding facts 
from the public.94
As Zamir sees it, democratic values such as the flow of information and the divi-
sion of powers are reconcilable with the Israeli primacy of security. By contrast, 
Peres perceives security policy and intelligence activities as something that 
should be dealt with exclusively behind closed doors. To him, the mere fact that 
the affair has shifted Shin Bet into the center of the public eye is already enough 
to endanger national security. In other words, Shin Bet shall not be deprived of 
its mystique. 
For this long-serving politician, one property of the Israeli order is the taken-
for-granted exclusion of society, judicial power and the Knesset from the sphere 
of security. To what extent this political culture had already been established in 
Israel by this point is illustrated by Peres’ remark, as quoted earlier: “In the event 
of an investigation I would have to allow the service to present precedents which 
the entire state wants to see as a secret matter.”
93 Gutman 1995: 50–51.
94 Haaretz, May 30, 1986.
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This presupposition made by an establishment man and bearer of hope for 
the Zionist Left, according to which there is a social consensus to remain silent 
on certain topics as well as the concurrent assumption that society is identical 
with the state, demonstrate to what extent Peres has internalized security as a 
universal task of politics. In his understanding this goal can ultimately only be 
accomplished by security organizations using their own methods of operation 
while society remains excluded. Security is thought of as the security experts’ 
field of competence, by no means an object of public debate. Against the back-
drop of this perception, it may be explained why Peres kept the Knesset, his own 
party and even his own government in the dark right up to the moment the affair 
came to light. 
From this point on, the events threatened to spin out of control. Shortly 
after, on June 1, 1986, Attorney General Zamir was ousted. But as he had already 
personally filed an indictment against the four Shin Bet suspects with the chief 
of police and instructed him to take up investigations, Zamir’s successor Josef 
Harish (1923–2013) had to deal with his predecessor’s problematic legacy.95 
Now a new proposition shifted into focus, namely that the defendants should 
be pardoned, by which the earlier process and guilty verdict would be waived. 
The person authorized to carry out such a procedure was the president of the 
state. This office was held by Chaim Herzog (1918–1997), a lawyer, former chief of 
Aman and co-founder of Rafi, and given his personal and political relationship 
with Peres, as well as his security-political ideology, he was indeed willing to con-
tribute to the “rescue of the security service and state security.” On June 25, 1986, 
Herzog went ahead with the procedure and put the pardon to a vote in a cabinet 
meeting.96 
As was to be expected, the amnesty of the Shin Bet’s suspects provoked a 
wave of criticism in the Israeli press, particularly aimed against a political lead-
ership that bent the law by using “cheap tricks.” The Israeli lawyer and journalist 
Moshe Negbi (1949–) interprets the role of the Israeli government in the Shin Bet 
Affair as “a rebellion against the constitutional state and the rule of law.”97 The 
outrage in the country reached a peak.
But ultimately even the pardon could not avert a police investigation, which 
led to all four pardoned persons resigning by the end of 1986. In August, the 
Supreme Court upheld the legal validity of the pardons, so that a government 
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in mid-September and analyzed by three high-ranking officials of the Ministry of 
Justice. At this point there was no doubt that the two Palestinian hijackers had 
been killed on Shalom’s orders. And yet Shalom maintained that he gave the 
order on the grounds of a private meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 
November 1983, in which the treatment of captured terrorists had been discussed. 
Shamir, however, told the police that although he remembered a talk taking 
place, he had not given any kind of authorization to act in the course of that 
conversation. The judicial commission neither held Shamir responsible for the 
killing of the kidnappers nor for the attempted cover-up that followed. Harish 
closed the case by the end of December 1986.98
Security, Rule of Law and the Israeli Order
The conduct exhibited by Shimon Peres in the course of this affair shows his deep 
commitment to the “Israeli order.” This order is a firmly established political 
culture centered on “security” which has taken shape with time as a result of the 
tensions between the Zionist goal of nation building and the frequently escalat-
ing Arab-Israeli conflict. The strong fixation on security has become a character-
istic attribute of the Israeli social fabric and one of its untouchable tenets. 
This development can be explained by the fact that in the eyes of many Israe-
lis national statehood is still in the process of being shaped. And having not yet 
been fully realized, it still has to be consolidated by settlements and properly 
secured in the first place. Consequently, security is the absolute, basic prerequi-
site for the existence of the national state and thus indispensable to it. In turn, 
this fixation on security sustains the Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
so that the high social significance of security is being continually fostered.
The Shin Bet affair clearly outlines the existing relationships. The prime 
minister, acting and arguing in the name of security, was able to assert himself 
against the resistance of the press and the law by drawing on the firmly estab-
lished political culture in which the public is excluded from security-political 
matters. In the various offices and functions he has held since the early 1950s, 
Peres has significantly contributed to this depoliticization of security that has 
become such a defining feature of the Israeli mindset. 
As the example of the Shin Bet Affair shows, security is understood as an ele-
mentary basis of the Israeli immigrant and settler society. Rule of law, integrity, 
morality and the “truth” take a backseat in the face of this goal. Since the fight 
98 Black and Morris 1994: 588–590.
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against terrorism and the securing of Zionist Israel are deemed so essential, even 
questionable intelligence methods of operation are considered admissible – pro-
vided they continue to be excluded as a subject matter for public debate.
Peres’ telling statement of 2000 – “In the first fifty years Israel fought for its 
physical existence, in the next fifty years it will be fighting for its moral iden-
tity.”99 – reflects his notion that democratic, constitutional and moral values 
can only be warranted to a certain extent while the process of shaping a Jewish 
national statehood is still underway. This also applies to the domestic context. 
Within this political order, not only the public and its representatives but also 
ultimately the law has to be subordinated to the primary principle of national 
security. Even if Peres did not want to right out dismiss the rule of law, like in how 
he was careful to avoid openly questioning the Attorney General’s authority, he 
still solved “the dilemma” in this affair between security and law in his own way. 
Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak (1940–2002) sees the demeanor of 
the political leadership in the Shin Bet Affair as a typical example of the firmly 
established political culture of “elite illegalism”:
[...] the Shin Bet scandal [...] shows that Israel’s political culture contains a strong dimen-
sion of elite illegalism, an instrumental orientation of the nations’ leadership toward the 
law and the idea of the rule of law. Israeli leaders, so it seems, do not appear to be antidem-
ocratic in principle, or have an alternative model of government to the democratic order. But 
their conception of democracy is limited, and their commitment to universal legal princi-
ples, recognized today as an integral part of the modern democracy, is very low. [...] Israeli 
democracy has always been very weak on the question of legalism, and [...] recent govern-
ments have not been an exception to this phenomenon. Legalism in the Western sense of 
the term never was an integral part of the democratic system established in Israel by the 
Zionist parties and their leaders.100 
In his detailed presentation of the development of the tradition of “elite illegal-
ism” since the time of the Yishuv, Sprinzak goes on to say:
The political psychology of Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin, the ministers 
involved in the Shin Bet Affair, was shaped when almost everything was permissible. They 
all grew up in Palestine of the 1940s, when it was prestigious to cheat on the British and 
to engage in ‘illegal’ settlement, ‘illegal’ defense, and ‘illegal’ immigration; […] The Zionist 
founding fathers of Israel were not vicious or corrupt. They were great idealists and daring 
dreamers. They wished to build a better society and set an example for the rest of the world. 
99 Schmidt 2000: 75.
100 Sprinzak 1993: 174–175.
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Eager to do so as fast as they could, they ignored legalistic details and procedures. All they 
wanted was political power, free of constraints, to make the dreams come true.101 
Peres’ way of presenting the Shin Bet Affair in his 1995 political memoirs reaffirms 
the notion that the existing Israeli order is inevitable for the state’s existence and 
therefore has to be kept up under all circumstances. Even a decade later, Peres 
still clings to his truth of 1986 – and not just out of self-righteousness. Although 
he is aware that the Shin Bet Affair is not exactly a glorious chapter in his political 
career, he supports the Shin Bet in his carefully constructed historical narrative 
and creates the impression that the guilt of the secret service has never been con-
clusively established.102
When called out on his “selective way of narrating” by the journalist Nahum 
Barnea, who was well acquainted with the details of the affair, Peres replied that 
“facts are a subjective matter,” whereupon Barnea commented that this is “Peres’ 
way of justifying his disgraceful role and that of his colleagues in the Shin Bet 
Affair. For Peres, political survival and one’s own interests are of greatest priority. 
[…] the rest is of secondary importance.”103 
But when it comes to this particular case, Barnea’s hypothesis that Peres’ 
actions were motivated by the goal of maintaining power falls short. There was far 
more at stake for him. Of course, the assumption that Peres refrained from polit-
ically capitalizing on the affair because he did not want to strain his image any 
further and reinforce his repute as an untrustworthy politician cannot be fully dis-
missed.104 Indeed, it would have compromised his position had he failed to observe 
the coalition agreement with Shamir because of the affair and called early elections. 
He also knew: “No one in Israel ever won votes by making an issue out of two dead 
Arab terrorists. Peres seems to be doing everything he could to bury the affair.”105
However, as far as Peres was concerned, the “two dead Arab terrorists” were 
indeed not sufficient grounds for a state affair, and so he did everything in his 
power to prevent them from turning into one. After the affair had become known 
in May 1986, he was put under massive pressure to join “the good guys,” that is, 
to advocate an investigation into the matter so as to possibly capitalize on it polit-
ically. But he ultimately stayed true to his innermost convictions that Shin Bet has 
to be protected in the interests of the Israeli order. By doing this he accepted the 
101 Sprinzak 1993: 190–191.
102 Peres 1995: 295–300.
103 Barnea, June 25, 2004.
104 Bar-Zohar 2006: 542; Keren 1996: 50.
105 Black and Morris 1991: 407.
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possibility of losing part of his authority and damaging his moral standing in the 
eyes of the public. 
Peres’ reappraisal of the events in his memoirs of 1995 further attests to his 
depoliticized understanding of the affair. Here, the seventy-two-year-old still-act-
ing politician is intent on stripping this clearly political affair of its explosive 
political nature. He insists that his actions in the years of 1985 and 1986 were 
correct, precisely because he perceives the existing political order as a matter of 
course and apodictically right, so that it must be maintained at all costs. This is 
what Peres understands to be his duty in this affair, even though he may express 
it in a more instinctive than reflective manner.106
Conclusion: Civil Militarization of Israeli Democracy
Established politician that Peres is, his contribution to what the sociologist Uri 
Ben-Eliezer has termed “state-spawned praetorianism”107 – in other words the 
government-sponsored concentration of power in the hands of the army – cannot 
be overstated. The security-political affairs discussed herein may serve as telling 
examples of how the special status of the Israeli military and security apparatuses 
is reinforced and ultimately consolidated by state and politics. It was particularly 
from his civilian political position – first as a government official in the Ministry 
of Defense, and later in an unprecedentedly long political career in central posi-
tions of power – that Peres effectively helped shape the civilian militarization 
of Israeli democracy. His was a historically as well as socio-politically important 
contribution, in the process of which the security authorities, especially the mili-
tary, were stylized as the “guardians of the nation.” 
And so, to this very day they are viewed as indispensable for the protection 
of Zionist Israel, which is seen as the only available option. A scenario where 
the military might seize power, where the “nation in arms” might rise up against 
its own government or against civil society seems unimaginable in Israel. For 
the military is still perceived as the main identity-establishing institution of the 
national state. More than any other entity, it is thought of as the agent that the 
State of Israel owes its existence to. As a result, the security apparatuses are held 
in high esteem and are still determining the security-political discourse in polit-
ical and public life.
106 Amar-Dahl 2010: 178–183.
107 Ben-Eliezer 1998: 338–339.
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In Israel, this is linked to a highly developed civil militarism, with politics 
and military closely cooperating in the political culture of the country. By and 
large the security policy represents a product of an agreement between these two 
spheres, where the heads of the security apparatus are entrusted to set the tone 
and de facto shape security policy in their function as “security experts.” 
This may serve to explain why the depoliticization of the topic of “security” is 
a central feature of Israel’s political culture. A depoliticization of security means 
the effective transfer of the power of decision on security matters from the hands 
of civil society and its political representatives into those of the security forces 
and the exclusive “security cabinet” clique. Such a depoliticization process 
amounts to nothing less than a disempowerment of civil society, since the entire 
field of internal and external security cannot really be made the subject of public 
debate. Considering its existential importance, it is deemed untouchable – and 
therefore apolitical.
Peres’ statement from the year 1970 – “If the Israel democracy faced any 
danger at all, it would be from perverted civilians and not from a misguided sol-
diery.”108 – is baffling, not least because Peres is a career politician. But as has 
been shown here, this is indeed consistent with his worldview and politics. In 
the Lavon Affair, it was the “Old Guard” of the Mapai party or individual political 
decision makers of the first decade after the state’s founding that Peres fought as 
the enemies of the security authority he considered sacrosanct. Later, in the Shin 
Bet Affair, it was the judicial power, the press, and the public. Peres’ dictum that 
“in Israel arms are not only subjected to civilian authority but quite literally lie in 
civilian [i.e., political] hands.” illustrates the perception of the Israeli order as it 
is widely held in the country. The same is true for this point of view: “The neces-
sity for defense against exterior threats corresponds to the [Israeli] will to remain 
a free and pluralist society, just as if there were no security problems. That is to 
say, the military in Israel is a consequence of the situation and not of the [Israeli] 
orientation.”109
What finds expression here is the conviction that Israeli democracy can unite 
both elements, namely the special status of the military as guardian of the newly 
formed small nation in need of protection, and at the same time the self-conception 
as a democratic, open and pluralist, but nonetheless Jewish society. The “Jewish 
democracy” which has historically emerged in Israel is indeed the product of a 
political order that corresponds to the model of a “Jewish-Israeli nation in arms.” 
And indeed war does represent an integral part of this democracy.
108 Peres 1970: 255.
109 Peres 1970: 210. (Hebr.)
4   Israel’s War Policy in the Service of Zionist Israel
From its very beginnings, the Zionist movement was highly ambivalent when it 
came to the question as to whether its adherents were allowed to use violence 
to reach their goals. In her book The Sword of the Dove, the Israeli-Zionist histo-
rian Anita Shapira puts forth the hypothesis that prior to the establishment of the 
State of Israel the policy in the Yishuv was initially characterized by a “defensive 
ethos.” As a matter of necessity and only hesitantly did it turn into an “offensive 
ethos” over time. Shapira identifies the “Arab Revolt” of 1936 to 1939, when the 
organized Arab-Palestinian community protested against the progressing Jewish 
settlement of the country, as a decisive watershed event. From that point on a 
more offensive stance developed in Zionism, culminating in the war of 1948.1 
As for Jewish nationalism in the Zionist context, Shapira makes out two dif-
ferent notions regarding the issue of violence. For a first group, it is not only inev-
itable, but even plays a positive role when Jews make recourse to violence. Jewish 
authors like Micha Josef Berdyczewski (1865–1921) and Max Nordau preached a 
“muscular Judaism” as a prerequisite to creating the “New Jew” who was to make 
nationalization possible, and by doing so would help bring “Judaism back into 
history.” 
By the same token, the physically weak exiled Jew who recoiled from any 
kind of violence was denounced as an obstacle to nationalization and thus to a 
“normalization” of Jewish life. The German-Jewish philosopher Emil L. Facken-
heim (1916–2003) and the Zionist-Israeli philosopher Eliezer Schweid (1929–) go 
so far as to interpret violence used by Jews as a form of counter-violence, given 
that the Jews are powerless and the ultimate victim of the aggression directed 
against them. This reasoning helps to shape an attitude in which violence against 
the Goyim is generally considered legitimate, however unrestrained it may be.2
The second notion, as proposed by Cultural Zionist Achad Ha’am, makes a 
plea to the Jewish people to sustain their “moral superiority” and to reject any 
kind of violence. He thinks that “true Jews” should never be ashamed of their 
physical weakness, but rather cherish it as a source of their uniqueness and moral 
superiority over the Goy. Zionism, as Achad Ha’am understands it, is decidedly 
not a project of Jewish assimilation to the non-Jewish world with regard to poli-
tics and national-state existence, but rather an endeavor to preserve the mental 
and cultural singularity of the Jewish people. His Cultural Zionism challenges the 
1 Shapira 1992; Biale 1986.
2 Fackenheim 1990/1978; Schweid 1973.
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maxim that a Jewish state has to follow particular examples and define itself by 
physical strength and power.3
Militarism in Israel
From 1948 on, the military was given a pre-eminent role in the realization of 
the Zionist project in Eretz Israel. The Jewish state was born out of war and has 
been in a permanent state of war ever since. This is true in the political, legal and 
mental sense. As for the juridical situation, Israel has been under emergency law 
since the proclamation of the state in 1948, with emergency ordinances being in 
effect from then on. In spite of this fact, traditional Israeli political and social 
sciences are unwilling to speak of an Israeli militarism.4 It is not that the question 
is not raised as to why no militarism would evolve in a country where the military 
enjoys such high prestige, is given such a central status, and also has an enor-
mous budget at its disposal. Also, Israel’s influential military-industrial complex 
controlled by the Ministry of Defense does not remain unnoticed.5 
Rather the notion that these factors might pose a danger to the democratic 
social order or that Israel might be well on its way to becoming a “modern Sparta” 
is brushed aside. It is presumed that the country’s democratic culture is just too 
firmly established, the political system too stable for any such thing to happen. 
Besides, the Israeli army is seen as a “people’s army” comprised of reservists and 
civilians, so that the formation of a closed-off military class is by no means con-
sidered likely.6
In addition, the institutional and mental separation of the army and the 
“civilian,” i.e., political, sphere is looked upon as an indication that the mili-
tary is concerned exclusively with matters of national security. It is underscored 
that members of the military, including the officers, are strongly involved in the 
national decision processes and therefore have no reason to break the democratic 
rules they themselves profit from. According to this point of view, the danger of 
militarism is neutralized.7
Other sociologists, however, explicitly address a pronounced “Israeli milita-




6 Horowitz 1977; Lissak 1984.
7 Horowitz 1977.
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esis that a political culture of the martial has gradually emerged and taken on a 
life of its own in Israel, resulting in fundamental impacts on nearly all political 
decisions. The model of a “nation in arms” provides the socio-cultural context.8
Israeli militarism, so says the Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling, has 
been developing one step at a time since the establishment of the state to become 
a shaping principle of the Israeli social order. Although he sees this militarism as 
arising mainly in reaction to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he thinks that by now it in 
and of itself has become a reason for keeping up that conflict – one that forms an 
integral part of Israeli reality and is firmly rooted in social awareness.9
Kimmerling generally distinguishes three central dimensions of militarism. 
The first dimension is the political-violent one, which develops only when a direct 
or indirect military government exercises power over an extended period of time 
– as was the case with the military regimes in Africa and South America during 
the 1970s. 
Kimmerling’s second dimension of militarism,, cultural militarism, arises 
in societies where the military plays a central role for public life and collec-
tive self-perception, with the military being an important symbol of collectivity 
and epitomizing patriotism.10 Here, Kimmerling bases himself on Alfred Vagts’ 
concept of civilian versus soldierly militarism: In civilian militarism most collec-
tive aims are defined in connection to war. Wars are considered a central part of 
collective life and are initiated by civilian leaders.11 
The third dimension of militarism identified by Kimmerling lies in the sphere 
of the cognitive; structural and cultural militarism are internalized to such a 
degree that they become a general state of mind. It is on this level that militarism, 
not being consciously reflected, unfolds with a particularly strong effect. It is 
taken for granted and no longer questioned by either the ruling or the ruled. With 
all these mechanisms in place, the collective becomes fixated upon war, both on 
the institutional (politics, military, society, economy, industry and legal system) 
as well as on the mental level. War preparations become an ongoing social state. 
The next armed encounter appears inescapable. Wars and military missions turn 
into routine.12 
This last dimension of militarism is defined by Kimmerling as “civilian mili-
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by it, with the pillars of Israeli militarism being no other than the civilian govern-
ment, the academic, legal and economic elites, and not least, Israeli society itself. 
The military does not have to stand at the center of political power to be influ-
ential. It suffices that military approaches, worldviews and mindsets are system-
atically internalized by most decision makers as well as the broad public, across 
all party affiliations and class identities. In “civilian militarism” the military is 
understood to be the warrantor of “national security,” in other words it guaran-
tees the state’s existence. And as the guarantor of existence it nearly always is 
granted priority over all other areas of life. Kimmerling sees this precept as an 
organizational principle of Israeli polity.13
A good example of this is the eulogy that Chief of General Staff Moshe Dayan 
gave at the open grave of the soldier Ro’i Rotberg on April 30, 1956. The words he 
uttered on this occasion in the formative years of Jewish national statehood have 
sunk deep into the new society’s collective memory. The Israeli historian Idith 
Zertal (1945–) draws attention to the wide circulation of this text in Israeli media: 
“It had an immediate, stunning impact. The Israeli collective, the members of 
the young Israeli elites, saw themselves as represented and defined by this text, 
which had become the voice of a generation.”14 With this in mind, it is worthwhile 
quoting the speech in its entirety:
Yesterday morning Ro’i was murdered. The quiet of a spring morning blinded him, and he 
failed to see those who lurked in wait for him behind the furrow. Let us not, today, hurl 
accusations at the killers. Why should we complain at their fierce hatred of us? For eight 
years they have been dwelling in refugee camps in Gaza, and before their very eyes we are 
turning their land and the villages where they and their forefathers dwelt into our home.
It is not from the Arabs in Gaza, but among ourselves that we should seek Ro’i’s blood. How 
could we have failed to look our fate in the eye, to see the destiny of our generation in all 
its brutality? Have we forgotten that this group of young people, living in Nahal Oz, bear 
on their shoulders the heavy gates of Gaza, gates beyond which are crowded hundreds of 
thousands of eyes and hands, praying for our weakness, so as to tear us to pieces – have 
we forgotten this? For we know that, in order for their hope of annihilating us to die away, 
it is incumbent on us – morning and night – to be armed and ready. We are the generation 
of settlement, and without the steel helmet and the cannon’s mouth we cannot plant a tree 
nor build a house. There will be no life for our children if we do not dig shelters, and without 
barbed wire fences and machine guns we cannot pave roads nor drill for water. Millions of 
Jews, who were exterminated because they had no country, are watching us from the ashes 
of Israeli history and exhorting us to settle and to build up a land for our people.
13 Ibid.130.
14 Zertal 2005: 179–180.
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But beyond the furrows of the border surges a sea of hatred and dreams of vengeance, await-
ing the day when the calm dulls our alertness, when we lend an ear to the ambassadors 
of scheming hypocrisy, who exhort us to lay down our arms. Ro’i’s blood cries out to us 
from his mangled body. For we swore a thousand times that our blood would not be spilled 
in vain and yesterday we were beguiled once more, we listened and we believed. Let us 
conduct a reckoning with our selves today. Let us not shrink from seeing the enmity, which 
attends and fills the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, who dwell around us and 
await the moment when they can spill our blood. Let us not lower our gaze lest our arm be 
weakened. This is the decree of our generation. This is our only choice – to be ready and 
armed, strong and hardy, for if the sword slips from our fists – our lives will be cut short. 
Ro’i Rothberg, the lean blond youth, who left Tel Aviv to build a home at the gates of Gaza, 
to be a wall for us all; Ro’i – the light in his heart dazzled his eyes, and he did not see the 
glint of the knife. The yearning for peace dulled his hearing, and he did not hear the sound 
of lurking murder. The gates of Gaza weighed too heavily on him and undid him.15
Kimmerling discerns seven codes of Israeli society in this text: Firstly, the State 
of Israel is a settler and immigrant state and its existence in the region is neither 
secured nor can it be taken for granted. The second code reads that the “Arabs” 
– an undifferentiated and generalized category – hate “us.” Thirdly, Kimmerling 
gathers from this text a code by which the immutability of the situation is postu-
lated. All is fate, and it is for Israeli society alone to secure its existence. Fourthly, 
this existence can only be secured “with the fist and the sword,” by which the 
necessity of war is implied. The fifth code, namely the dominance of security, 
follows from this inevitability. This in turn is, sixthly, connected to the perpetual 
mobilization of Israeli society. And, seventhly, Dayan also speaks of unavoidable 
“human sacrifices.”16
Critical voices in Israel have repeatedly put into question the constitutive 
power of these codes. Nonetheless, their defining influence in shaping the new 
society remains by and large uncontradicted to this day. Against this background 
the conflict with the Arab neighbors and the Palestinians stands as a given, 
unchangeable fact, with the negative attitude of the “new Goyim” towards the 
“Jews” being thought of as a constant that defies all historical developments.
The Arab rejection of Israel’s existence is put in the same line as the Jewish 
experience of violence in Europe. And even as it is admitted that the Arab posi-
tion is understandable given the new historic developments, the Arab-Israeli con-
flict still appears as nothing more than another version of anti-Semitism in the 
15 Zertal 2005: 180–181; text quoted from Dayan.
16 Kimmerling 1993A: 123.
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Jewish-Israeli awareness. But this also serves to dehistoricize and depoliticize the 
conflict, rendering its concrete subject matter all but irrelevant. 
Soon this notion of an “eternal” conflict solidified, and social institutions 
prepared to face a long-term confrontation. Therefore, Kimmerling speaks of a 
routinization of war, in the course of which Israeli society improved its ability 
to mobilize from one war to the next. This goes on to the point where war finally 
permeates the entire day-to-day reality, while it can still be conveniently pushed 
aside in “times of peace.” In this way, the conflict becomes a constant and con-
stitutive factor of the Israeli order and thus of Israeli awareness. The boundaries 
between politics and military are dissolved, and as a general rule politics bows to 
the military, the ultimate argument of national security. This submission in turn 
serves a particular kind of security policy that perpetuates its own monopoly by 
blurring the dividing lines between war and peace, civil society and military.17
The genesis of Israeli security policy is explained by the Israeli political sci-
entist Reuven Pedezur (1948–): In the founding years of the state between 1949 
and 1956, leading political personalities have formulated a security doctrine and 
developed a distinct security culture. In all of this, Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defense David Ben-Gurion had a key role. In his unique party-political position 
as the father of the nation, he laid the foundation for a national security policy. 
He did this by excluding the members of his party from this decision process, so 
that de facto he obtained unlimited freedom for himself and the security estab-
lishment in the shaping of security policy. 
Ben-Gurion asserted himself within the ruling Mapai party in that he sepa-
rated the complex of “security” from other “political” matters. In this way, he laid 
the tracks toward a political culture in which security was no longer the concern 
of party and government, but rather of the Ministry of Defense and the military.18 
As a consequence of this division between security and politics, a small group of 
politicians and members of the military were able to push through an “offensive 
ethos” under the protective hand of Ben-Gurion. As a proponent of the “defen-
sive ethos,” Moshe Sharett (foreign minister from 1949 to 1956, and prime min-
ister from 1953 to 1955) struggled in vain against the hardliners in the security 
establishment.19 The Israeli historian Motti Golani (1954–) thinks of the 1950s as 
a crucial period for the history of Israeli militarism. It was in the 1950s and 1960s 
17 Ibid. 131.
18 Pedezur 2003: 88–89.
19 Sheffer 1995; Amar-Dahl 2003.
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that the “offensive stance” that had emerged in the 1930s and finally taken on an 
aggressive dimension in the subsequent decade was ultimately cemented.20
Let us now investigate further the connection between the establishment of 
the Jewish state and Israel’s war policy by trying to answer the question as to 
which role the use of national-state violence plays in the realization and protec-
tion of the Zionist project, and as to what exactly the Israeli security doctrine 
entails. Why does war appear to be a permanent companion of its politics and 
history? And which social constellation facilitates the perpetual use of military 
violence? Does Zionist Israel have to be a modern Sparta to survive?
The Sinai-Suez Campaign of 1956
The Sinai-Suez Campaign is considered the climax of the so-called “little border 
wars” that were fought after the war of 1948 between Israel and its Arab neigh-
bor states, or between Israel and the Palestinian refugees21, as the Israeli leader-
ship and army opposed the attempts of the Palestinian refugees to return to their 
homes and properties in the core country of Israel. During its first years Israel 
developed defense strategies in reaction to the Palestinians’ attempts to return, 
which they referred to as “infiltration.” These tactics comprised measures such 
as the founding of Jewish settlements at the borders, the deployment of a border 
protection police, and even the expulsion or killing of the “intruders.”22 
In addition, an offensive form of military response was established: the 
policy of retaliation. This practice dates back to the 1930s, when already the 
Haganah (“defense” in Hebrew), a paramilitary Jewish organization controlled 
by the Jewish Agency, reacted to Arab raids with violence. It did not only target 
the actual perpetrators, but also their families and tribes for the purpose of deter-
ment. After the establishment of the state, the political leadership carried on with 
the retaliation policy but did not officially admit to it until 1953. The military oper-
ation in Qibya in October 1953, in which the Israeli army killed sixty-nine Pales-
tinian civilians in a Jordanian village in the West Bank, is a well-known example 




23 Ibid. 199, 203. On the cooperation of the Israeli press with the government as it rejects 
responsibility for Qibya, see Morris 2000: 175–197.
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Revenge was an important motive of this retaliation policy, but so was the 
wish to demonstrate military strength as a defensive strategy. The excessive retal-
iatory strikes served the purpose of deterring the Arab neighbor states and the 
Palestinians from attacking Israel. Another thing Ben-Gurion and his Chief of 
General Staff Moshe Dayan had in mind was to make the Arab World recognize 
Israel’s strength and therefore accept its existence in the borders of 1949.
National statehood was associated with military strength and ultimately 
made dependent on it. After all, the new state territory – seventy-eight percent of 
Palestine – still remained to be secured. Already in the 1950s, the so-called “activ-
ist stance” – in other words the tough military course – became the dominant 
approach, not least because it was deemed indispensable for the desired security. 
Very soon this activist stance came to constitute a central tenet of the Israeli secu-
rity doctrine. Moreover, the retaliation policy also had a domestic political aspect. 
According to the Israeli historian Benny Morris (1948–) it created a permanent 
state of emergency, which strengthened the ruling Mapai party. Besides, actively 
fighting was a suitable way to bind together the young society of immigrants.24
This retaliation policy of the 1950s unsettled the Arab neighbor states, 
infringed on their territorial sovereignty and made them look powerless. At a 
certain point, the ongoing Arab-Palestinian acts of violence against Israelis and 
the Israeli military attacks crossed the line into a conventional war. Having origi-
nally been directed solely against the Palestinians who were attempting to return, 
the retaliation practice led to an expansion of the conflict when it was increas-
ingly aimed at the responsible Palestinians and also more against the Arab neigh-
bor states. 
Another reason why the Israeli-Palestinian and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
blended into each other was Israel’s rejection of its responsibility for the Pales-
tinian refugees, instead shifting it onto the states that took them in, i.e., Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. The intertwining of the two conflicts had further con-
sequences. In 1955, the devastating escalation of violence at Israel’s southern 
border brought the Palestinian combat units onto the scene against Israel. 
Especially after the heavy attacks of the Israeli army in February and August 
of 1955 in the Gaza Strip, Egypt’s President Nasser deployed the “Fedayeen” 
(Arabic for “liberation units”) – who had opposed the British in 1952 and 1953 at 
the Suez Canal – against Israel. Despite their military inferiority, they inflicted 
heavy losses on the Israelis and scared the settlers on Israel’s southern border. In 
24 Morris 1996: 199, 206–208, 447; Landau 2015: 35.
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late 1956, a crackdown on the Fedayeen was announced as a war objective in the 
conflict with Egypt.25
The role of the retaliation policy in the eruptions of violence in the years 1955 
and 1956, particularly in the Suez War in October 1956, is assessed differently in 
historical research. Benny Morris regards the numerous skirmishes at the border 
and the conflicts between Israel and its neighbor states, especially Egypt and 
Jordan, in these years as an important escalation factor that ultimately led to war. 
One of the reasons brought forward by the Israeli leadership as justification for 
the first preemptive war, was the goal of eliminating Fedayeen strongholds on the 
Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli army finally succeeded in seizing the Gaza Strip and 
the Sinai Peninsula and in destroying these bases in the Sinai-Suez War.26
In contrast, the Israeli historian David Tal argues that the French-British- 
Israeli cooperation against Egypt in October 1956 was based on the Israeli-French 
alliance: In return for the military-strategic alliance with France that was still in 
the process of being carved out and was considered a matter of existential impor-
tance, Israel was expected to render a counterperformance. And that it did by 
getting involved in a risky armed encounter with Egypt, hoping to get an angle 
against Egypt at optimal conditions.27 
Tal turns against the commonly held research opinion that there is a close 
connection between the border wars and the Sinai-Suez War28, whereby the latter 
is made to look like a “self-defense encounter” as well. He thinks of the situation 
at the borders as more of a local issue, with both Israel and Egypt being averse to 
a conventional war. Accordingly, Tal rules out a direct relationship between the 
border wars and the Sinai-Suez War.29
Motti Golani assumes a loose connection between the border wars and the 
Sinai Campaign. He thinks that Israel was “in search of a war” in the years 1955 
and 1956. In stating this, Golani mainly refers to Moshe Dayan, the political chief 
of general staff of the Israeli army, who he says explicitly sought war and instru-
mentalized the retaliation and escalation policy of the 1950s for that purpose.30 
In his 1992 book about Israeli foreign policy in the years 1955 to 1957, Dayan’s 
then secretary Mordechai Bar-On (1928–) lists the following motivations for the 
war: One of the decisive aspects was the desire to defeat the Egyptian army, and 
25 Ibid. 446, 459, 372–376.
26 Ibid. 382–436.
27 Tal 2001: 1.
28 Tal is referring to Bar-On 1992; Love 1969; Oren 1992, Morris 1996.
29 Tal 2001: 2.
30 Golani 1998: viii- ix.
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by using this argument Ben-Gurion was able to get the government to consent to 
the war. Bar-On goes on to outline the security-political concept of the hardlin-
ers, namely that the demonstration of military dominance over a leading Arab 
state could create a sufficient degree of determent so that other potential enemies 
would be discouraged from taking up arms against Israel.
From that time on, determent has been a cornerstone of Israel’s concept of 
security. Military passivity is deemed a long-term danger for the existence of the 
state. Weakness equals vulnerability. In “activistic” policy, war became a “part 
of the defense strategy.” Military strength was to be demonstrated, not least in 
order to “make it clear to the enemy that by attacking Israel they put themselves 
in danger.” Bar-On is convinced that the armed encounter of 1956 considerably 
strengthened Israeli deterrence power, and thus made the quiet years at the 
southern Israeli border from 1957 to 1967 possible in the first place.31
But the doctrine of determent involved two problems. For one thing, the 
“demonstration of strength” always entails the danger of escalation, which is 
exactly what it originally tried to avoid. Even if Israel is militarily superior, a mil-
itary reaction by the other state still cannot be excluded. This can be clearly seen 
in the history of border wars, and indeed Ben-Gurion’s qualms in the run-up to 
the war decision were grounded in his fear of such a counterstrike. The term “pre-
emptive war” reflects this problem: It follows the logic that in order to prevent 
an attack from the outside, one has to start a war oneself. However – and this 
is the second problem – Israel could not yet boast clear military superiority in 
1956, which is why Ben-Gurion dared to go to war only with the support of two 
European powers. It is not by its own means that Israel achieved the 1956 military 
victory.32
Regional War in Exchange for an Alliance with France
So why did Israel enter into the Sinai-Suez War? In those years, Israel was trying 
to obtain weapons from the Western Powers. Armament and purchase of weapons 
were an important factor in the cooperation with the West up to the Sinai-Suez 
Campaign. In the early 1950s, the USA, Great Britain and France officially met 
the corresponding Israeli endeavors with some skepticism because they did not 
want to freely supply the region with weapons. Secretly, these powers founded 
31 Bar-On 1992: 378.
32 Ibid. 378–379.
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the “Near East Arms Coordinating Committee” (NEACC) to regulate the purchase 
of arms.33
As for the United States, they responded only reluctantly to Israeli attempts 
to buy weapons. US Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) was willing 
to supply Israel with weapons only for defense purposes, directly or via a third 
party, i.e., Canada, France or Great Britain.34 Moreover, he was determined to 
make the supplies dependent on Israel’s border policy and its cooperation with 
the UNTSO (“UN Truce Supervision Organization”), which was responsible for the 
observance of the ceasefire agreement, among other things.
The Egyptian-Czech arms treaty that became public on September 27, 1955, 
threw the Israeli leadership into a newly menacing situation. For Dayan, this 
supply agreement seemed to provide the occasion for the war against Egypt. He 
pressed the matter with Ben-Gurion, and the latter, though turning down the war 
option at this time, decided for an armament of the army.35
However, Israeli attempts to purchase weapons through the USA and Great 
Britain failed. Only in France, in talks with the French Prime Minister Edgar Faure 
(1908–1988), did the still Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett 
succeed in laying the foundations of the large arms deal of June 1956 that would 
ultimately be concluded under the direction of Peres.36 For it was Peres who was 
commissioned by Ben-Gurion to carry on the negotiations with France, following 
the political disempowerment of Sharett in early June 1956.
Peres had developed his expertise in the purchase of weapons during his stay 
in the USA from 1949 to 1952, at the time of the American arms embargo against 
Israel. All arms deals had to be concluded illegally and in roundabout ways.37 
Peres commented on the embargo: “The embargo of the great powers was not 
lifted. The independent, sovereign State of Israel has to buy its weapons through 
dealers, bring them to her territory by clandestine ways, and keep their very exis-
tence in utmost secrecy.”38
Peres had already tried his luck in France in early 1954, taking advantage of 
political instability in the Fourth Republic (1944–1958) to gain access to particu-
lar individuals in the military and political leadership. He gradually convinced 
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embargo.39 As Ben-Gurion’s personal confidant, Peres succeeded in taking up 
contact with the new socialist government under Guy Mollet (1905–1975), and in 
particular with Minister of Defense Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (1914–1993), the 
leader of the Parti radical. 
All this took place to the exclusion of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Bourgès-
Maunoury’s primary interest was in securing Algeria for France and crushing the 
local independence movement (“Front de Libération Nationale” FLN). Egyptian 
President Nasser was considered a supporter of the FLN, so his disempowerment 
would certainly have been in the interests of France as well. Having this common 
enemy, France and Israel now moved closer together. Already in March 1956, talks 
between representatives of the two ministries of defense took place with the goal 
of planning a joint action against Nasser. Both respective foreign ministries were 
excluded from this as well.40
The negotiations with France about the acquisition of weapons also created 
tensions between the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense. The 
two heads of these ministries, Ben-Gurion and Sharett, disagreed on core ques-
tions of security policy. Their opinions diverged especially when it came to the 
foreign-political significance of the retaliation policy, because the responsible 
people in the Ministry of Defense wanted to be able to decide independently on 
any purchasing of weapons abroad. 
In a special session on April 10, 1956, Ben-Gurion won through and trans-
ferred responsibility for the procurement of weapons from the Foreign Ministry 
to the Ministry of Defense. Peres got the green light for the unofficial acquisition 
of weapons. In the same session, he hinted at the possibility of cooperating with 
France in order to satisfy Israel’s armament needs: “The main question now is 
how to make the French believe that we are ready to act together with them. [...] 
We must take dramatic steps, to make France understand that we are ready to 
engage in far-reaching cooperation. [...] I propose finding an unconventional way 
to negotiate with the French, and make them offers that they would consider as 
real accomplishments.”41
What Peres is alluding to here in coded language is the Israeli-French cooper-
ation basis for the next months, namely an alliance in exchange for war. Foreign 
Minister Sharett would not have supported such an agreement. In fact, he most 
probably would have done everything in his power to prevent it. In order to 
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shut out from the negotiations with France and later, before the planned war, he 
had also to be deprived of power.
As early as mid-April 1956, Peres was unofficially acting in Paris against the 
Egyptian president in the interests of the Guy Mollet government. The French 
Ministry of Defense signalized to Peres that it sought to win Israel’s military coop-
eration for the fight against Nasser. Peres passed this information on to Ben-Gu-
rion on May 31, 1956. Ten days later the latter authorized negotiations with France 
about working together, which could also include armed clashes as long as 
responsibility for it would be shared with Israel.42
On June 23 and 24, 1956, an Israeli delegation under Peres met with 
high-ranking representatives of the French government in a top-secret conference 
in Vermars and concluded agreements about extensive arms supplies to Israel. 
While the French side sanctioned the entire Israeli purchase list – 200 AMX tanks 
and 72 Mystère IV fighter jets valued at eighty million US dollars43 – what was 
expected in return was a supply of intelligence concerning Egyptian support of 
the Algerian rebels, as well as the execution of secret operations against Egypt 
and other forces involved in the Algerian War.44
In the run-up to the Sinai-Suez War, Dayan and Peres were looking for argu-
ments that would provide a basis for a war against Egypt and that could also win 
over Ben-Gurion for it.45 As of late 1955, the Chief of General Staff explicitly spoke 
of a preemptive war. After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 as 
a reaction to the USA withdrawing aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam, 
Dayan once again proposed an offensive. But Ben-Gurion still objected to a war 
without any foreign support for Israel.
Thanks to Peres’ mediation, this assistance was now shifting tantalizingly 
close. Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the responsible people 
on the French side were increasingly eager to unseat Nasser. They found an ally 
in Great Britain, where Nasser’s actions were also meeting with vehement criti-
cism, and saw Israel as another convenient partner in the fight against him. It was 
France who finally took the initiative to open negotiations about a military pact 
between the three states.
In August 1956, Peres met with his French colleague Abel Thomas, Direc-
teur Général in the French Ministry of Defense, who informed him that the Brits 
42 Tal 2001: 8.
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and the French had opted for a joint military operation for the purpose of taking 
control of the Suez Canal.46 The only thing still lacking was a concrete reason for a 
French-British armed action against Nasser. Great Britain, having taken a critical 
position towards the Israeli retaliation policy, hesitated to openly team up with 
Israel. What is more, the country was bound to Jordan by a defense pact, and 
was also connected to Egypt by the so-called Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 
between France, Great Britain and Egypt.47
The solution finally came from the French side. It would later be referred to as 
the “Challe Scenario.” In talks on October 14, 1956, General Maurice Challe (1905–
1979), representative of the French chief of general staff, accompanied by Albert 
Gazier (1908–1997), representative of the Foreign Ministry, proposed to the British 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1897–1977) an attack on Egypt on the grounds that 
Israel was to engage in an armed encounter with the Egyptian army in Sinai. 
A conflict between Egypt and Israel was in turn supposed to give France and 
Great Britain a reason to seize the Suez Canal as it would be endangered by the 
clashes, so as to defend it and keep the fighting parties apart (“Operation Mus-
keteer”).48 Eden agreed in principle, and in further talks on October 16, 1956, sig-
nalized to Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau (1904–1995) that Great 
Britain would not interfere in the event of an assault on Egypt, the Tripartite Dec-
laration of May 1950 notwithstanding.49 
Ben-Gurion only reluctantly gave his consent to the Challe Scenario at the 
conference of Sèvres that took place from October 22 to 24, 1956, not least because 
it put his country in a highly precarious situation. An offensive against an Arab 
state for the purpose of paving the way for France and Great Britain would not 
only make Israel come across as the aggressor, but would also expose it to the 
danger of becoming a target itself. What Ben-Gurion had in mind was an equal 
partnership between the allies. Instead Israel was granted only a rather subordi-
nated mercenary role in the Challe Scenario. 
The Israeli delegation was keenly aware of all this. But to avoid endangering 
the freshly forged agreements concerning French arms supplies, it was cautious 
not to snub France. With this in mind, the Israeli delegation and particularly 
Ben-Gurion made sure to always refer to the “British plan” when discussing the 
Challe Scenario that was so awkward for Israel, although its true origin was very 
well known. This linguistic twist made it possible for Ben-Gurion to point to the 
46 Tal 2001: 11.
47 Shlaim 2001: 119–143, 121–122.
48 Ibid. 121.
49 Ibid. 121–122.
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risk associated for Israel in the scenario, and to oppose Great Britain’s plan that 
would have Israel leading the way all by itself in the first seventy-two hours of 
the attack until an ultimatum would be submitted to Israel by Great Britain and 
France. The Israeli Prime Minister pleaded that the Royal Air Force would destroy 
the Egyptian Air Force before the Israeli troops advanced into Sinai.50
Ultimately, an eight-point plan drafted by Dayan and finally endorsed by 
Ben-Gurion provided the basis for the cooperation. According to this plan, Israel 
itself would have the authority to decide how to initiate its attack on Sinai. In the 
second point it was stipulated that Israel was to perform military actions resem-
bling a military operation, so that the French as well as the British government 
would be able to spin it as an endangerment of the canal. Thirdly, the French and 
British air forces were to become active thirty-six hours into the attack at the latest. 
Fourthly, the French and British governments were to separately direct messages 
to Egypt and Israel a day after the Israeli attack. As for Israel, it was to receive an 
appeal rather than an ultimatum to withdraw from the Canal Zone. Fifthly, France 
was to station fighter jets in Israel to protect Israeli cities at the onset of the opera-
tion and up to the intervention by the allies, wherein the origin of the planes was 
supposed to be unrecognizable. In the last point, the date of the attack was deter-
mined to be Monday, October 29, 1956, at seven p.m. Israeli time.51
David Ben-Gurion’s Vision for a New Order in the Middle East
Eventually, Ben-Gurion’s allies had to also acknowledge Israel’s territorial claims. 
The Prime Minister had added another item to Dayan’s plan, though it did not 
get included into the protocol as it was ultimately signed in Sèvres. Ben-Gurion 
appealed to the French and British governments to take note of Israel’s territo-
rial aspirations. Here is how the Oxford professor of International Relations Avi 
Shlaim (1945–) outlines the hopes Ben-Gurion was cherishing at the time for 
cooperation between the two old European powers, which Shlaim himself calls a 
“fantastic plan”:
Jordan, he [Ben-Gurion] observed, was not viable as an independent state and should there-
fore be divided. Iraq would get the East Bank in return for a promise to settle the Palestinian 
refugees there and to make peace with Israel while the West Bank would be attached to 
Israel as a semi-autonomous region. Lebanon suffered from having a large Muslim popula-
tion which was concentrated in the south. The problem could be solved by Israel’s expan-
50 Shlaim 2001: 123–126.
51 Ibid. 130–131.
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sion up to the Litani River, thereby helping to turn Lebanon into a more compact Christian 
state. The Suez Canal area should be given an international status while the Straits of Tiran 
in the Gulf of Aqaba should come under Israeli control to ensure freedom of navigation. A 
prior condition for realizing this plan was the elimination of Nasser and the replacement 
of his regime with a pro-Western government which would also be prepared to make peace 
with Israel. Ben-Gurion argued that his plan would serve the interests of all the Western 
powers as well as those of Israel by destroying Nasser and the forces of Arab nationalism 
that he had unleashed. The Suez Canal would revert to being an international waterway. 
Britain would restore its hegemony in Iraq and Jordan and secure its access to the oil of the 
Middle East. France would consolidate its influence in the Middle East through Lebanon 
and Israel while its problems in Algeria would come to an end with the fall of Nasser. Even 
the United States might be persuaded to support the plan for it would promote stable, 
pro-Western regimes and help to check Soviet advances in the Middle East. Before rushing 
into a military campaign against Egypt, Ben-Gurion urged that they take time to consider 
the wider political possibilities. His plan might appear fantastic at first sight, he remarked, 
but it was not beyond the realm of possibility given time, British goodwill and good faith.52
Israel’s view of the Western and the Arab world is the pivotal point of this new 
geopolitical order. True to Herzl’s vision of a Jewish state also being a bridge pillar 
of the West in that region, the dominant notion was that of a natural alliance with 
the West based on allegedly common goals. The orientation towards the West 
seems indispensable for Israel’s vital interests. Meanwhile, the West itself is per-
ceived out of hand as an enemy of the Arab world. 
The direct projection of one’s own enemy image onto the Western powers is 
clearly reflected in the plan. It is based on the conviction that Western control 
over the region would also serve Israeli interests, Ben-Gurion seeing it as a means 
by which he believed he could contain the dreaded Arab nationalism. The sug-
gestion to just do away with Jordan by parceling it off in order to solve the Israe-
li-Palestinian conflict gives an idea of how little Israel was and would be willing 
to integrate into the region.
Ben-Gurion was pursuing two objectives with his scheme: Israel would 
expand and by doing so would get rid of its most bitter enemies at the same time. 
His intentions to pin Israeli interests to the interests of the West illustrates two 
things: namely the marked fear of isolation felt by the Israeli decision makers in 
the 1950s and the condescension and arrogance that the Israeli leadership exhib-
ited towards the inhabitants of the region. This way of thinking grows out of a 
bipolar worldview in which people can be divided into “good ones,” the strong 
and the civilized, and weak ones, the backward. Based on this understanding, an 
active geopolitical “restructuring” of the region does seem indeed plausible. At 
52 Ibid. 124–125.
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that time, the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 was only a few years in the past, and up 
to that point Israel had balked at any compromise on the refugee question.
In the Suez War, the Israeli decision makers were well aware they ran the risk 
of being painted as the helpmates of Western imperialism – an accusation which 
could have a direct negative impact on the recognition of Israel’s right to exist 
in the region. With this in mind, Ben-Gurion was even concerned about Israel’s 
esteem among its enemies. He wondered whether “the Arabs will ever be able 
to forgive us and our descendants that we are a bridge head of aggression and 
annihilation?”53 But as for Shimon Peres, he had no second thoughts. This can be 
gathered from his description of the last day of the conference, October 24, 1956: 
I think there was a general feeling that a supreme effort had been made, involving the fate 
of nations, and had ended with the logical conclusion. We had come together to wipe out 
evil, to nullify the aggression and stifle the further aggressive intentions of the Egyptian 
dictator. Of course, [the] decision was not easy, for life is not easy. It is not a tabula rasa but 
heaped with snares and obstacles, risks and complications. In the final analysis, however, 
when faced with a historic challenge, there is only one choice – the elementary and fun-
damental choice between good and bad, right and wrong. With us, the basic alternatives 
were to defend ourselves, even with the power of the sword, or to submit to the sword of 
the aggressor. 
The French nation had sacrificed the lives of her finest sons, not many years before, because 
she had failed to recognize in time the danger of Hitlerism. She was now of firm mind that 
a dictator had to be dealt with not after he had struck but while he was still building his 
might. Nasser revived painful memories of their recent past.54
The enemy image of a Hitler-like dictator eager for war leaves barely any room to 
consider alternatives to military action. Nasser is portrayed as unpredictable and 
dangerous but also as powerless, as someone who seems to lack the ability to 
correctly assess his own power. Nasser’s unpredictability concerning his policy 
towards Israel as well as his actual weakness renders the elimination of “evil” 
a reasonable option. And since Israel is not the only one affected by this evil, 
the international community must also be mobilized against it. Over and over, 
this argumentative pattern would resonate in Peres’ long political career during 
which he repeatedly supported Israel’s war policy.55 
53 Quoted from Bar-Zohar 2006: 199.
54 Peres 1970: 204–205.
55 Amar-Dahl 2010: 219–295.
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Of War and Nuclear Weapons
A little known fact is that Israel took advantage of the military alliance with 
France in the Sinai-Suez War of 1956 to begin developing nuclear weapons. As 
Director-General in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres played a key 
role in all of this. He is considered to be the driving power behind the endeavor to 
obtain French start-up support for the construction of a nuclear reactor. Accord-
ing to the Israeli historian Avner Cohen (1951–), a specialist in the nuclear history 
of Israel, Peres’ most important contribution to the country’s armament with 
nuclear weapons is the establishment of the connection to France. As the right 
hand of the Prime Minister and due to his position in the Ministry of Defense, 
Peres was the man who would continue to advance this strictly secret project over 
a decade.56
According to Cohen, it was three men who eventually fathered the project: 
Ernst David Bergman (1903–1975), David Ben-Gurion and Shimon Peres. Bergman, 
Ben-Gurion’s scientific advisor in nuclear matters, convinced the Prime Minister 
that Israel would be able to develop nuclear weapons. Subsequently, Peres was 
entrusted with the task of probing the international scene for Israel’s options for 
“realizing Ben-Gurion’s vision.”57
Since Israel under the leadership of Ben-Gurion considered military strength 
an important means for vouchsafing security, the possession of nuclear weapons 
appeared to be the panacea. Although Cohen himself considers the idea of a 
country as small as Israel acquiring nuclear technology for military purposes a 
“considerable brazenness,” he also submits that for a state that is “born from the 
Shoah to find itself thrown into a hostile Arab environment, it would be down-
right reckless not to do it.”58
Peres finally convinced his mentor to embark on this project, despite it being 
not only extremely costly but also difficult to push through internationally. France 
proved to be the right contact for the initial steps. The political instability of the 
Fourth Republic presented Peres with a unique opportunity, and he seized upon 
it between the summer of 1956 and autumn of 1957.59
Whether the French support for an Israeli nuclear program already consti-
tuted an integral part of the Israeli-French military alliance as it was reached at 
the conference of Sèvres remains the subject of a controversial scholarly debate. 
56 Cohen 2000: 39; Evron 1987: 14–15.
57 Cohen 2000: 37.
58 Ibid. 25.
59 Ibid. 39; Bar-Zohar 2006: 292–296.
110   4  Israel’s War Policy in the Service of Zionist Israel
Did France buy Israeli cooperation with a reactor? Is this the reason why Ben-Gu-
rion consented to the Sinai-Suez War? Cohen believes that Peres used the Israe-
li-French rapprochement of 1956 as a singular occasion to “realize the nuclear 
vision.” 
But in Cohen’s assessment, France’s assent to the reactor was not the actual 
“price” for Israel’s intervention in the Suez Crisis: “From the perspective of 
both states, this cooperation was an ‘additional incentive.’ […] Had Ben-Gurion 
declined the political and military conditions for the cooperation, the purchase 
of the reactor could not have tipped the scales.”60 In any case, Cohen asserts that 
Peres’ motivation for the cooperation with France in the Suez Crisis is directly 
connected to the armament aid offered by France, which also extended to nuclear 
weapons.61
Avi Shlaim likewise contends that the purchase of a French reactor by Israel 
was not directly linked to Israeli military cooperation with France in the Suez 
Crisis. Shlaim’s elaborations suggest that Ben-Gurion ultimately had to go to war 
because of the military alliance. Still, the acquisition of the nuclear reactor was an 
aspect related to the hopes of satisfying Israel’s territorial claims and of weaken-
ing or even ousting the Egyptian president. In his memoirs, however, Peres makes 
a statement about Sèvres that admits interpretations different from Shlaim’s:
Before the final signing, I asked Ben-Gurion for a brief adjournment, during which I met 
Mollet and Bourges-Maunoury alone. It was here that I finalized with these two leaders 
an agreement for the building of a nuclear reactor at Dimona, in southern Israel, and the 
supply of natural uranium to fuel it. I put forward a series of detailed proposals and, after 
discussion, they accepted them. Eventually, the Protocol was signed.62 (emphasis added)
Despite its significance, Shlaim leaves out this last remark.63 Unlike Avner Cohen 
and Avi Shlaim, Peres’ biographer Michael Bar-Zohar (1938–) supports the 
hypothesis that Israel’s military backing was bought with the reactor. He quotes 
a remark Peres made to a French friend about the signing of the protocol, in 
which he implied that the reactor was one of Israel’s conditions: “Should Israel’s 
request [for nuclear start-up support] not be complied with, we may reconsider 




63 Shlaim 2001: 41, 142.
64 Bar-Zohar 2006: 292.
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Peres is said to have indicated in the talks what sort of risk Israel would face 
as a result of a military operation against Egypt, such as the danger of “the surge 
of Arab hostility towards Israel” and the “associated threat to its existence.” 
Israel, said Peres, was in need of a deterrent potential that France was in a posi-
tion to provide. In the end, Peres got the French to agree to a draft agreement on 
cooperation for the construction of a reactor in Israel, as well as a French commit-
ment to provide regular uranium supplies.65 
Although this is not the place to relate the entire process of the emergence of 
Israeli nuclear power in the 1950s and early 1960s66, what is important to stress 
here is that as coordinator of the Ministry of Defense Peres played a decisive role 
in this top-secret treaty. His was a key contribution to the conference of Sèvres 
which resulted in the agreement on a “nuclear cooperation” with France that 
was ultimately concluded in late September 1957, in the last days of the Bourgès-
Maunoury government. 
Three treaties were finally signed at the end of 1957. The treaty of December 12, 
1956 provided French aid in the construction of a nuclear reactor for the purposes 
of nuclear research. In it, France committed to supply Israel with a forty – accord-
ing to other sources only twenty-five – megawatt nuclear reactor and 385 tons of 
natural uranium. 
The second agreement of August 23, 1957, negotiated amidst the greatest 
secrecy between Peres and French Prime Minister Bourgès-Maunoury, stipulated 
cooperation in the research and production of nuclear weapons.67 
The third treaty of October 1957 regulated all aspects concerning the construc-
tion of the reactor and the production of plutonium. It was only with the greatest 
effort that Peres was able to reach an agreement in the last days of the government 
under Bourgès-Maunoury. At this point in time, both Foreign Minister Pineau and 
Party Leader Mollet had reservations when it came to giving their final consent 
required to put the deal into effect. After all, this would mean nothing less than 
putting into place the entire basis for the development of nuclear weapons in 
Israel. In Bar-Zohar’s opinion, the “peaceful purposes” underscored by France 
were just lip service meant to refute any accusations by Arab states to the effect 
that France had made Israel a nuclear power.68
The pact with France paved Israel’s path to Dimona, the site of the nuclear 
reactor that would soon become a synonym for this Israeli secret. Today, the 
65 Ibid. 292–294.
66 Ibid. 292–308; Cohen 2000.
67 Bar-Zohar 2006: 296–297.
68 Ibid. 302.
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fact that Peres contributed to the project of turning Israel into a nuclear power 
is beyond dispute. But what was Peres’ politico-ideological stance towards this 
project? What about the political environment in general? Did any kind of politi-
cal discussion about this topic even take place in the late 1950s?
David Ben-Gurion made the decision in favor of Dimona from a unique polit-
ical-charismatic position. Only a small, exclusive circle of confidants was in the 
know, and the decision process did not take the appropriate legal route via the 
inclusion of the government and the Knesset. Ben-Gurion succeeded in keeping 
the matter off the political agenda. From the very beginning, construction work 
on the reactor in the years 1958 to 1960 was subject to the strictest military cen-
sorship.
In spite of all this, political debates in the Mapai party, the government and 
the parliament could not be entirely suppressed. As completion of the reactor 
drew near in early 1962, the question as to what was to be done with the now 
available nuclear capacities became more pressing. Should they be used for 
peaceful purposes, or for the production of nuclear weapons? This debate took 
place to the exclusion of the public.69
Over the course of the year 1962, two schools of thought emerged within 
the small security-political circles that were grappling with the questions of the 
security concept and the structure of the military. Avner Cohen labeled them the 
“nuclear technology school” and the “school of conventionalists.”70 The main 
representatives of the “nuclear technology school” were Vice Minister of Defense 
Peres (1959–1965) and Moshe Dayan (since 1959 a member of the Mapai party, 
the Knesset and the cabinets). At this point, Ben-Gurion was still wavering in his 
position.71
As the responsible person, the Prime Minister had to face down the growing 
pressure from the United States demanding he put Dimona under international 
supervision. For that would have meant revealing Israel’s actual goals. The adher-
ents of the nuclear technology school expected a long-term regional conflict that 
would involve an endlessly progressing conventional armament, which is why 
they advocated the development of high-tech arms systems that would make an 
ongoing conventional armament superfluous in the long run. The desired deter-
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These conjectures of the “nuclear technology school” also had a transre-
gional aspect. In light of the experience of the years 1956 and 1957, when the 
United Nations had forced Israel to give up the territorial conquests it had made 
in the Sinai War, the determent was also to be directed against the Western 
Powers should Israel’s interests be at stake. The Israeli political scientist Yair 
Evron called Israel’s nuclear weapon capacity an “undeclared trump card” and 
“leverage” towards the USA, so that they would ensure arms supplies to Israel.73
In the security-political cabinet, the nuclear lobby was set against the “con-
ventionalists.” This latter was represented mainly by Mapai’s coalition partner 
Ahdut Haavoda, headed by Yigal Alon (1918–1980) and Israel Galili (1911–1986). 
They, too, expected a long-lasting contention with the Arab neighbors, making a 
powerful army necessary. But their goal was in maintaining a well-armed conven-
tional force comprised of a modern and mobile tank force and a strong air force. 
In their assessment, a determent by nuclear weapons alone could not provide a 
lasting guarantee for Israel’s security. 
Aside from this, the “conventionalists” feared the policy pursued by the 
nuclear technology advocates would lead to the “nuclearization of the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict,” and this could hardly be in the interests of a small state sur-
rounded by enemies. The “conventionalists” also rejected the naïve notion that 
Israel would be able to maintain its monopoly with regard to nuclear weapons 
over the long haul.74 Nuclear weapons might even provoke the Arabs with their 
demographic and geopolitical advantages to wage war against Israel.75
Both lines of thought adopted a negative and pessimistic perspective of the 
conflict. The subject matter of the debate was made up of specialist military-tech-
nical questions, while diplomatic-political approaches for ending the conflict 
were not taken into consideration as a realistic option. The quarrel between the 
two schools of thought reflects their perplexity when grappling with the future of 
Israel in the region, as they both put the main focus on military aspects. And it 
is not by chance that both the “conventionalists” and the proponents of nuclear 
technology were able to score successes, with massive investments being made 
in both directions.
Cohen and Evron show that this domestic political controversy hardly quali-
fied as a proper political debate, since the rivals did not really object to the other 
side’s position. Supporters of nuclear technology did not press for a reduction in 
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did not categorically reject nuclear research and development.76 Ultimately, both 
schools of thought prevailed by invoking the worst-case scenario. 
Published texts by a proponent of nuclear technology like Shimon Peres barely 
touched on the issue of nuclear weapons, as the topic was and still is subject to 
the strictest military censorship. But the texts he wrote in the early 1960s may be 
reassessed in light of what we know today. What is important to remember is that 
at this point in time the question as to what purpose Israel would put its nuclear 
plant to use was still open. An anthology published in 1965 as well as some of 
Peres’ statements to the press yield several clues as to what the security policy of 
the time looked like.77 In his essay “Aspects of Quality” Peres advocated modern 
technology and stressed the significance of the determent potential:
The road to security and peace comprises three stages: firstly, retaliation power; secondly, 
deterrent power; and thirdly, disarmament. […] For a long time, we have been fighting for 
the formation of a defense force in Eretz Israel so as to be able to defend ourselves in the 
event of an attack, but in this we have only been partially successful. […] In the War of Inde-
pendence we organized an army and bought weapons, but not in sufficient amounts, so that 
we were unable to dictate the desired war aim. […] Today, we are entering the second phase, 
the creation of a deterrent power. In doing this – and I say this in all sincerity in spite of 
journalists being present – we do not seek war, but only wish to deter our enemies. We want 
to establish a power so that Nasser may feel compelled to eschew an attack on the State of 
Israel. Herewith, we proclaim in all sincerity our willingness regarding the third phase: the 
disarmament of the Middle East.78
Here, Peres wants the possibility of disarmament in the region, and therefore of 
a peaceful solution, to be understood as dependent on the determent potential of 
Israel. Even if he does not use the term “nuclear weapon,” there is no doubt as to 
what he is referring to. But he suggests that the nuclear weapons are not meant to 
be used, but are only for determent as a safeguard against being attacked.
Peres’ chain of thought is based on the assumption that Israel as such is 
unwanted in the region, with its neighbors striving for its demise. Peace is only 
possible if Israel succeeds in commanding respect and convincing the Arab states 
of its strength and invincibility. And since this is going to be an extended process, 
Israel has no choice but to build up its arms arsenals “in the meantime.” 
76 Ibid. 196; Evron 1987: 19.
77 Cf. interview with Peres: “Alert for prevention of backwardness by power balance,” Davar, 
August 24, 1962; weekly interview with Vice Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, “Arms race began 
already before Shavit 2,” Maariv, February 27, 1962; Peres’ release to the press: “We are entering 
a difficult era,” Maariv, August 5, 1962.
78 Peres 1965: 190.
 Of War and Nuclear Weapons   115
Peace, which was probably almost impossible to imagine for Peres at that 
point in time, can only be achieved by military strength. Peres’ maxim with 
regard to the “decade of peace” that began in 1990 is this: “The path to Oslo is via 
Dimona.” In the mid-1960s he comments: “If the defense force [the conventional 
army] is regarded as indispensable, and the deterrent power as an opportunity, 
then the disarmament can be called a hope. In the State of Israel opportunity and 
hope go hand in hand.”79 
According to this logic, peace can only come about as a side effect of security. 
And security is synonymous with the existence of the national state. The devel-
opment of modern weapons with the goal of becoming militarily superior to the 
Arab neighbor states is the logical conclusion to this way of reasoning. Thus, in 
Israel’s formative years Peres’ perception of political reality in the Middle East 
was firmly tied to the described security doctrine. 
He gets to the heart of it in a May 1962 essay entitled “Lessons for Security 
Policy.”80 The text was written under the impression of the debate between the 
“conventionalists” and the proponents of nuclear technology, and against the 
backdrop of a relative calm on the Israeli borders following the Sinai-Suez War:
Given the absence [of peace], we have to rely on our [military] power alone. The formation of 
this power has to proceed in a timely manner for the purpose of achieving maximal [Israeli] 
independence. But the creation of military power requires considerable endurance, espe-
cially in view of the constantly changing political and security-political situation. Accord-
ingly, this task of power buildup [meaning armament] must not be influenced by temporary 
changes in the political situation. Rather, it needs to be tackled from the perspective of a 
pessimistic assessment of the situation in order to be able to face one of the most com-
plicated and grave of constellations. Against this background, the relative relief which is 
achieved by temporary political improvements must be completely ignored. […] We are in 
a new phase in the history of arms acquisitions. This is not a political, but a technological 
change. There is talk of a kind of weapon, which we could barely imagine in the past, but 
which now is introduced into our region.81
This text may serve to illustrate another aspect of the security doctrine, namely 
its depoliticization. In this context, the term “depoliticization” refers to the exclu-
sion of the public from any discussion regarding the issue of non-conventional 
weapons, hence the security doctrine itself. There is some irony to the fact that 
by falling back on his coded language, Peres dives into the public debate with the 
sole purpose of arguing that it is not up for discussion because deterrence power 
79 Ibid. 190.
80 Cf. Peres, “Lessons for Security Policy,” of May 1962, in: Peres 1965: 146–156.
81 Ibid. 146, 149.
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is simply indispensable. Peres’ argument that the comparatively peaceful period 
of 1962 is treacherous and that a pessimistic assessment of the situation is perti-
nent to upholding security is ultimately an appeal to keep shaping security policy 
based on the worst-case scenario. Proceeding from this assumption, any political 
debate seems obsolete to him. 
Besides, such a discussion was virtually impossible at that time. After all, the 
Dimona project was in a precarious phase in the early 1960s. By the end of 1960 
the USA gained knowledge of the Dimona reactor. Now Ben-Gurion came under 
massive pressure from the American government to put the nuclear plant under 
international supervision and to disclose Israel’s plans. But since the Israeli lead-
ership was unwilling to let anyone peer at their cards, it came up with a securi-
ty-political strategy that consisted of dodging any confirmation or denial of Isra-
el’s nuclear weapons potential.
The Policy of Opacity 
When asked about the nuclear program, Israel usually fell back on the standard 
reply: “Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the 
Middle East.” The Israeli leadership would neither negate their possession of 
nuclear weapons nor corroborate it. In domestic politics the issue had already 
been a taboo topic from the 1960s onward. In his book The Last Taboo, published 
in 2005, Avner Cohen deals with the Israeli “policy of ambiguity” which he calls 
the “policy of opacity.”82 
Cohen depicts this policy as a “case of extreme tension between nuclear 
policy and democracy.” The social tabooing of this topic has been possible 
because it simply does not exist in the public sphere, i.e., government, Knesset, 
and judicial power. Cohen puts the phenomenon of tabooing nuclear weapons in 
the context of a “culture of opacity,” a political culture which is closely connected 
to the “Israeli order”: “The culture of opacity leads to extreme tensions in liberal 
democracy, in particular when it comes to the question of supervision.”83 
Avner Cohen ascribes this political culture to the interplay of three factors, 
namely the taboo as a social code within the Jewish-Israeli “tribe,” the military 
censorship as an instrument used by the state to enforce the taboo, and the policy 
of opacity as a political strategy. Without the strict military censorship, and later 
the social tabooing of the nuclear issue, the policy of opacity would not have 
82 Cohen 2005.
83 Ibid. 14.
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been so successful. And the social tabooing would have been impossible to keep 
up without the public’s recognition that the nuclear weapons policy is a matter 
of national security.84
With the information block-out firmly in place, one may even wonder in how 
far it can be said that the public has any knowledge of the nuclear program at 
all. Avner Cohen goes on to points out: “Out of almost mythical fear, the public 
manages to stay clear of the topic and its actual meaning, to completely block 
it out and to act as if the serious strategic and moral dilemmas are none of its 
business.”85
In Israel, disregarding this social imperative still means becoming liable to 
prosecution. To break this silence was the objective of The Last Taboo, which 
barely made it past the military censorship.86 The author offers the following 
hypothesis: Although the taboo on discussing nuclear weapons might have been 
forced on the public, the public itself has “a deep-seated desire” to remain obliv-
ious of this delicate topic. The taboo is actually “an echo of the authentic will of 
the Israelis to not discuss the topic publicly and to leave it completely up to the 
‘authorized experts.’”87
Although Avner Cohen makes a plea for an open debate about Israel’s nuclear 
weapons, he does not really question their necessity. Rather, he sees the “tremen-
dous success of the nuclear endeavor” in how it “has turned Israel into a regional 
power and has given it standing and prestige among its enemies as well as its 
friends.” With this kind of appraisal, he might be said to hold the same view as 
Peres, namely that it is (military) strength that inspires (political and diplomatic) 
respect. What is more, Cohen draws on the presumed consensus in Israeli society 
that Israel’s nuclear weapons serve the national security. At the same time, Cohen 
points out the deliberate ignorance of the Israeli public in this matter.88 
But how is such a taboo created? Where does the “putative authentic will” 
to not want to know come from? How did this social consensus concerning the 
nuclear issue come about? Is it that the unreserved support of the Israelis as it 
is hinted at here applies exclusively to the procurement of nuclear weapons? Or 
does this political behavior also pertain to other aspects of security policy such 
as conventional armament? First and foremost stands the question as to what 
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ambiguity” when it came to the issue of nuclear weapons, and what contribution 
he made to the tabooing of this topic, hence to the establishment of a “political 
culture of opacity.”
The culture of secrecy surrounding security questions has its roots in the pre-
state Yishuv. The principle of secrecy created in British Palestine provided the 
ideological-cultural basis for the Zionists in representing their own security inter-
ests. The first arms purchases as well as the provisional production of weapons in 
the 1930s and 1940s were subject to utmost secrecy.
The Zionist underground militia, as such illegal, formed the fundament of the 
secrecy culture. In the 1950s, this element of political culture survived and took 
root particularly in security policy. Befittingly, Ben-Gurion finalized the decision 
to buy a nuclear reactor from France with only a handful of people involved and 
continued to keep the project secret. Ben-Gurion’s political mentality of secrecy 
also found expression in the fact that he was not willing to set any long-term 
goals. When the USA discovered the nuclear reactor at Dimona towards the end 
of 1960, Ben-Gurion went on to declare before the Knesset on December 21, 1960 
that Israel was not developing nuclear weapons and Dimona served exclusively 
peaceful purposes. 
This formal explanation was accepted without discussion or criticism. All 
too touchy was the issue even for the nuclear weapons opponents in parliament. 
Ben-Gurion’s authority inhibited any resistance.89 And although most Knesset 
delegates from the big parties were essentially opposed to the armament with 
nuclear weapons, they – with the exception of representatives of the communist 
party Maki  – barely dared to bring it up and challenge Ben-Gurion. He in turn 
applied his own strategy in order to ascertain the parliament and public remained 
excluded. To evade any parliamentary debates, the Prime Minister made it possi-
ble for every leader of a Knesset parliamentary group to turn to him directly. 
In addition, a secret commission was formed in late 1962 within the context 
of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to deal with the financial 
aspects of Dimona. Avner Cohen observes that this secrecy policy was a “conve-
nient solution” for the legislative and the executive. As for the nuclear weapons 
opponents within the Mapai, they also failed to express their pragmatic and moral 
reservations within the party. Accordingly, the secrecy imperative extended to the 
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But still some nuclear weapons opponents did express their protest openly 
in the hopes of being able to stop the project in time. How did the duo of Ben-Gu-
rion and Peres deal with them? The example of the intellectual Eliezer Livneh 
(1902–1975), a former member of the Mapai party, shows how effective the rules 
of censorship laid down by the Ministry of Defense were. 
Even before the decision as to how the nuclear capacity of Israel was to be 
used was made, Livneh came out in favor of publicly discussing “the true purpose 
of the nuclear venture.” In an article entitled “The Last Warning,” published in 
Haaretz on January 12, 1962, Livneh expressed his concern regarding Israeli secu-
rity policy. He feared that a security doctrine based on nuclear weapons and bal-
listic missiles would “nuclearize” the Middle East conflict – a disastrous develop-
ment for the region. 
Some months later he founded a small group that included Israeli personali-
ties such as Martin Buber (1878–1965), Efreim Orbach (1912–1991) and Yeshayahu 
Leibowitz, as well as former members of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission 
Gabriel Stein (1920–1976) and Franz Ollendorff (1900–1981). They jointly handed 
in a petition to the government seeking to prevent the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into the region. 
Confusion spread in the Ministry of Defense. An official reply was never 
issued. Instead, the group around Livneh was fought behind the scenes. In order 
to silence the nuclear opponents they were portrayed as a danger to the security 
of the state. For this purpose, the Ministry of Defense put the Israeli Journalists’ 
Association under pressure to cancel a press conference on “Nuclear Weapons in 
the Middle East” announced by Livneh – with success. All this was justified by 
arguing that Livneh and his supporters compromised national security.91
In the summer and fall of 1962, Peres tried to convey his ministry’s position 
through the press. But Peres’ statements to the media turned out to be counter-
productive. His public statements confirmed the suspicions of the anti-nuclear 
weapons group, namely that Israel did indeed intend to use its nuclear capac-
ity for the production of weapons. In the summer of 1962, Livneh, Stein, Orbach 
and others founded the “Committee for the Nuclear Disarmament of the Middle 
East” with the support of the President of the World Zionist Organization Nahum 
Goldman (1895–1982). The committee appealed to the political elites of the 
country to draw attention to the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.
The objective of the committee was to make the nuclear weapons issue a 
top-priority political topic, and the argument put into the foreground by the group 
was that the introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the region could 
91 Cohen 2000: 188–189.
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endanger the entire Zionist project. As they emphasized, given Israel’s small size 
and its disadvantageous geopolitical and demographic situation, it would be 
exposed to the risk of total annihilation should it come to a nuclearization of the 
Middle East conflict. In its own best interests the country should seek an absolute 
ban on the introduction of such arms into the region. 
For even if Israel should prove successful in producing technically superior 
nuclear weapons in the near future, it would not be able to keep up the advan-
tage permanently. The committee advocated opening negotiations with the 
other states in the region to avert the danger of nuclear armament. Its members 
further stressed that the acquisition of the weapons as well as the associated 
secrecy policy were undemocratic.92 Already then the critical Israeli philosopher 
Yeshayahu Leibowitz recognized the problem of the nuclear program, which he 
described as a “state within the state” in the sense that it stands outside Israeli 
jurisdiction and beyond the public’s oversight.93 
But the nuclear weapon opponents were quickly silenced when the govern-
ment invoked military censorship. Avner Cohen points out the essential role of 
censorship in the enforcement of this demand to silence, and later in the consoli-
dation of the policy of ambiguity.94 The military censorship prohibited any factual 
references to Israel’s nuclear program. It only allowed and still only allows com-
mentary on foreign sources, or publications that are specifically marked as a 
personal opinion or as hypothetical deliberations of the author. In this way, any 
basis for a possible public debate is eliminated. 
Even today, to publish information about the Israeli nuclear program 
means making oneself guilty of an offense. And so the anti-nuclear committee 
was trapped in a Catch-22 situation: In order to be able to pursue their goal, its 
members put themselves in danger of being accused of betraying state secrets.95 
Indeed, the Israeli media scientist Yoel Cohen points out that Livneh was “sum-
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The Vanunu Affair
Following the short and unsuccessful attempt at resistance by the “Committee 
for the Nuclear Disarmament of the Middle East” in the early 1960s, the policy 
of opacity became more and more prevalent – even as particularly Peres’ posi-
tion regarding this policy remained inconsistent for decades. According to Avner 
Cohen, on the eve of the Six-Day War Peres made a proposition to abandon the 
strategy of ambiguity and disclose Israel’s position as a nuclear power to the 
public. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol rejected the suggestion.97
The Israeli historian Tom Segev (1945–) also maintains that in the crisis of 
May/June 1967, Peres campaigned for demonstrating Israel’s determent poten-
tial to avoid the impending war.98 Some years later, in the initial days of the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan was thrown into a state 
of panic when faced with heavy losses at the southern front. He suggested the 
deployment of nuclear weapons to Prime Minister Golda Meir, but this time as 
well Israel made do with its conventional military forces. What is important here, 
though, is that both Peres in 1967 and Dayan in 1973 believed that Israel could 
indeed make use of its nuclear weapons in an emergency situation to escape 
catastrophe.99 
Only in the mid-1980s did the concept of “opacity” start to show cracks. On 
October 5, 1986, the London Sunday Times ran an exclusive report on its front 
page: “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal.” The article relied on 
information provided by Mordechai Vanunu (1954–), formerly a technician at the 
Nuclear Research Center near Dimona where he worked from 1977 to 1985 in a 
top-secret subterranean bunker system.
The article, the contents of which had been thoroughly vetted by the Sunday 
Times’ research team Insight prior to its publication, created a giant stir world-
wide. From the evidence and statements offered by Vanunu, nuclear scientists 
consulted by Insight concluded that not only does Israel have the atomic bomb 
– which had long been speculated –, but also that the country has developed 
into a major nuclear power. In a nutshell the article said: Israel takes sixth place 
among the nuclear powers of the world, it secretly produces plutonium in an 
97 Cohen 2005: 154.
98 Segev 2005: 347–345.
99 Cohen 2005: 49–54. In the wake of the 1973 war, Israel “tremendously” increased its nuclear 
arsenal. This took place under the Rabin government of 1974–1977, with Peres as minister of de-
fense. It is by this increase, Cohen says, that Israel became a nuclear world power. Ibid. 54–55.
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underground complex, and one hundred to two hundred nuclear weapons have 
already been produced in Dimona.100
In August 1986, the Israeli security service informed Prime Minister Peres that 
Vanunu had made contact with the Sunday Times. At first the Mossad searched for 
Vanunu in Australia, but later learned from the British security service MI6 that 
the technician was in London. On September 21, 1986, Peres decided, together 
with his deputy, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Minister of Defense Yitzhak 
Rabin, to abduct Vanunu and bring him back to Israel.101 
Given the tensions between the Israeli and the British security services since 
the early 1980s, Peres is said to have instructed the Mossad to make sure to not 
violate any British laws when kidnapping Vanunu. As such the Mossad devel-
oped a plan to first coax Vanunu out of England, and then bring him to Israel by 
force.102 In the end, Vanunu fell into the trap of Mossad agent Cheryl Hanin-Ben-
tov who managed to lure her victim to Rome, from where he was taken to Israel. 
Vanunu was put on trial to the exclusion of the public. The charge comprised 
three items: treason, espionage of a particularly heinous nature and collection 
of secret information with the intent to compromise state security. On March 
24, 1988, Vanunu was found guilty of espionage and treason and sentenced to 
eighteen years in prison in solitary confinement.103 Due to international pressure 
his solitary confinement was lifted after eleven years. Finally, on April 21, 2004, 
Vanunu was released, but his freedom of movement remains highly restricted to 
this day.104
All decisions reached in the Vanunu Affair were subject to the strictest 
secrecy and were made by a small group of people, with Peres keeping only a few 
members of the cabinet of ministers in the loop. He neither informed the Knesset 
nor did he consult with his advisors. Only as late as November 16, 1986 – seven 
weeks after Vanunu’s disappearance from England on the first of October – and 
only in reaction to international pressure put on Israel to disclose the where-
abouts of the persecuted man, was it finally confirmed that Vanunu was indeed 
in Israel and under arrest. 
Yoel Cohen, author of Nuclear Ambiguity: Vanunu Affair, is of the opinion that 
Peres’ decision to break the silence was a major mistake. It brought to light that 
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he had secretly planned the kidnapping within a small circle without taking into 
account the consequences. Moreover, by publicly confirming a covert operation 
he committed nothing less than a deadly sin of intelligence work.105
Whether Peres really had any chance of permanently keeping under wraps 
Vanunu’s whereabouts and the breach of international law committed by the 
kidnapping remains controversial. At any rate, he managed to remain silent for 
several weeks. Or did Peres anticipate that he would have to admit to the kidnap-
ping and had accepted this fact? As Yoel Cohen speculates, Peres had developed 
“a full-on security neurosis” over the course of the years, and not having any per-
sonal experience in intelligence work finally made the decision that would trigger 
such severe criticisms from the world public and various foreign parliaments. 
Another position is that Peres wanted to create a precedent.106 With this in 
mind, can the decision to take recourse to such a drastic measure as kidnapping 
really be attributed to a “security neurosis” which the decision makers were 
suffering from? Or did Peres merely make use of common practices to preserve 
the “Israeli order”? This is what Peres, who only rarely comments on the affair, 
said about the decision for the kidnapping: “Even if Vanunu’s information about 
nuclear weapons is incorrect, Israel should still prosecute him because he does 
not have the right to talk about such matters. He has betrayed state secrets.”107
Yoel Cohen labels this a “cosmetic excuse.” He argues that patriotism and the 
imperative to remain silent on state secrets are deeply ingrained in the political 
culture of Israel as it is, so that setting a cautionary example was not really nec-
essary. Cohen is convinced that Vanunu was kidnapped because Israeli author-
ities sought to prevent him from betraying even more information.108 This claim 
is plausible because the decision to capture Vanunu was finalized before the rev-
elations were made public. The hope was that he could be stopped in time. But 
can the reason given by Peres, to the effect that the abduction was supposed to 
set a warning example, really be dismissed as a “cosmetic excuse”? Is this kind of 
determent not in fact an integral part of the political culture of Israel?
Peres’ blunt remark regarding people who divulge state secrets sheds some 
light on the fundament of the specific “Israeli order,” namely its keen sense of 
security. Any attempt to shake that order is to be resisted tooth and nail. It is 
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tified “to talk about such matters” unless they are authorized by the state. Conse-
quently, “Israel” had to go after him.
As for the press, they took Peres’ side. The Israeli journalist Gidon Shapiro 
observes that the Israeli press had defamed and condemned Vanunu with the 
support of the government even before the beginning of the trial.109 This in turn 
confirms the position of the Israeli journalist Akiva Orr that Vanunu would have 
had no chance to pursue his objective via the Israeli press. Not only would they 
have refused to publish his information, but also in all probability they would 
have even turned him over to the authorities straight away. Bearing this in mind, 
Vanunu’s decision to approach a foreign newspaper seemed like the logical way 
to proceed. “In Israel, the loyalty of newspaper editors is first and foremost to 
the state.” Democracy – or truth, for that matter – is of secondary importance.110
Avner Cohen expounds on the severe punishment of the Israeli nuclear infor-
mant111 by stressing the social significance of his actions: Vanunu did not grasp 
the “actual social function of opacity.” Its goal was “to conceal the entire nuclear 
issue.” Vanunu had failed to fully appreciate that “beyond the fiction of opacity, 
we all know exactly what is going on in Dimona. But we pretend not to know […] 
so that we do not have to deal with the strategic and moral dilemmas associated 
with it.” Vanunu had believed “with a naïveté that was very close to stupidity,” 
says Avner Cohen, that his actions could trigger a profound national debate.112
Still, in his book The Last Taboo, Avner Cohen has himself come out in favor 
of giving up the “anachronistic politics of opacity,” which got him into conflict 
with the military authorities and the censorship regulations.113 He explains the 
non-appearance of a nuclear weapons-debate with the single fact that Israeli 
society did not want to know about the weapons in the first place. But what Cohen 
sometimes loses sight of is that this “schizophrenic situation” must be evaluated 
in closer context to the ban on speaking that is enforced by the Israeli leadership 
with utmost severity.
This order to remain silent is one of the preconditions for the eyes of Israeli 
society being so firmly closed. The way that the Israeli government, the secu-
rity apparatuses and the justice system reacted to the Vanunu Affair shows just 
how powerful the principle of “not being allowed to speak” really is. The press, 
109 Shapiro 1998: 154–155.
110 Orr 1998: 65–68.
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too, makes sure to observe the prescribed rules. When the imminent publication 
of explosive material in the Sunday Times came to Peres’ knowledge, he turned 
to the Editors’ Committee, an association of Israeli broadcasting and television 
station directors and newspaper editors. 
The Editors’ Committee is regularly informed of sensitive military and dip-
lomatic matters by high-ranking cabinet members. In return, it promotes the 
political line of the government when required. Peres told the Editors’ Committee 
about the upcoming publication in the Sunday Times. Since the foreign media 
is beyond the reach of Israeli censorship regulations, he appealed to the patri-
otism of the journalists in asking them to not allow any local reporting and also 
no comments for a period of forty-eight hours after the article’s publication.114 
Moreover, Peres requested that the Editors’ Committee refrain from mentioning 
in their coverage any details about security glitches. He assumed as a matter of 
course that the Editors’ Committee would cooperate. Avner Cohen sees this as 
confirmation of how firmly the taboo to talk about the nuclear program has taken 
hold of society.115
The press policy validates Avner Cohen’s assessment that the political system 
is schizophrenic. After all, word of the meeting between Peres and the Editors’ 
Committee also reached the Insight team of the Sunday Times, who saw this as 
corroboration of Vanunu’s story. But even in the moment when the fiction has 
been unmasked, Peres and the Israeli press continue to pursue the “policy of 
opacity.” The guardians of the “Israeli order” are the first to pretend “to not know 
what is going on in Dimona.” And society follows suit.
Many years of information-banning policies combined with the cooperation 
of the press are why the topic is not publicly discussed and why Israelis appear 
indifferent. The schizophrenia inherent in the “policy of opacity” is based on the 
discrepancy between being and seeming – a discrepancy that threatens the sta-
bility of the “Israeli order” in instances such as this affair. This is the reason why 
Vanunu is considered a public enemy even now.
In January of 1988, Peres, by then foreign minister, testified in Vanunu’s trial. 
Oddly enough he was summoned as a witness for the defense, because in Novem-
ber 1986 he had announced in a non-public session with Knesset members of 
the Labor Party that the article in the Sunday Times had not caused any serious 
harm to Israel’s security.116 And refuting the allegation that Vanunu’s revelations 
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intent was precisely what Vanunu’s defense attorney Avigdor Feldmann (1948–) 
built his defense strategy around. 
In the trial, though, Peres kept insisting that Vanunu’s information had jeop-
ardized the security of the state. He neither gave reasons for this claim nor offered 
any explanation for his remark before the members of his party, which he had 
most probably made in order to reassure the persons present and to convince 
them that Israel’s determent power had not been damaged. When making his 
statement in court, he adhered strictly to the government instructions according 
to which certain issues were not to be discussed in the courtroom; such as the 
question as to whether the article in the Sunday Times had caused any damage, 
or even whether it had actually been true. Peres refused to answer Feldmann’s 
queries, and only repeated that the published information had harmed “Israel’s 
security.”117 In the excerpts from the protocol of the Vanunu trial, published in 
late 1999, Peres’ testimony reads as follows: “The publications of the Sunday 
Times prompt some Arab states to head into various directions that are undesir-
able for Israel.”118 
How to verify or refute Peres’ allegation of 1988? What is the gauge by which 
to rate the harm inflicted on national security? Were the Arab states really com-
pletely ignorant of the Israeli nuclear weapons arsenal prior to the report in the 
Sunday Times? Or could the article have even amplified the desired deterrent 
effect? What exactly are the unwelcome reactions that Peres observes in his Arab 
neighbors? 
To make it possible to publicly ask and discuss such questions was Vanunu’s 
intention, and also the cause taken up by the few members of the “Israeli Commit-
tee for the Liberation of Mordechai Vanunu and for A Middle East Free of Atomic, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons.” By criticizing the “policy of opacity” and the 
continuing information ban as undemocratic, they hoped to initiate a political 
discussion about nuclear weapons. They assumed that once the Israeli public 
was informed of what was going on in Dimona, it could be mobilized against the 
nuclear armament. 
Moreover, they were hoping to be able to effect a change in the way of think-
ing about security, so that weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited. In 
contrast to Avner Cohen who, in spite of proposing leaving behind the policy of 
opacity, considers nuclear weapons to be advantageous for the purpose of deter-
ment, the Israeli disarmament activists and nuclear weapons opponents of the 
117 Ibid. 318–320.
118 Protocols of the Vanunu trial, Haaretz, April 20, 2004 (first published November 25, 1999).
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1960s saw the mere existence of the Dimona plant as a danger to the Zionist 
project as well as to the environment. 
Israeli law made it easy for the government to declare any concern a state 
secret. As Vanunu’s defense attorney objected during the trial: “Anything that the 
government wishes to categorize as a state secret is considered a state secret by 
the law.” At the same time it is under no obligation to define what a state secret 
actually is.119 But all this only became possible because the Knesset acquiesced to 
the directives and sat still. Its submission is firmly rooted in the political culture. 
There is a consensus among most delegates to leave certain tasks up to the “secu-
rity experts.” In other words, the parliament cooperates in blocking the debate 
about nuclear weapons.120
Two perspectives on the use of violence in the service of the Zionist project are 
merged in the “policy of nuclear opacity.” For one thing, the ambivalent attitude 
towards violence, and for another, the justification of the use of violence, even 
as it takes on extreme features, since it is seen as counterviolence or necessary 
violence. The policy of nuclear opacity has a paradoxical character, for it denies 
the factual possession of weapons of mass destruction while at the same time 
declaring that these weapons are merely for determent as a kind of “insurance 
policy,” and not for actually being used. The possibility of an actual deployment 
as a last resort is firmly blocked out, for it would trigger too much fear. After all, 
in the face of Israel’s geographic and demographic situation, the deployment of 
nuclear weapons could very likely mean the end of the Zionist project. 
The other aspect incorporated in the policy of opacity is the willingness con-
tained in the concept of determent to actually resort to “extreme means,” should 
it really come to the worst. Domestically, this would be legitimized as a necessity, 
as counterviolence by the “ultimate victim” in the sense proposed by Fackenheim 
and Schweid. But let us now look closer into the question of whether the principle 
of determent is really limited to non-conventional weapons.
Conventional War and the Zionist Project: Lebanon 1982
As is well known, conventional wars are still a bitter reality in Israel, the deter-
ment potential of nuclear weapons notwithstanding. The security-political 
concept that a conventional war can be avoided by means of nuclear determent 
did not prove successful. War has dominated Israeli everyday life since the estab-
119 Feldmann 1998: 129.
120 Cohen 2005: 163–165.
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lishment of the state. Wars of conquest such as the Sinai-Suez War of 1956 and the 
Six-Day War of 1967; explicit defense wars such as the Yom Kippur War of 1973; 
“Wars of Attrition” from 1968 to 1970 on the southern border, and from 1985 to 
2000 on the northern border; military clashes with the goal of retaining territo-
ries, such as the Lebanon War of 1982 or countering the First and Second Intifada 
of 1987 to 1992 and 2000 to 2004; moreover, those wars in which Israel, though 
not directly militarily involved, was nevertheless attacked, such as the Second 
Gulf War of 1991. 
The vortex of violence and counterviolence is further intensified by the mil-
itary occupation of the Palestinian territories and by the acts of terror against 
Israeli facilities triggering retaliation operations from Israel’s side. As has been 
demonstrated by drawing on the example of the Sinai-Suez War, the notion that 
war is necessary to preserve the Jewish state has solidified over the course of the 
years. As such, conventional war has become an integral part of the Israeli order. 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982 has entered Israel’s political and 
social awareness as the first war that was “freely chosen” by the security-polit-
ical leadership of the country. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Minister of 
Defense Ariel Sharon sent the Israeli army into Lebanon in a military operation 
called “Peace for Galilee,” which was also the official rationale.
Ian Black and Benny Morris, coauthors of Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of 
Israel’s Intelligence Services, view the Lebanon War as a result of two develop-
ments. For one thing, Israel interfered in Lebanon because PLO leader Yasser 
Arafat and his combat units had shifted their main area of activities to Beirut 
and South Lebanon after having being expelled from Jordan by Jordanian troops 
in the so-called “Black September” of 1970. The second strand of events is made 
up of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, the volatile situation in the country and the 
Israeli-Falangist alliance.121
Israel had been supporting the Christians in Lebanon since the 1950s as part 
of the so-called Periphery Doctrine, with these connections being referred to 
as a “natural alliance.”122 In 1982, the Israeli leadership deemed that the right 
moment to push through a new political order in the region had arrived. Black 
and Morris count the influx of PLO fighters in the wake of “Black September” 
among the main factors that led to the gradual disintegration of Lebanon in the 
first half of the 1970s:
121 Black and Morris 1994: 526.
122 Ibid. 528.
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The PLO influx was one of the factors leading to the gradual disintegration of the Leba-
nese state and society during the first half of the 1970s. The organization’s cross border 
operations against Israeli frontier settlements brought IDF retaliation against the whole 
population of southern Lebanon, leading, in turn, to the flight of Shi’ite refugees to Bei-
rut’s southern suburbs. These poor Shi’ites were embittered with the Christian-dominated 
Lebanese establishment and turned increasingly to fundamentalist religion. They became 
an important element in the destabilization that eventually resulted in civil war. When that 
began the country’s Christian communities, led by the Maronites, and their militias – dom-
inated by the ‘Lebanese Forces’ of the Phalange Party – were pitted against a loose and 
shifting coalition of Muslims and left-wingers […].123 
Israel supported the Christian Maronites in the 1975 Lebanese Civil War, and 
Israeli troops marched into Lebanon on March 15, 1978. In the ensuing “Operation 
Litani,” a retaliatory act for Palestinian attacks in the Israeli core country, several 
brigades comprising a total number of seven thousand men were deployed. The 
goal was to destroy PLO facilities north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. The plan 
was to create four enclaves that would be dominated by Israel, and via which mil-
itary control for Israel’s Christian allies, the Free Lebanese Army (FLA) of Major 
Saad Haddad (1936–1984), was to be ensured.124
Since the accession of the second Likud government in August 1981, Israel’s 
security policy had been shaped by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Minister 
of Defense Ariel Sharon and Chief of General Staff Refael Eitan (1929–2004). But 
it was Sharon who was the main driving force.125 He did everything he could to 
weaken the PLO at the northern border of Israel so as to make sure his overall 
strategy would be successful. He believed “that with the PLO humbled, Israel 
would find it easier to browbeat the now leaderless Palestinians of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip into accepting Israeli rule, thus paving the way for eventual Israeli 
annexation.”126
Once the political-military power of the Palestinians and the Muslims of 
Lebanon was crushed, Sharon hoped to be able to create a “new” Lebanese state 
under the leadership of the “Phalange” party with which Israel was prepared to 
conclude peace. Sharon expanded on the plan that had been drafted in April 1981 
by the Israeli military for the invasion of Lebanon, called “Operation Pinetree.” 
In the original plan, the invasion of the Israeli army as far as Sidon was provided; 
while in Sharon’s variant the troops were to advance all the way up to a line north 
123 Black and Morris 1991: 364.
124 Black and Morris 1994: 525–526.
125 Landau 2015: 146–169.
126 Black and Morris 1991: 371.
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of Beirut. From the beginning, Sharon preferred his so-called “Operation Big 
Pines” to “Operation Small Pines.”127
Operation Big Pines included bringing the PLO from Lebanon back to Jordan 
in order to overthrow the Hashemite royal family and establish a Palestinian 
state.128 Black and Morris stress that the Minister of Defense “henceforward 
proceeded more cautiously, rarely letting his cabinet colleagues see the entire 
breadth of this thinking.”129 On May 10, 1982, Prime Minister Begin presented the 
cabinet with a shortened version of Operation Big Pines, which Sharon described 
as a “limited operation.” He and Begin wanted to convince the ministers that the 
undertaking was an attack in the mold of “Operation Small Pines.”
The occasion for an Israeli military invasion into Lebanon came up in June 
1982 through an incident in London. The Israeli ambassador to Great Britain, 
Shlomo Argov (1929–2003), was shot and severely injured by a Palestinian who 
was a member of the renegade group of Abu Nidal. At that, Minister of Defense 
Sharon and Prime Minister Begin sent the Israeli army into Lebanon. Begin cited 
the fight against the “terrorists” as the reason for the military operation. The 
cabinet and ultimately also the Knesset, including the Labor Party opposition 
under the leadership of Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, did not put any obsta-
cles in the way of this motion. The goal was to destroy PLO mortar and rocket 
launchers that were positioned in range of Galilean settlements within a forty-ki-
lometer zone in South Lebanon.
Sharon spoke of a “twenty-four-hour” operation that was to bring about 
“Peace for Galilee.”130 Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Yasser Arafat 
and approximately eleven thousand PLO combatants were evacuated to Tunisia 
by August 1982. The preparations for realizing Sharon’s Big Plan for a “new order” 
in Lebanon got underway, with Israel helping thirty-four-year-old Phalange 
leader Bachir Gemayel (1947–1982) win the presidential election through military 
backing. According to the Lebanese constitution, a candidate had to attain a two-
third majority in parliament to be successful, so the Israeli occupation hindered 
Gemayel’s opponents from casting their vote.
On August 23, 1982 Gemayel was elected president of Lebanon with fifty-seven 
votes of the sixty-two delegates who managed to make an appearance. Already on 
September 14, 1982 he was assassinated.131 An escalation was bound to occur, 
127 Black and Morris 1994: 538.
128 Shlaim 2000, “Ariel Sharon’s Big Plan”: 395–400; Benziman 256.
129 Black and Morris 1991: 372.
130 Black and Morris 1994: 543–545.
131 Shlaim 2000: 413–415.
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and Sharon feared that the remaining PLO fighters could seize political power 
in Beirut. He instructed the Israeli army to advance into West Beirut where the 
PLO still held control. The Phalangists, meanwhile, intruded into the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in South Beirut to “purge them of hidden 
terrorists.” From September 16 to 18, 1982, the Phalangists unleashed a massacre 
of the Palestinians, all while in plain sight of the Israeli army. According to Israeli 
reports, between seven hundred and eight hundred were killed, while Palestinian 
sources estimated more than two thousand people slaughtered.132
War Policy: A Social Political Consensus
When it comes to the question of military operations in the service of national 
statehood or of security, what is important to remember is the fact this practice 
traditionally enjoys social and political backing. For all Zionist parties of Israel, 
war and national-state existence are intricately linked. This could particularly be 
observed in the war of 1982, when for the first time in Israeli history a “right-wing 
government” chose to go to war. All military operations carried out up to that 
point – with the exception of the Litani operation of March 1978 – were decided 
under the governments of the Mapai or Labor Party. 
This time, the position of the Zionist Left was represented from the ranks of 
the opposition. As leader of the Labor Party opposition, Shimon Peres defended 
the invasion on June 8, 1982 – two days after the war had started –in the face 
of a no-confidence vote made by the small Jewish-Arab Knesset parliamentary 
group Hadash (“Democratic Front for Peace and Equality”) against Begin’s gov-
ernment and the war decision. Peres’ support helped secure Begin the majority 
in the Knesset.133 
Why did Peres stand up for Begin in the no-confidence vote? And why does 
the Zionist Left historiography cling to the hypothesis that Peres was “one of the 
fiercest opponents of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by the IDF”?134
What has to be factored in here is that the Israeli Zionist Left has always 
had an ambivalent understanding of the use of national-state violence. It deems 
it absolutely essential for security – though security is exactly what it fails to 
achieve, even endangering it instead. The escalation potential of the respective 
missions is denied. Immediately after the invasion, Peres made statements to 
132 Ibid. 416.
133 Maariv, June 9, 1982.
134 Ben-Simon 1997: 231.
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the press about the war that seemed irresolute and scattered. He did not really 
give the impression that he belonged to the great proponents of the war. This 
awkward stance shows an ambivalent attitude towards the use of violence: Peres 
supported the war de facto, but would not be frank about it.
Newspaper headlines testify to this fact: “Peres and Rabin Demand: No Strife 
with Syria”135; “Please not Another West Bank”136; “Peres: [Begin’s] Government 
Will Have a Reckoning After the Days of Mourning [for the fallen Israelis] and 
the Return of the Soldiers”137; “Israeli Invasion into West Beirut Could Become 
a Historic Mistake”138; “The Invasion into West Beirut Will Come at a High Price, 
Although the Temptation is Great [to invade West-Beirut]”139; “Peres Asks: Why 
was the Bombing of Beirut Necessary?”140. 
On the occasion of the Lebanon War, Peres himself penned an article enti-
tled, “For the Political Path.”141 Then, shortly after the massacre committed by 
the Phalangists against Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila on September 16 to 18, 
1982, he published the newspaper article “Public Squares and Bulldozers – But 
No Way Out.”142
Clearly, Israel’s war objective was the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon. 
Peres stressed that this was not only in the interests of Israel but also for the 
benefit of Lebanon. He said that the IDF acted in the interest of the Lebanese gov-
ernment that “knows […] that the destruction of Beirut did not start with the inva-
sion of the Israeli army, but has rather been going on […] since 1975 on account of 
the Syrians and the PLO.”143
Thus, in Peres’ argumentation the war is a positive force which helps elimi-
nate injustice in Lebanon. According to Peres, “the Muslim inhabitants of Beirut” 
would be wise to wish for the expulsion of the “PLO terrorists,” even if at this 
point in time they still feel represented by them. He attributes their support of the 
PLO to a “lack of judgment” keeping them from recognizing that “the PLO ulti-
mately has no one to blame but itself for their bitter fate.” In Peres’ interpretation 
the Israeli army is even rendering the Palestinians in Beirut an important service.
135 Maariv, June 8, 1982.
136 Al Hamishmar, June 11, 1982.
137 Haaretz, June 16, 1982.
138 Maariv, June 29, 1982.
139 Davar, June 24, 1982.
140 Maariv, July 26, 1982.
141 Haaretz, July 30, 1982.
142 Maariv, September 26, 1982.
143 Haaretz, July 30, 1982.
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On July 30, 1982, the very day that the UN Security Council called on Israel 
to cease their siege of Beirut so its people could be supplied with food and med-
icine, Peres conveyed the events as if the IDF was actually doing a good deed in 
Lebanon – and quite obviously he actually perceived it this way.144 Another war 
objective which Peres mentions is the election of a new president in Lebanon:
It would be naive to think that all the [Israeli] efforts in Beirut […] had the removal of ter-
rorists as their only goal. Another aim – an enormously important one in my assessment 
– is the formation of a Lebanese government, or rather the election of the next president 
of Lebanon, […] and that without foreign intervention. Therefore, the removal of terrorists 
is not a goal in itself, but rather an important means for helping Lebanon sort itself out.145
This is not the first time that Peres espouses the view that Israel has the right to 
exert influence on the formation of new governments in its neighboring coun-
tries. Already in the Sinai-Suez Campaign of 1956, one of the goals was to remove 
the Egyptian president from office. And also when riots broke out in Jordan in 
1963, Peres suggested to Ben-Gurion that in the event of King Hussein (1935–1999) 
being overthrown, Israel should “appoint an Israeli Arab in his stead.”146
In 1982, Peres stressed that the election of a new Lebanese head of state was 
to take place “without foreign intervention.” Was he aware of the inconsistency of 
his statements? Perhaps in his mind the Israeli army was so positively connoted 
that he would never refer to its actions as a “foreign intervention.” Or maybe he 
was of the opinion that Israel’s intervention on the grounds of their alliance with 
the Lebanese Christians – a group belonging to the ruling stratums in the country 
– was in some way nothing more than helping them help themselves. What is 
certain though is that his focus was solely on Israeli interests, which in 1982 were 
to be preserved by a military invasion of the neighboring country. Even as he stuck 
to diplomatic rhetoric, what can be gathered from the article is that he regards the 
military as an essential instrument in the shaping of regional politics.147
So what position did Peres take towards Sharon’s actual war aim, namely the 
solution of the Palestinian question in Jordan? Sharon’s plan provided the expul-
sion of the PLO leadership into Jordan, where they were to establish a state. The 
144 On August 1, 1982, the IDF seized Beirut International Airport and bombarded the southern 
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international pressure on Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territories would 
then subside, or so was the hope.
On the Israeli Right this plan was known by the slogan “Jordan is Pales-
tine.”148 But Sharon did not say what was to happen with the Palestinians living 
in Eretz Israel/Palestine, should his plan be successful. Would they have to move 
to Jordan? At any event, Sharon did not believe that Israeli military occupation 
could be kept up for long in the Palestinian zones. And giving up any territories 
was completely out of the question. 
It also remained unclear by which means Sharon intended to secure the 
consent of the PLO and the Jordanian Royal Family. Even if Arafat should coop-
erate, it was to be expected that the realization of the plan would result in con-
siderable tensions at the Israeli-Jordanian border.149 At the time Peres penned his 
article on the “political path,” Sharon’s plan had not yet been made public. For 
this reason the leader of the opposition had to be very cautious in taking up a 
clear position regarding the connection between the Palestinian question and the 
war in Lebanon, and so he took refuge in coded language:
I don’t see in the future any Israeli mandate based on which anybody can decide in Israel’s 
name to force a withdrawal from the territories of 1967, to divide Jerusalem and to create a 
Palestinian state. This state would attempt to sometimes unsettle Israel, sometimes to rule 
Jordan. Especially since we have a much more convincing alternative, namely to negotiate 
with elected representatives of the territories and with Jordan. With this in mind, it is unfor-
tunate that the European initiative seeks to adjust the [UN] resolutions 242 and 338 to PLO 
caprices. Resolutions such as 242 and 338 could be revoked, but it is unlikely that an accept-
able alternative can be found for the Arab as well as the Israeli side. […] Thus, the European 
intervention not only complicates American mediation, but also adds unnecessary fuel to 
the fire of the PLO’s wishes.150
Peres is careful to not directly link the war to the Palestinian question or Sharon’s 
suggestion for a solution. Like Sharon, he disapproved of UN Resolutions 242 and 
338. He was critical of the supporters of these motions, such as the European 
Union. The said resolutions stipulated an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian 
territories, and this is exactly what Peres tried to avert in 1982. But he does not 
discuss in how far the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon serves this territorial 
interest. He also ignores the nexus between this war in Lebanon and his solu-
148 Landau 2015: 195 seq.
149 Shlaim 2000: 412.
150 Peres 1982.
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tion of the Palestinian question, at the same time remaining unclear whether he 
would even support the idea of a Palestinian state in Jordan. 
But Peres does clearly express his actual goal: No Israeli withdrawal from the 
Palestinian territories. Even as he has little to offer by way of a concrete sugges-
tion regarding the solution of the Palestinian issue, his concluding sentence does 
reveal something about the unspoken connection between the war in Lebanon 
and the Palestinian question: 
The Israeli army has fulfilled the immediate mission of liberating northern Israel from PLO 
terrorism. The time has now come for great politics: for the liberation of Lebanon from the 
Gordian knot of its uninvited guests and for the comprehensive solution of the Palestine 
question, and namely by peaceful means.151
Three years after the commencement of the war, the Israeli army partially with-
drew from Lebanon. This was pushed through by Prime Minister Peres in early 
1985, against the resistance of the Likud coalition partner in the cabinet. In the 
retreat plan presented by Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, a gradual pullout 
from the country was provided, wherein a “narrow security zone” in South 
Lebanon along the Israeli-Lebanese border was to remain under the control of 
the Israeli army; notably in cooperation with the army of South Lebanon under 
the command of General Antoine Lahad (1927–2015).152
This plan was carried out by June of 1985. The “security zone,” as it is called 
in Israeli parlance – a military occupation from the Lebanese point of view –, de 
facto meant a continuation of the Lebanon War. The Islamic-Lebanese organiza-
tion Hezbollah, which was founded in the wake of the Israeli invasion and was 
financially and ideologically supported by Iran, took up a guerrilla war against 
the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. After eighteen years of relentless fight-
ing, it managed to force Israel into a so-called “unilateral retreat” from Lebanon. 
In the year 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1942–), leader of the Labor Party, 
followed through with a full withdrawal from the region against vehement pro-
tests from the leadership of the Israeli army.153 Up to this point, skirmishes had 
been occurring regularly in the “security zone.” One of these military missions 
had been approved in the spring of 1996 by Peres himself during his second term 
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The Escalation Potential of the “Security Zone” in 
South Lebanon
Peres’ contribution as prime minister in 1984 to 1986 towards containing the 
damage created by the Lebanon War led by the Likud government is generally 
viewed as a positive one.154 However, what is not properly taken into account in 
this context is that the plan he pushed through in 1985 provided only a partial 
withdrawal. He kept holding on to the “security zone.” In 1984, when he was 
still leader of the opposition, Peres delineated his security-political solution for 
the ongoing war in the neighboring country in his article “Lebanon – A Different 
Policy.”155 
Even though according to the article Israeli troops were to withdraw from the 
greater part of the country, Israel’s military dominance was still to be kept up. 
Peres wanted that “the [Israeli] Air Force continues flying in the sky over Lebanon 
and the [Israeli] navy keeps patrolling its coasts. The armed forces [of the Israeli 
allies under the leadership] of Haddad [Major Saad Haddad (1936–1984), prede-
cessor of General Antoine Lahad] shall also be bolstered to protect as a regular 
force the villages in South Lebanon from the return of the terrorists.” Basically, 
Israel would “regard South Lebanon as flexible territory.”156 
As Peres goes on to explain: “As long as this [region] is free of terrorists, 
the IDF will not interfere. But if they [the terrorists] entrench themselves there 
[in South Lebanon], the IDF will [have to] cross the border for a limited time to 
chase them out.” Peres claims that the security of Israel can be guaranteed by 
his defense strategy, even without “the IDF having to act on foreign territory.” In 
order to clear up any misconceptions, the leader of the Labor Party stressed that 
the Israeli army was “a defense force, by no means an occupying army,” so there 
would be “no real occupation” in South Lebanon.157
Based on this plan of “active defense from outside,” the “security zone” was 
finally firmly established. It would determine Israel’s Lebanon policy up until May 
of 2000. The fighting in the “security zone,” led with varying intensity, became 
routine in the course of the years. But the situation escalated in July of 1993 when 
Hezbollah combatants killed six Israeli soldiers. The government of the Labor 
Party under Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin launched a 
military operation that was put into action on July 25, 1993, under the name of 
154 Shlaim 2000: 427–428; Azoulay-Katz 1996: 122–123.
155 Hadashot, March 4, 1984.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
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“Payback.” The IDF, under Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak, bombarded vil-
lages in South Lebanon. The goal was to make the inhabitants of the villages flee 
north and put the Lebanese government under pressure to disarm Hezbollah. By 
the ceasefire of July 31, 1993, approximately 300,000 South-Lebanese had fled 
their homes. One hundred and eighteen Lebanese civilians and eight Hezbollah 
fighters – “more than fifty,” according to Israeli reports – were killed.
On the Israeli side, two civilians and one soldier died as a result of Hezbol-
lah missile strikes on northern Israel. The seven-day clash devastated South 
Lebanon, until finally American mediators were able to achieve an armistice reg-
ulation in which all sides declared they would cease fire. Syria promised to not 
support Hezbollah and the Palestinian organizations in the event of an attack on 
Israel.158 The “security zone” remained in place. The fight between Hezbollah, the 
South Lebanese and the Israeli army continued, though less intensively. 
This hot spot was ultimately the reason for Peres’ operation of 1996. In the 
spring of that year, shortly before the start of operation “Grapes of Wrath,” Prime 
Minister Peres declared why the “security zone” in South Lebanon needed to 
remain:
There have been attempts [by Hezbollah] to reach the [Israeli-Lebanese] border. Without 
the security zone, everything that happens over there would happen at the border. After all, 
many infiltrations have been avoided [through the security zone]. The situation is still tense, 
but there is no solution for the war [of Hezbollah] which is actually a guerrilla war. This is 
a war that will continue on unless there is a comprehensive political solution. Lebanon is 
Israel’s largest field for experimentation in the fight against terrorism. We have tried every-
thing, from an invasion to peace with Lebanon. None of this has worked. The final true 
remedy is peace.159
Peres’ dilemma still stood unsolved. He invoked military strength, which did not 
really amount to anything, but was somehow still considered vital and thus con-
tinued to be used. The circle is almost inescapable. In this case, military strength 
was demonstrated by occupying South Lebanon while being understood as 
“defense.” The “security zone” was also part of the defense strategy, which is 
why the military occupation had to be kept up. 
At the same time, this occupation was the reason for Hezbollah to lead a guer-
rilla war against the IDF. The result was a war of attrition. For Israel, Hezbollah 
(and for many years also the PLO and later Hamas) was a “terrorist organization.” 
Negotiations with it remained unimaginable because it was allegedly pursuing 
158 Shlaim 2000: 560–561.
159 Maariv, April 3, 1996.
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the goal of obliterating Israel. Therefore, a political solution was not even on the 
radar. 
What we have here is the logic of perpetual warfare, which is at the heart of 
Zionist Israel’s dilemma. War becomes routine. It took civilian Israeli resistance 
against the Israeli presence in South Lebanon, the “Four Mothers Movement,” 
to prompt Israel’s government to “unilaterally retreat,” which occurred only as 
late as 2000. But the Israeli army continues to stick to the opinion that their with-
drawal has tarnished Israel’s determent power.160
Security and the Policy of Targeted Killings
The operation “Grapes of Wrath” in Lebanon on April 1996 was Israel’s reaction 
to another escalation of violence. On January 6, 1996 the Israeli domestic secu-
rity service Shin Bet killed the Palestinian Yahya Ayyash (1966–1996). Israel held 
him responsible for several Hamas suicide attacks in the years 1994 and 1995. At 
that time, suicide attacks were a new form of fighting against Israel. They were a 
response of religious-political Palestinian movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
to the massacre of twenty-nine Palestinians at prayer, committed in February of 
1994 by the Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein in Hebron. Goldstein’s deed had in 
turn been directed against the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks that had been taken 
up in late 1993. The massacre itself had all the features of a suicide attack. Gold-
stein shot blindly into a group of people before he was finally overpowered and 
beaten to death by survivors of the massacre. 
The political scientist Avi Shlaim ascribes the murder of Ayyash to the Chief 
of Shin Bet Carmi Gilon (1950–) wanting to end his term in office with a “spectac-
ular gesture.” It also served to divert attention from the security gaps which his 
intelligence agency was responsible for and which had allowed the assassination 
of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to occur on November 4, 1995. Ayyash, 
who had been hiding in the Gaza Strip, was finally killed on the orders of Peres.161
Straightaway Hamas declared Ayyash a martyr. After Ramadan ended, a 
revenge campaign began which shook Israel in the spring of 1996. In the months 
of February and March, sixty Israelis were killed and many more injured in 
Hamas suicide attacks in Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv. In reaction to this, 
Peres terminated peace talks with the Palestinian Autonomy Authority under the 
160 Pedezur 2006.
161 Shlaim 2000: 556.
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leadership of the PLO and ordered the closure of the borders to the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank. 
Why did Peres give permission to liquidate Ayyash so shortly after the murder 
of Rabin that the country was still reeling from? Shlaim surmises two motives 
behind this. For one thing, the Prime Minister had thought of the retaliation as 
“tough justice.” For another, he felt like he was acting “in the service of the moral-
ity of the nation and of the security forces.”162 Indeed, at first Ayyash’s execution 
was welcomed enthusiastically in Israel. 
But Peres himself told the American journalist Robert Littell (1935–) that the 
killing was to be understood as a preemptive strike. As he stressed, there was 
proof that “Ayyash was actively preparing another attack. It wasn’t a matter of 
revenge. The decision to liquidate him prevented this terrorist attack.”163 Peres 
denies payback as a motive. He maintains that Israel did not do this for reasons of 
vengeance “although he [Peres] is satisfied that a Jew killer has disappeared.”164
This understanding nipped any public debate in the bud because the killing 
of Ayyash was cast as a necessary defense of Israel. Peres did not question this 
policy. In keeping with his security doctrine of using retaliation as a means of 
determent, he continued to pursue the liquidation policy of his predecessors as a 
matter of routine.165 Despite the spiral of violence and counterviolence that this 
practice keeps triggering, its security-political benefits remain undisputed to this 
very day. 
But how did Peres not have any scruples to execute Ayyash in view of the 
upcoming elections and the starting Oslo Peace Process? Obviously “tough 
justice,” the biblical principle of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” and the 
nationalistic element of the “morality of the nation” and the security apparatuses 
had priority. Rabin’s murder not only created tension within the Shin Bet, but 
also divided Israeli society. Now a convincing strike against a “clearly identified 
enemy of Israel” was meant to reunite the Jewish people within the country. After 
Ayyash’s killing, a patriotic mood spread in the entire country, accompanied by 
a feeling of satisfaction regarding the capabilities of the guardians of the Zionist 
project. But are wars led by Israel really only for national-state or security-polit-
ical reasons?
162 Ibid. 556; Azoulay-Katz 1996: 238.
163 Peres and Littell 1998: 87.
164 Ben-Simon 1997: 216–218.
165 Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin authorized the execution of Islamic 
Jihad leader Fathi Shikaki. The Mossad carried out this order on October 25, 1995, on the island 
of Malta.
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The Military Operation Grapes of Wrath of April 1996
The suicide attacks in the spring of 1996 shook Peres’ government and darkened 
his prospects of being reelected. US President Bill Clinton (1946–) tried to save 
the Oslo Peace Process and Peres’ government, initiating an antiterrorism summit 
that took place on March 13, 1996 in Sharm el-Sheikh. But the international 
summit did not have the desired effect. The prime minister’s drop in popularity 
remained drastic. 
Regarding this point, Peres’ biographer writes: “Peres still hadn’t under-
stood that international conferences had no influence on Israelis; a single mil-
itary operation against the terrorists would have been much more effective.”166 
Did Peres hope to improve his chances for reelection with the military operation 
in Lebanon? According to Shlaim, Lebanon was a “tempting retaliation target” 
against the background of the terror wave in Israel so close to the parliamentary 
elections. After all, the Israeli public was longing for a reprisal.167 But whether 
the Israeli public really wanted another military operation in Lebanon has to 
remain open. As for the security-political elites in the military, government and 
the media, they were ready to enter what was referred to as “the next round.”168 
The army leadership and some ministers of the cabinet, in particular Foreign 
Minister Ehud Barak – who had been chief of general staff and the architect of 
operation “Payback” in July 1993 – advocated another military action against 
Hezbollah in South Lebanon, given the tensions in the “security zone.” Passivity, 
so went their assessment, would damage Peres’ security-political standing. But 
other voices in the government warned Peres, also with a view to his prospects 
for being reelected, that “we all [in the Zionist Left] will come to regret a war.”169
166 Bar-Zohar 2007: 467.
167 Shlaim 2000: 559.
168 Cf. press releases such as: IDF assessment: “Inhabitants of the security zone assisted in 
the killing of an Israeli soldier by the Hezbollah,” Haaretz, March 11, 1996; “Rumors of immi-
nent IDF military action in Lebanon,” Haaretz, March 18, 1996; “Hezbollah announces: Should 
IDF attack Lebanon, we will bombard settlements in northern Israel with Katyusha rockets,” 
Haaretz, March 19, 1996; “Katyusha rockets hit Galilee in reaction to IDF bombardment in which 
two Lebanese were killed,” Haaretz, March 31, 1996; “110 terrorist attacks committed against the 
IDF in South Lebanon since beginning of the year,” Haaretz, March 17, 1996; Yoel Markus asks: 
“Is a second Lebanon War imminent?,” Haaretz, March 19, 1996; Ehud Oshri observes the “Com-
bativeness of TV media,” Haaretz, April 2, 1996.
169 Ben-Simon 1997: 230.
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Peres went ahead with it anyway, authorizing the military operation “Grapes 
of Wrath.” It was supposed to be directed only against Hezbollah fighters.170 
However, the military leadership as well as Foreign Minister Barak pushed for 
air raids to force the majority of the civilian population of South Lebanon to flee 
north so that the Israeli army could deal the local Hezbollah a massive blow. 
Further, it was hoped that the Lebanese refugees would put their government 
under pressure, and together with Syria it would restrain Hezbollah.171 The air 
strikes on South Lebanon, Beirut and the Beqaa Valley began on April 11, 1996. 
Approximately 400,000 civilians fled the area. Nevertheless, Hezbollah suc-
ceeded in firing Katyusha rockets into northern Israel. Some of the Israelis living 
there were also forced to flee.172
Statements Peres made to the press on the eve of the war reveal how the prime 
minister promoted the escalation of the war by rhetorical means: “Iran smuggles 
weapons and explosives to Hezbollah through diplomatic mail”173; “Syria thinks 
that it is clever to provoke us. We will not tolerate the escalation in the north.”174 
A couple of days before the battle began, Peres publicly pointed out “the IDF 
intelligence service has new evidence that Iran is about to overthrow the ‘peace 
government’ [Peres’ government].”175
What sort of practical effect did the head of the peace government see in the 
war? Peres did not enlighten the Israeli public on the specific political goals of the 
new operation in Lebanon, “in order to avoid high, unattainable aspirations.”176 
A long fight might become necessary in order to achieve a sustainable solution, 
he said. He asked his people for resilience and patience.177
The clashes finally ended on April 27, 1996 as a result of American pressure. 
On the domestic front, the Labor Party, and thus Peres’ “peace government,” lost 
the elections; not least because it had failed to take into account the Israeli Pal-
estinian votes it had lost because of the fighting in Lebanon. It was a heavy blow 
for the Zionist Left, and consequently for the Oslo Peace Process. From a military 
standpoint, the 1996 operation ended without result. Israel had neither managed 
170 Ibid. 231.
171 Shlaim 2000: 560.
172 Ibid. 560; Ben-Simon 1997: 231.
173 Haaretz, March 24, 1996.
174 Haaretz, March 21, 1996.
175 Haaretz, April 8, 1996. On June 8, 1996, just a few days before the fighting began, the inhab-
itants of northern Israel were called upon to seek shelter in bunkers. Cf. Haaretz, June 9, 1996.
176 Haaretz, April 14, 1996.
177 Haaretz, April 16, 1996.
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to consolidate its presence in South Lebanon, nor had it won the support of its 
inhabitants for such a presence.178 
Hezbollah had not been crushed and their guerrilla war continued up to the 
retreat resolution of the Ehud Barak government in 2000. The military criticized 
this decision as a “major curtailment of the deterrence power” of Israel, and 
blamed it for the eruption of the “Second Intifada” that same year. There was a 
crack down on the Palestinians with the goal of regaining the determent objec-
tive. On these grounds alone, the military got its way and was authorized to carry 
out another operation in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, again triggered by an 
incident with Hezbollah at the northern border.179 
In late 2008, Barak – this time as the leader of the Labor Party and Minister of 
Defense in the government of Ehud Olmert who led the Kadima party, a party of 
the center that had been newly formed in 2006 – sent Israeli troops into the Gaza 
Strip which had been controlled by Hamas since 2006. The other decisive armed 
encounters in the new century – 2000 to 2004, 2006, and 2008 to 2009 – were 
likewise the result of decisions made by a “Zionist Left government” in Jerusalem. 
And as for the clashes of 2012 and 2014 in the Gaza Strip that were led by the Likud 
government, these too had the Zionist Left’s unshakable consent. 
Conclusion: Of War and Jewish Statehood
How may this perpetual state of war be explained? Why has it been tolerated by 
Israeli society for so many years, despite the fact that the war policy has proven 
to be counterproductive over and over again? The answer to this question may 
be found in the fact that historically Israel has come to presuppose a close con-
nection between military strength and national-state existence. And as a conse-
quence thereof, and especially in the face of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe, an 
internalized understanding of Zionism as a guarantor of Jewish existence or as 
the only answer to the so-called “Jewish question” has evolved. 
Already in 1948, in the first war over Palestine, the implementation of the 
Zionist project in Eretz Israel proved to be utterly dependent on the operational 
readiness of the military. A military defeat was equated with the disintegration of 
the Yishuv, while a military victory – as would turn out to be confirmed – with the 
birth of a national state.
178 Shlaim 2000: 561; Bar-Zohar 2006: 665; Azoulay-Katz 1996: 247.
179 Bar-Josef 2006.
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The Jewish state was born out of war. It was thanks to the war of 1948 that 
Zionism managed to come much closer to achieving its national-state goals than 
UN Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947 was prepared to allow. Through other 
wars – particularly that of 1956 – Israel built up its deterrent effect, and it also 
succeeded in expanding its state territory as a result of the war of 1967. In this 
sense, war has a positive connotation. It secures Jewish statehood. 
But since Israel did not settle the question of its state territory in 1949 but 
rather was intent on expansion, and also because in 1949 no peace deal but only 
a temporary ceasefire agreement with the neighbor states could be reached, no 
solution to the question of Palestine was arrived at and various conflicts contin-
ued to ignite. Gaining and keeping territory has turned out to be a central motive 
of the military operations undertaken over the course of the years. Not only the 
wars of conquest (1948, 1956 and 1967), but also the less glorious wars of attrition 
(1967–1970, 1985–2000) as well as the defense wars (such as 1973) were ultimately 
fought over land.
But the armed encounters of 1956, 1982 and 1996 show how closely the ter-
ritory is linked to the military task of defense in the Israeli understanding. And 
defense stands for security, which in turn stands for national-state existence. For 
this reason security has become a central social code, the “Security Code”180 rep-
resents a way of life to which there is no alternative. In Hebrew, the expression 
“Ein-Breira” (no choice) was popularized as a social code for the necessity of war 
for the purpose of self-defense. 
What the Security Code spells out is this: Security is a guiding principle of the 
social order. But because security has not yet been achieved and keeps ending 
up back on the political agenda, the state has no choice but to revert even more 
resolutely to a war policy with the conviction that it ensures national statehood. 
This happens with the support of society. 
Over time, Israeli militarism has become a taken-for-granted fact. The histori-
cal development of Israel’s state apparatus, social structures and political culture 
has unfolded accordingly. The Israeli collective is fixated upon war institution-
ally (politics, military, society, economy, industry and legal system), as well as 
mentally and politico-culturally. In dialectic relationship to the notion that war 
is an integral part of reality in the Middle East, the security doctrine of determent 
has been established. This became apparent from the formative years on, as the 
worst-case scenario was constantly invoked. This included the assumption that 
the Arab neighboring states of Israel are its archenemies. And this in turn gave 
birth to the conviction that an invincible Israeli military power is a necessity. 
180 Kimmerling 2001.
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The doctrine of determent was soon framed in terms such as “activistic 
defense,” “preemptive war,” “retaliation” and “determent.” The “demonstration 
of strength” was supposed to neutralize the hostile potential of the enemy. If only 
the military strength of Israel could be made obvious, the feared attacks would 
be averted. But this doctrine does not only entail perpetual armament. It also 
means a ceaseless demonstration of military power. As a consequence, non-con-
ventional weapons and disproportionate military operations are likewise legiti-
mized in domestic policy. The deterrent effect cannot be allowed to lessen, even 
if in parallel peace is being negotiated. 
The flipside of such a security doctrine based on determent is the state of 
panic into which politics, army and society are thrown every time cracks appear 
in the deterrent effect. Whenever the Israeli army suffers a defeat – even against 
clearly inferior powers such as Hezbollah or the Palestinian resistance of first the 
PLO and later also Hamas – the urge to rebuild the deterrence power through the 
military grows stronger. 
To political Israel, deterrence power is equivalent to its military hegemony in 
the region. This is to be achieved not only through a well-equipped conventional 
army, but also through the exclusive regional possession of non-conventional 
weapons. And while Israel is still not admitting to its nuclear capacities, it fully 
understands that its national state security is closely coupled to being the only 
nuclear power in the region. 
This is why it cannot let its Arab neighbor states, perceived as mortal enemies, 
ever come into possession of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, 
so-called preemptive wars also form a part of the security policy where the goal is 
to prevent the nuclear armament of neighbor states. This became obvious in the 
case of Iraq in June 1981 and Syria in September 2007, when the Israeli air force 
destroyed nuclear reactors in these countries. The ongoing debate concerning 
Iran’s nuclear program has also been ranking at the top of Israel’s security-polit-
ical agenda for some years.
The prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons is a source of great concern to 
Israel, because through the 1980s and 1990s this Islamic republic has become 
an increasingly important ally of two political-military organizations with Mus-
lim-religious orientations, namely the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hez-
bollah. Both of these have become declared archenemies in these decades from 
the Israeli point of view. And since Israel accuses Iran as well as Hamas and Hez-
bollah of having the strategic goal of annihilating Israel, Iran being a nuclear 
power poses a danger to the Jewish state. It would challenge Israel’s hegemonic 
military position in the region, and in doing so possibly also jeopardize its nation-
al-state existence. Or so goes the Israeli fear. Thus, political Israel sees the preclu-
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sion of a nuclear Iran as an integral part of its security policy that is based on the 
security doctrine of determent through Israel’s military superiority.
It is obvious that this doctrine entails escalation and keeps intensifying the 
respective conflicts instead of diffusing them as the determent policy promises. 
Despite this fact, it has barely lost any of its potency. How does such an over-
whelming social consensus on a war policy based on this doctrine come about? 
An explanation may be found in the already discussed civil militarism. Israeli 
militarism is a product of the depoliticization of security as it has been practiced 
from above for many years. The state (and its apparatuses of violence) claims the 
exclusive power of decision in security matters, thus effectively excluding society, 
i.e., the public and their representatives in the Knesset, from the actual decision 
process.
De facto it is the executive powers – the security cabinet and the security 
apparatuses – that make all the decisions regarding security policy. Through the 
exclusion of society from this entire area, the executive has plenty of room to 
maneuver. It can stick to a repeatedly failed security policy without really being 
forced to expose it to scrutiny. This domestic political procedure has been estab-
lished over the course of the years to become an essential feature of Israel’s polit-
ical culture. In opposition to the strength and autonomy of the state stands a 
society that is deprived of power as a result of its depoliticization. 
The fundament for this depoliticization of security was already laid in the 
early years of the State of Israel, when Prime Minister and Minister of Defense 
David Ben-Gurion held enough power and authority to segregate the complex 
of security policy from political routine and debate. In the formative years, the 
actual decision process did not take place in the Knesset or the Mapai party. 
Instead, a small circle within the Ministry of Defense exclusively decided issues of 
war and armament. In this way, Ben-Gurion set the course for a political culture 
of the depoliticization of security. His protégé Peres would later reinforce these 
structures. While the state strengthened its executive power by relieving it from 
any obligation to account for its security policy, the new immigrant society was 
weakened “from above” as this entire field was effectively placed out of its reach.
The first Israeli “war of opportunity” is a good example of the process of the 
depoliticization of security. In 1956, it was three individuals on the Israeli side 
who prepared the war against Egypt: David Ben-Gurion, Army Chief Moshe Dayan 
and Director-General in the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres. The latter two took 
a vanguard role in politically paving the way for Ben-Gurion. Neither the Mapai 
party nor the Knesset or even the government, not to mention the public, had a 
say in any of it.
The entire endeavor had to remain strictly secret at the time, not least because 
the actual backdrop to the war, namely the stabilization of the military alliance 
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with France, would have been difficult to communicate. Even as it was beyond 
debate to Peres that the war was led in the interest of Israel and that the alliance 
with France was only necessary during the embargo, he knew how to mask the 
actual background in order to achieve consensus in Israel.181 
More importantly, even years later Israeli society was still not informed of the 
true motive. Therefore, the Sinai-Suez War remained an undisputed necessity, a 
defense war in the collective awareness. This rendered domestic political debate 
a moot point. The narrative according to which “the enemies want to annihilate 
us and we have to defend ourselves,” can neither be proven nor refuted. It has, 
however, been passed on and become firmly institutionalized in an unreflective 
process carried on over many years.
And so the security question was ideologized and ultimately depoliticized. 
In this way the concrete circumstances of any war appear to be of secondary 
importance. They are ultimately blocked out. Accordingly, any serious discussion 
or effective criticism fails to emerge. The scenario of 1956 repeated itself in 1967, 
on the eve of the Six-Day War. The war was portrayed as an existence-securing 
measure as the country was seized by a downright fear of annihilation. Behind 
the scenes, the decision to go to war was forced on politics by the military.182 
Israel scored a military triumph, which led to victory euphoria. Here, too, any 
substantial public debate about the reasons, the course, the goals or the devastat-
ing politico-demographical and geopolitical results of the war failed to material-
ize. Settlement of the new territories commenced immediately afterwards.
Another contribution to the depoliticization of war and thus to the consolida-
tion of civil militarism was made by civilian politician Peres in 1982, when he was 
in the opposition. In the beginning he did not only agree with the government’s 
decision to send the Israeli army into Lebanon, but he also supported the political 
architect of the Lebanon war by practically smothering any public debate about 
the aims of the war before it even began. This was again fueled by the conviction 
that war was a necessity, but it also arose from the fact that disclosing to the 
public the actual motivation for this bold military operation in the neighboring 
country was out of the question.
The Lebanon plan ultimately failed, exposing Israel to an even greater threat 
from the country’s northern border. Despite this fact, the war of 1982 was still 
considered a defensive war by the political-military leadership, and this is why it 
would continue for eighteen years. Although in 1983 Israeli society actually did 
come to the point where it forced the resignation of war architect Ariel Sharon 
181 Amar-Dahl 2010: 225–250.
182 Golani 2002: 197–203; Segev 2005.
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through a state investigation committee, it no less than its political leadership 
still maintains the view that this war was an act of defense. This is why it would 
go on to entrust itself to the same security-political leadership for so long after-
wards. Shimon Peres and Ariel Sharon would try to keep the Palestinian territo-
ries under Israeli control for many more years, before finally making the decision 
in 2005 to pull out of the Gaza Strip.183
The depoliticization of security becomes most apparent in the question of 
nuclear weapons, where the inception of the Israeli nuclear program was decided 
to the exclusion of the public and its representatives. The “policy of opacity” 
carried the day. This policy is not only geared towards keeping the Israeli nuclear 
program out of international control, but also towards preventing it from being 
discussed domestically. Peres played a central role in these developments, start-
ing in the mid-1950s with the acquisition of the infrastructure, and leading up 
to the assertion and ultimately the consolidation of the policy of opacity in the 
political culture.
This depoliticization of security forms the basis for the civil militarism that 
has taken such a firm hold in the political culture of the country. The genesis 
of this political culture is rooted in the disciplining of an immigrant and settler 
society for the ultimate goal of national statehood, as it is understood by the 
political-military leadership and enforced by the state. For the sake of its secret 
warfare, the state secures its own political maneuvering room by reverting to mil-
itary censorship, emergency laws, the policy of denial and the exertion of control 
over the military-industrial complex. 
All these measures carry an important domestic-political function in effec-
tively stifling public debate of the security question. As things stand, Israeli 
society is de facto all but completely at the mercy of the state when it comes to 
matters of security. This understanding of state and society has evolved not least 
because the country’s political leadership failed to clarify the question of state 
territory, leaving it to the military instead. And so the question of Palestine con-
tinues to play a decisive role in Israel’s quest for peace.
183 Landau 2015: 344 seq. 
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The now fifty years of my public life can be divided into two halves. The first half of my 
work has been dedicated to defense, the second to peace. […] For me, crossing over from 
the domain of defense to the domain of peace was like leaving the real world in exchange 
for an unreal one.1 
This remark by veteran politician Shimon Peres, made in the late 1990s, provides 
a telling insight into the political culture of Israel – and, for that matter, into its 
prospects of ending the century-long conflict over Palestine. Peres succinctly 
describes the fifty years following Israel’s establishment as a balancing act 
between the conflicting priorities of defense and peace, security and reconcilia-
tion. It is in this difficult terrain that he, Peres, had to move and find his bearings 
throughout his entire political career. War remains indispensable for Israel’s exis-
tence, but since the state of war is excruciating in the long run, peace needs to be 
aspired to. However, it is to come about strictly as a consequence of security, and 
is only feasible after the Jewish state has been secured. In other words, existence 
as a national state has to precede reconciliation.
But what exactly should this reconciliation look like? This is what Peres had 
to say with regard to this matter five decades after Israel’s establishment and fol-
lowing several years of peace talks with the Palestinians, but still before the final 
failure of the Oslo Peace Process in October 2000: “Peace is like a dream: It still 
lingers as I awaken, even if it is only pale and blurred like the dusk, but as the 
day is dawning and the hours pass, reality gets the upper hand.”2 Is “reality” as it 
presents itself roughly half a century after the founding of the state not suited for 
peace in the eyes of Israel’s last remaining founding father? 
Since the mid-1980s, the bearer of hope for peace and leader of the Israeli 
Labor Party had been increasingly putting himself out for an initiation of peace 
talks. And it was his party that popularized the formula of “peace and security” 
(Shalom ve-Bitahon). In numerous speeches over the years, Peres mentioned 
these two terms in one breath. His voice was increasingly perceived as a call for 
negotiations to solve the Palestinian question. Up to this point, any such thing 
had been unimaginable in Israel. 
In 1985, Peres, as prime minister in the grand coalition, pushed through the 
partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon against the resistance of most 
Likud cabinet members. This decision was preceded by the peace settlement with 
1 Peres 1999: 57, 61.
2 Ibid. 61–62.
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Egypt in 1979, by which the danger of war in the south was averted for the time 
being, as well as by the failed attempt of 1982 to solve the Palestinian question by 
waging war in Lebanon. Peres’ policy created a feeling of relief in Israel, which 
had maneuvered itself into a hopeless war.
The leader of the Labor Party distinguished himself as a responsible, level-
headed politician, as the “liberator of the Israeli army from the Lebanese quag-
mire,” and this in spite of the fact that a “security zone” had been created in South 
Lebanon and a guerrilla war with Hezbollah had ensued there. Peres increas-
ingly positioned himself as a proponent of the peace process. His conciliatory 
demeanor was in clear contrast to the blockade mentality of the Likud that balked 
at peace talks, given its commitment to the ideology of the “promised land.” 
Yitzhak Shamir, head of the Likud and prime minister in the period from 1986 
to 1992, soon turned out to be Peres’ main political rival regarding this question. 
The debates over peace finally led to a split into a Zionist Right and a Zionist Left. 
Foreign Minister Peres (1986–1988) initiated talks with Jordan’s King Hussein 
with the goal of solving the Palestinian question. But the result, the “London Doc-
ument” of 1987, was blocked by the Likud in the grand coalition and was never 
ratified. 
Finally, in 1990, Peres started working on dissolving the grand coalition in 
the hopes of being able to form a “small government” together with the party of 
religious peace advocates Shas. The leader of the Zionist Left justified this stra-
tegic move in the name of peace: “So far, big decisions could only be made by 
small governments.”3 The formation of this “peace government” occurred only 
as late as 1992 under the leadership of the Labor Party. Thus, for the first time in 
history, Israel had a political constellation that made direct negotiations with the 
Palestinians possible. The Oslo Peace Process was set in motion by the Zionist 
Left government only a short time later. 
What was this government hoping to achieve in this process? What kind of 
peace did the Israeli peace camp strive for? And why did the only attempt to solve 
the conflict over Palestine ultimately fail?
Zionist Left: The Language of Peace
Let us first take a closer look at four catchphrases used by Israeli scholarship to 
describe the manner in which the Zionist Left conceives of peace: “peace ide-
ology,” “imaginary peace,” “security myth,” and “peace without Arabs.” These 
3 Al Hamishmar, April 9, 1990.
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terms were coined as a reaction to the Oslo Peace Process, or the failure of it, as 
the first serious attempt undertaken by Israel to tackle the Palestinian question 
by diplomatic means. The reconciliation process of 1993 was considered a politi-
cal victory of the Zionist Left over the Zionist Right. 
Moshe Zuckermann speaks of a “psycho-collective fear of peace” inherent in 
Israel’s political culture. Using the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian talks of 2000 
as an example, he shows that while Israel kept evoking the “longing for peace” in 
an emotionally charged manner, it proved to be utterly unable to realize this aspi-
ration by politically legitimizing peace in its own society. Zuckermann refers to a 
“peace ideology,” i.e., a depoliticized understanding of peace that has been prev-
alent since the founding era. He observes that there is constant talk of “peace” 
and the “peace wish,” and also of “wanting to live with the neighbors in peace.”4 
Such avowals of peace are also ubiquitous in songs, political rhetoric and 
Israeli diplomacy, “so that one may speak of a fetishistic relationship to the term 
of ‘peace’ and peace ideology.” Zuckermann interprets this as a “false conscious-
ness about the actual intent.” In terms of collective conceptions as well as the 
actual policy, in Israel “peace is on everyone’s lips, but nobody has ever really put 
it to the test, that is, shown the willingness to bring it about by paying the neces-
sary price.” Even as alternative approaches to the peace question have gained in 
significance over the years, the depoliticized peace ideology has remained dom-
inant in Israel.5
For Zuckermann, the “peace ideology” represents the flipside of the “security 
question.” As he sees it, the “security question” serves as “cement for the con-
flict-laden society.”6 Over time it has engendered the Israeli-Jewish unit matrix, 
an undisputed consensus regarding the borders and developments of Israeli 
society and its political framework.7 The central function the “security question” 
or the “security myth” has for the cohesion of Jewish-Israeli society only became 
fully apparent when its unifying effect seemed to wane, namely at the moment 
when a deep rift appeared in Israeli society as a result of the peace process with 
the PLO. 
One does not have to believe that the Israeli-Palestinian political talks initiated in 1993 even 
needed to bring about actual peace in order to threaten the ‘unity’ effect which depends on 
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This weakening can be seen in the unprecedentedly scathing criticism that was 
directed by the Israeli Right against the security politician Yitzhak Rabin of all 
people, who, however hesitantly, dared to tread the path of peace. As a result, 
he was vilified as a “traitor” and “murderer of Zionism.” On the other side, the 
reaction of the Zionist Left to Rabin’s assassination is likewise an indication of 
the central function of the “security question.” Shortly after Rabin’s murder on 
November 4, 1995, it was depoliticized to such an extent that the debate about the 
deed and its political background shifted to the question of the “split of Israeli 
society” or the “unity of the Jewish people.” According to Zuckermann, this rep-
resents an attempt to keep the divergent ethnic, socio-economic, religious and 
political powers of Israeli society from surfacing.9
A similar connection between the ideologization of the security question, 
Israel’s peace [in]ability and the schisms inherent in Israeli society is also dis-
cerned by the Israeli sociologist Lev Grinberg (1953–) in his examination of the 
Oslo Peace Process: Imagined Peace, Discourse of War.10 According to Grinberg, 
the “myth of security” has an indispensable regulating function for inner-Israeli 
as well as for Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. He defines the “security myth” as the 
belief that the new hostile relations with the Arab world are an incarnation of 
Jewish history, one that is conceived of as a history of suffering and persecution. 
It is a perception that had already been solidified in the founding period as a con-
sequence of the Holocaust and the “War of Independence” of 1948. 
This notion contains the fear that the Goyim’s intention – in any historical 
epoch – is the annihilation of the Jews. Accordingly, the ethnic-national army is 
stylized as a “defensive army” in order to legitimize its use of violence, among 
other things. As a result of the security myth, the conflict is depoliticized as it is 
traced back to an unredeemable archenemyship of the “new Goyim” towards the 
Jews:
The security myth sprang from the sense of being under an existential threat that is deeply 
rooted in Jewish history, and in particular from the experience of anti-Semitism dominated 
by the Holocaust, which is why the security myth stands in the way of a debate on Israel’s 
realpolitik situation, including the concrete dangers it involves.11
The security myth is not always being accepted without resistance, however. 
Against the backdrop of the Palestinian uprising from 1987 to 1992, for example, 
9 Ibid. 186–187; id. 2003: 105.
10 Grinberg 2007.
11 Ibid. 44–45.
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doubts arose in society, politics and the army as to whether the Intifada was really 
about the annihilation of Israel, and whether it can be kept in check by military 
means. Such doubts shake the legitimation of military violence and damage the 
belief in the security myth.
An alternative to the security myth is the myth of “peace and security.” This 
myth is propagated mostly by the Zionist Left in the hopes of escaping the con-
sequence of perpetual warfare as it is contained in the security myth. Pursuant 
to the myth of peace and security, the occupation of the Palestinian territories 
of 1967 is only temporary, with these areas merely representing a trump card 
for future negotiations or a pawn that can be used in exchange for the desired 
peace.12 
What makes this declaration of “peace and security” a myth is the fact that 
championing this combination of peace and security does not keep its propo-
nents within the Zionist Left from politically supporting Jewish settlement in the 
Palestinian territories, even if only by implication. And this is clearly done out of 
conviction, since the Zionist Left no less than its opponents pins its politics on the 
Zionist vision of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. 
Grinberg demonstrates in how far this fundament of “peace and security” 
has posthumously turned out to be a myth. He uses the expression “imagined 
peace” – included already in the title of his book Imagined Peace, Discourse of 
War – to refer to the tension between peace and security that is contained in said 
myth. What he means by “imaginary” peace is a depoliticized, ahistorical under-
standing of peace. Thus, peace is imagined as separate from any concrete politi-
cal action. On the one hand, a symbolic gesture like the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles on September 13, 1993 (Oslo I) is enough to spark peace euphoria, 
as if the peace would arrive by virtue of a ceremony at the White House alone. On 
the other hand, the Oslo Peace Process is conceptualized in such a way that the 
core questions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain untouched for the time 
being; one first has to focus on building trust with the new Palestinian dialogue 
partner, after all. 
This constellation creates a situation where it becomes possible to cherish 
the illusion of a continuously approaching peace, since it is now possible to point 
to ongoing political talks. But at the same time there is no progress whatsoever 
in the modification of the old political order of military occupation, including the 
expansion of settlements. Grinberg speaks of a peace discourse in which peace is 
thought of in abstract terms, without any concrete changes occurring or any real 
political solutions being discussed. 
12 Ibid. 54.
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The occupation is deemed to have ended, with the borders of 1967 represent-
ing the final state lines. Especially in the constellation of the Oslo Accords, the 
old occupation practices and the necessity of decolonizing the Palestinian ter-
ritories are not only allowed to be ignored, but are being even further solidified. 
In addition, the Zionist Left’s discourse of the depoliticized “irreversibility of the 
peace process,” which is conceived of in messianic terms, leads to a shift in the 
debate. Now it is no longer centered on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that indeed 
remains to be settled. Instead, it moves from a conflict-laden to a post-conflict-
laden agenda. As a result of this shift 
Israelis succeeded in imagining peace, in turning it into an illusion, because they managed 
to ‘disconnect’ themselves from what had really happened behind the Green Line [the 
borders of 1949–1967]. But for three groups it was all but impossible to disconnect and 
indulge in the illusion of peace: the Palestinians, the [Jewish] settlers and the Israeli army.13 
Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin speaks of a “principle of separation” as a characteristic 
feature of the understanding of peace across the entire Zionist-Israeli political 
spectrum. According to this notion, the separation of the two collectives is the 
goal of any peace.14 Based on the traditional perception of the Zionist project as 
an apolitical utopia, detached of the concrete space and very real people and 
actual history of Palestine, Raz-Krakotzkin describes the separation principle 
inherent in the Zionist consciousness also in connection to its understanding of 
peace. The Zionist vision of peace is based on a separation of the two peoples, 
which is why Palestinians and their rights are given little attention, even as many 
Israelis sincerely believe in the end of the occupation. Thus, the categorical elimi-
nation of the Palestinians from the Israeli consciousness remains unchanged also 
in the context of the act of the Oslo Process.15
The “principle of separation” certainly becomes apparent in the fact that 
it was particularly in the Oslo era that the policy of locking down Palestinian 
territories was reinforced. The passport system, introduced in 1991 for Palestin-
ians living in the occupied territories, signalized the end of a relative freedom 
of movement for Palestinians on Israeli state territory. Despite some restrictions 
for security-political reasons, the policy of “economic integration” that had been 
pursued by Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan from 1967 on at least conceded 
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of movement within Israel, mostly for work purposes. In contrast to that, the 
Oslo Process brought the implementation of the passport system by which the 
freedom of movement of the Palestinian population was considerably restricted, 
and became a privilege that was granted on a case-by-case basis by Israel or the 
Palestinian Autonomy Authority.16 
Raz-Krakotzkin interprets this lockdown policy as the result of a mindset 
fixed on separation even in the act of peace. Another consequence of this way 
of thinking is that neither the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor the 
different political positions were actually discussed in the Oslo Process. In the 
groundwork of the Oslo Accords (Oslo I and II), the core questions of the his-
torically grown conflicts are indeed excluded from negotiations and ultimately 
also from public debate. True to the precept that confidence has to be built first, 
these questions are postponed to a later point in time. But peace can hardly be 
achieved without revising one’s own understanding of it. A change in perception 
that is indispensable for peace cannot be realized without the reappraisal of the 
historically developed subject matter of the conflict.17 
But how is it that this kind of historical consciousness evolved? And what 
understanding of the conflict or of peace is it based on? How may the collective 
fear of peace18 with the Palestinians be explained? And why is it still so hard for 
Zionist Israel to imagine such a peace even in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century?
The Young Israel: Jewish Statehood without Peace 
After the devastating war of 1948 had come to an end, it became clear to the Israeli 
leadership that it would be possible to manage peace with the Arab neighbor 
states only if two complexes of problems could be settled, namely the question of 
state borders and the problem of Palestinian refugees. But the Israeli leadership 
excluded any compromise in both of these matters.19 
For David Ben-Gurion, a political settlement was impossible at this early 
stage. A statement he gave to the New York Herald Tribune concerning this issue 
went around the world: “I am prepared to get up in the middle of the night in 
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years. We are under no pressure whatsoever.”20 True to this statement, Ben-Gu-
rion initially opposed peace talks with the Egyptian King Faruq (1920–1965) in 
September 1948, as well as with the Syrian President Husni Zaim (1894–1949) in 
the spring of 1949. 
According to Avi Shlaim, Ben-Gurion was convinced that Israel’s starting 
position in the negotiations would improve at a later point in time. The time 
factor played an important role for the father of the nation. Surely, in 1949 he was 
still in the process of intellectually digesting such enormous demographic and 
geopolitical changes. Israel’s interests as a national state could initially be pre-
served even without peace. But at the same time, Ben-Gurion makes recourse to 
the language of the peace ideology, such as for example in a debate of the cabinet 
on May 29, 1949:
It is true that these things should not prevent us from accelerating the peace, because the 
issue of peace between us and the Arabs is important, and it is worth paying a considerable 
price for it. But when the matter is dragged out – it brings us benefits, as the mufti helped 
us in the past. […] But in general we need not regret too much that the Arabs refuse to make 
peace with us.21
Likewise, Shimon Peres, Ben-Gurion’s right-hand man in the Ministry of Defense 
for the first decade, hardly knew what to make of the terms “peace” and “recon-
ciliation.” Peres’ main focus in these years was the armament of the young state. 
The security myth dominated his view of Arab-Israeli relations. His essay “Recon-
ciliation Does Not Mean Security”22, published on September 29, 1955, is one of 
his few early comments on this topic. At this point the political debate between 
the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry on war and peace, retaliation 
and rapprochement had reached a climax. The protagonists of the controversy 
were Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister 
Moshe Sharett (1949–1956). In his short term in office, Sharett, who was also 
Prime Minister in the period from December 1953 to August 1955, tried to initiate 
a dialogue with Nasser.
But Israeli-Egyptian relations perceivably deteriorated following Ben-Gu-
rion’s return to the Ministry of Defense in February 1955. With the support of 
Ben-Gurion, Chief of General Staff Moshe Dayan pushed through his aggressive 
political plans against Prime Minister Sharett. Already on February 28, 1955, 
the Israeli army in Gaza carried out “Black Arrow”; one of its most devastating 
20 Shlaim 2000: 52; quoted from Ben-Gurion’s Diary, July 18,1949.
21 Shlaim 2000: 51–52; quoted from the Cabinet Protocol of May 29, 1949.
22 Peres 1965: 16–24 [hereafter: Peres, September 29, 1955].
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retaliation operations.23 Egypt’s President Nasser used this occasion to recruit 
Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip, the Fedayeen, which he then deployed 
against Israeli facilities.24 
Another consequence of the retaliation operation was the Egyptian-Soviet 
arms treaty of September 1955, which in turn threw Israel into a state of panic 
and prompted it to buy arms through France. “Black Arrow” also put an end to 
the unofficial talks between Nasser and Sharett that had been taken up in early 
1954. Although the Lavon Affair of July 1954 and its consequences had already 
made the continuation of these meetings difficult, it was the Israeli retaliation 
operation that finally led to Nasser cutting off talks with Sharett.25 
In these years the Western Powers did not give up in their attempts to bring 
peace to the Middle East. Two plans, the “Alpha Plan” and the “Johnston Plan,” 
provided some material for discussion. With the Alpha Plan of February 1955, 
Great Britain and the USA pursued the goal of safeguarding their strategic inter-
ests in the Middle East by means of a peace settlement between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. The following points were proposed in project “Alpha”: The cre-
ation of a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan, wherein Israel was to give up 
two thirds of the Negev – without, however, having to abandon its connection to 
Eilat; an allocation of the demilitarization zones as they had been stipulated in 
the armistice agreement of 1949 between Israel and its neighbors; the return of 
a limited number of Palestinian refugees and the payment of compensations to 
others; a treaty concerning the distribution of Jordan’s water; the lifting of the 
Arab economic boycott against Israel; and a security guarantee by the West for 
the new borders. Israel categorically refused.26
The objective of the 1955 Johnston Plan – named for Eric Johnston (1896–
1963), the personal representative of American President Dwight D. Eisenhower – 
was to regulate the distribution of the water reserves of the Jordan Basin amongst 
the states of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel based on the model of the “Ten-
nessee Valley Authority.” It provided for the development of an irrigation network 
to the benefit of all states. The project also intended to turn the West Bank into 
fertile land in order to support the Palestinian refugees that were living there. The 
Johnston Plan was based on the hope that the regulation of water distribution 
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tion process might be initiated. This is how Shlaim describes the Israeli reaction 
to the Johnston Plan:
The attitude of the defense establishment was typically negative and suspicious: it was 
believed that Johnston’s purpose was to look for incriminating evidence against Israel and 
to curtail its rights. Sharett’s attitude was characteristically flexible and constructive. He 
mastered the water brief as only he knew how to, and he conducted the negotiations him-
self.27
Sharett was hoping to secure several advantages by supporting the plan. He also 
assumed that a settlement of the water dispute with American support could 
facilitate further talks with the neighboring Arab states. For one thing, he held 
the view that the allocation of the water resources, as provided by the plan, was 
consistent with Israel’s requirements. For another thing, considering the limited 
water resources available to Israel, this project was supposed to give Israel more 
flexibility with regard to the further development of water plans. As a third 
aspect, Israeli cooperation would secure greater economic support from the US. 
And fourthly, the Johnston Plan could serve as a basis for cooperation with the 
Arab states.
Although the security establishment under Pinchas Lavon had in principal 
rejected the first draft of the plan of June 1954, Sharett nevertheless finally suc-
ceeded in making the plan palatable to the cabinet. In the end, it was the Arab 
heads of state that rejected the Johnston Plan. According to Shlaim, this was 
because consenting to it would have meant recognizing Israel.28 Other interpreta-
tions assume that the Arab League turned down the Johnston Plan for the reason 
that its approach sought to solve the water question and the refugee problem sep-
arately.29 Israel eventually took an ambivalent stance toward the Johnston Plan. It 
did not openly agree to it but did not explicitly reject it, either.30
In the early 1950s, the security establishment and the Foreign Ministry were 
repeatedly facing each other as political opponents in the vehement quarrel about 
the Johnston Plan and other security-political questions, such as the border war, 
the retaliation policy and the arms purchases. This was due to two different points 
of view regarding the complex political realities after 1949. A year after he had 
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“Israel and the Arabs – War and Peace: Reflections on the Years 1947–1957”31. He 
examines the various political camps in Israel; the Israeli security establishment 
among them:
One point of view assumes that the language of power is the only thing the Arabs under-
stand. The State of Israel is so small and isolated; it is so weak in the geographical and 
demographic sense that it has to double its power by conspicuous military operations 
[namely retaliation policy] in order to preempt the dangers arising from its weakness. There-
fore, from time to time, Israel must clearly show the Arabs that it is strong and capable of 
exercising its power efficiently and relentlessly at all times. If Israel did not do this, it could 
be razed to the ground. According to this point of view, peace is doubtful and far off anyway. 
It can only arrive if the Arabs are convinced that the state is invincible. It is more likely that 
it arrives as a result of the persuasive power of Israeli violence than by virtue of the sincere 
conviction that Israel truly wishes for peace. As long as the day-to-day security problem 
has to be solved with violence, peace cannot even be considered. When retributive actions 
keep fueling hate there is no reason for determent, for the flame is fanned anyway. If we 
avoided retributive actions to mitigate the fire of hate, we would lose. In addition, if we take 
the following factors into account – namely the general human tendency to fight back, the 
particular vulnerability of the Jews that have historically always been considered weak, and 
the recentness of the great victory of the Israeli army [1948] – we will understand in what 
kind of atmosphere and in what kind of zeitgeist this position has been fostered.32
Sharett goes on to contrast this position of the security establishment to “the 
other stance” towards peace, which he himself shares and according to which
we have to be incessantly aspiring to peace. This is not only based on a political consid-
eration. It is a decisive security-political consideration in the long-term perspective. We 
have to understand peace as our basic interest and drastically curb our retaliatory reactions 
accordingly. After all, the question as to whether retributive acts really solve the security 
problem still remains open.33
As Director-General in the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres (1953–1959) held 
the view of the conflict as it was propagated by the security establishment in the 
young Israel. Peres’ voice may be considered to be representative here. In those 
years, Peres rarely made any statements about peace, but when he did, it was 
only to argue that it was utterly impossible for the time being. His 1955 essay enti-
tled “Reconciliation Does Not Mean Security” opens with the words: “Israel’s 
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diately after the War of Independence.” And he concludes the essay with the fol-
lowing postulation: “Israel’s security neither depends on reconciliation with the 
[Western] world nor on reconciliation with the Arabs. Rather, our security lies in 
our willingness and ability to defend what we have achieved with much blood.”34
Two central elements of the security myth are contained herein: Firstly, the 
text is based on the assumption that the Jews or the State of Israel are exposed 
to the threat of annihilation. While the “Western World” is accused of willfully 
jeopardizing Israel’s interests for the sake of “Arab demands” and is therefore 
met with suspicion. Secondly, it bears witness to the conviction that, true to the 
maxim that “the world is against us,” Israel can only rely on itself. According to 
this understanding reconciliation is impossible, with negotiations with the Arab 
world – regardless of whether they are carried out with the help of the Western 
Powers or not – not really being conducive to the Israeli “willingness and ability” 
to protect itself. At the time he authored this text, Peres was worried more about 
the Great Western Powers than his Arab neighbors:
The demands [made by the Great Powers] for [Arab-Israeli] reconciliation overlook the fact 
that only one side is responsible for the conflict. By directing the demand at Israel and 
the Arab states, the distorted impression is created that the enthusiasm for peace (or lack 
thereof) exists on both sides alike. But any unbiased party can clearly see that the factors of 
tension in the Middle East are these: the arms buildup by the Arabs for a targeted ‘second 
round’ [another regional war]; organized as well as sporadic intrusion [of Palestinian ref-
ugees into the Israeli state territory]; blockade of sea routes [for Israeli ships] in Suez and 
Eilat; frustration of the development of Israeli water sources; [Arab] economic boycott 
against the State of Israel; and the non-recognition of Israel’s state borders [the armistice 
borders of 1949]. If the Great Powers actually tried removing these factors of tension, Israel’s 
position would doubtlessly be as follows: Israel would be willing to avoid a ‘second round’ 
[sic]; Israel would open its sea routes and ports [to Arab states]; Israel would commit to 
refraining from imposing economic boycotts against Arab states; Israel would take respon-
sibility to make sure that Israeli infiltrators [sic] do not intrude into Arab states; Israel would 
be willing to recognize the state borders [of the Arab states]; and finally, Israel would also 
be willing to help solve the question of Arab refugees and take up diplomatic relations with 
the Arabs. But strangely, these demands are not made. This is because peace is not the 
main goal. Rather, placating the Arabs seems to be the actual objective of these demands 
for contentment.35
Peres rejects demands for reconciliation because in his view any kind of compro-
mise would endanger the demographic and geopolitical achievements of 1948. In 
addition, he sees the Arab opponents as the only party responsible for the con-
34 Peres, September 29, 1955: 16, 24.
35 Ibid. 17–18.
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flict. Entirely in accordance with the security myth, he ascribes the antagonism to 
ahistorical aversions of the Arab world, and even the world in general, against the 
Jews. In this way the conflict is separated from its historic and political context. 
It is described as a result of ultimate hostility, dismissing the political and his-
torical developments of 1948. For Peres, it is Israel that is the victim in this situa-
tion, which is why concessions are excluded. Peace is only possible if the ill will 
towards Israel is laid to rest. But an end to this enmity is simply unimaginable for 
the security-political leadership in the mid-1950s. And within the logical system 
of the security myth, this legitimizes the taking up of arms. 
This attempt to paint Israel as being some sort of military giant in the fragile 
situation of 1955 ends up casting some light on the actual powerlessness of 
Israel in its state of isolation. It has to live in the constant fear of a peace dic-
tated by the Great Powers. So now the language of peace ideology is invoked to 
create a domestic consensus in order to avoid any compromises as outlined in 
the Alpha Plan. The actual problems of borders, territory, refugees and water are 
not approached. It can hardly be a coincidence that neither the Alpha Plan nor 
the Johnston Water Plan is mentioned. Rather, the question of guilt is brought to 
the foreground: Who is responsible for the factors of tension? Who is striving for 
another war? Who is boycotting whom? Who refuses to recognize whom? Peres’ 
rendering of the conflict relies on blocking out all the complications that have led 
to the political development in Israel since 1948. In 1955, the country is described 
as an undisputed political entity that has always been in existence:
In a conciliatory world [with regard to the endeavors of the Great Powers to achieve peace 
in the region] Israel is in a strange situation: The point is not only that the [Western] world 
does not demand that Israel’s neighbors remove the obstacles on the way to peace; the 
Great Powers actually contribute to piling these obstacles even higher. For by supplying the 
Arabs with weapons, their target being none other than Israel, they inevitably encourage 
the Arabs to pursue a policy of non-peace. Therefore, Israel is unable to take the path it 
wishes to take, namely the path of peace. For the demands for reconciliation [made by the 
Great Powers towards Israel] are aimed more at being liked by the Arabs than at peace.36
Here, the security myth, which presumes that the world as such is a source of 
danger for Jews, meets the peace ideology, according to which Israel is longing 
for peace despite all political and historical realities. At the same time Israel fears 
peace, for it also means having to compromise. Peres had a difficult time consid-
ering territorial concessions throughout his career. Especially in the 1950s, giving 
up any territory was taboo. To the contrary, the security establishment openly 
36 Ibid. 19.
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talked about expanding the state territory even further. For Peres, peace almost 
amounts to capitulation on the part of Israel: 
In this way [through the willingness to compromise], an absurd situation is created in 
which, on the one hand, the spirit of reconciliation strengthens the will of one side [the 
Arabs] as it strives for war; on the other hand, it intensifies the appeals for peace directed 
towards Israel, which come across more like conditions such as are usually imposed on the 
defeated side in a war.37
Thus, the “spirit of reconciliation” is treacherous because it may cause Israel 
to lose what it has gained in 1948 at great sacrifice. Israeli sovereignty remains 
the first priority: “[…] the entire Negev is part of the state territory of Israel, and 
nothing […] can bring the Israeli military to restrict its freedom of movement in 
its own state.”38 By this route, Peres arrives at his main hypothesis that reconcili-
ation cannot lead to security: 
This situation forces us to return to the starting point, namely Israel’s security: We should 
count out the illusionary notion that outside parties or certain situations in the greater 
world [historical constellations] will ever be the saving anchor for Israel. Instead, relying on 
our own power is and will remain our realpolitik security policy.39 
Not peace, but the Israeli military is needed. Peres makes no secret of his resent-
ment of the peace initiatives by the West and the United Nations here. Especially 
the ceasefire of 1949 that is controlled by the UN is a thorn in the side of the secu-
rity establishment, as the treaties between Israel and its neighboring states stip-
ulate that UN observers have to be present at the contested borders as mediators.
Peres’ standpoint is that observers should keep out of the Arab-Israeli rela-
tions, since the armistice agreements did not actually result in the conclusion of 
peace as it was originally foreseen. He shares the position of army commander 
Moshe Dayan who openly demands that more freedom of action be given to the 
Israeli military at the borders, and he acts accordingly. “The ceasefire regula-
tion,” says Peres, “involves a danger for Israel’s sovereignty.” After all: 
The UN resolved the free passage in the Suez Canal [for Israeli ships], but this is not observed 
by Egypt. The UN resolved the release of the four Israeli soldiers [who were arrested during 
an act of espionage in Syria]. This, too, is not observed by Syria. But the UN observers create 
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than reinforcing the spirit of peace by virtue of their mere presence in the region, they actu-
ally become a burden of a special kind and a big political problem for Israel’s security.40
Peres argues that UN observers are “not too worried if a couple of Jews should 
die, they are more concerned about Nasser’s regime.” Once again Peres reaches 
the conclusion: “The reinforcement of our [military] power is an absolute, by no 
means relative matter.”41 The bottom line is that thinking about peace creates 
discontent. It remains a foreign, hazardous terrain that it is better to stay clear of. 
The hypothesis that peace is impossible to realize although Israel is longing for 
it is also held up by Peres in his 1965 article entitled “Disarmament and Peace.”42 
About nuclear weapons he offers the following thought:
The actual question is not what we want – nuclear disarmament or armament. Rather, the 
real question is what is possible and realistic for us. If we talk about ‘what we want’ it is 
quite clear that all of us in Israel want disarmament of nuclear as well as conventional 
weapons. We do not only want conventional disarmament, but also the elimination of the 
horrible hostility. In short, we want peace. But the situation is completely different once we 
leave the area of academic language and turn to the complicated reality in which a very real 
[political] choice has to be made.43
The text is informed by the rhetoric of the peace ideology. The longing for peace 
is never questioned, even presupposed as a self-evident fact. Nevertheless, Peres 
is still not able to imagine peace even in 1965, all too unrealizable as it seems in 
the face of the political reality. The main reason for peace remaining out of reach 
is the assumption that Israel has no dialogue partner in the Arab world. Peres still 
holds this position in 1970, even after the territorial victory of 1967 with its great 
geopolitical significance:
The Six Day War brought an acute relevance to the subject of the relations with the Arabs: 
how to translate military victory into the language of normal, logical and peaceful co-ex-
istence. I have long taken the view that any realistic appraisal of the prospects must take 
primary account of the relationship and not of the phrasing of formulae. What is really 
required to reach a peaceful settlement is not a road to peace. There have been frequent 
suggestions in the past about ‘roads’ and ‘paths’ to peace, but they have remained deserted 
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If there were really anyone among the Arab States prepared to make peace, this very fact 
itself would pave the way to peace. The countries beyond our cease-fire lines – and cease-
fire is all we have; there is not even armistice – refuse even to talk about, let alone act 
towards, a settlement by peaceful means.44 
Furthermore, Peres asserts that even if there were a potential dialogue partner 
in an Arab state, they would hardly be able to politically enforce peace given the 
instability of the Arab world. As he sees it, Jordan’s King Hussein is too weak, 
barely being in a position to represent his own population, and is met with dis-
trust in the Arab world.45 And as for Egypt, it is unlikely to make peace with Israel 
“even though the great need for peace is blatant for Egypt as well as for Israel.”46 
In Peres’ assessment, Nasser is not able to bring about peace “even if Israel gave 
back the entire territory. Because it is not territory, but prestige that Nasser has 
lost and is trying to regain.”47
Whether Peres’ arguments were brought forward for purely tactical reasons 
with a view to excluding negotiations, or whether he was sincerely firmly con-
vinced there was no credible, peace-desiring dialogue partner on the Arab side, 
we cannot know. But what is important here is that three years after the histori-
cally decisive war of conquest of 1967, the debate is shifted away from the central 
point of conflict, namely the territory, to the question of a dialogue partner. The 
claim that there is no such partner becomes one of Israel’s important standard 
formulas over the course of the years. Thus, a political solution seems impossible. 
What is applied here by Peres is a “discourse of separated contemplation.” He 
disconnects interrelated facts to better fit them into his line of reasoning. As he 
postulates, for Nasser it is not really about the territory, i.e., the Sinai Peninsula 
that had been seized by Israel, but merely about his loss of prestige.
Peace Treaty with Egypt 1978–1979: Peace Work of the 
Zionist Right
The Sinai Peninsula turned out to be the price Israel had to pay for their first 
peace treaty with an Arab state. It was concluded by Israel after the Mapai – later 
the Labor Party – had ceded the government to the Likud in May of 1977 after 
three decades in power. It was none other than the newly elected Prime Minister 
44 Peres 1970: 258.
45 Peres 1970: 259. (Hebr.)
46 Ibid. 218.
47 Ibid. 218.
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Menachem Begin, the leader of the Likud party and open proponent of the myth 
of the “promised land,” who ended up signing the first peace treaty with an Arab 
state in which Israel gave up part of the occupied territories. 
Shortly after he assumed office, Begin let American President Jimmy Carter 
(1924–) know that he was willing to take up peace talks with the Arab neigh-
boring states, and especially with Egypt. In the course of the negotiations that 
ensued, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat even visited Jerusalem on November 
19, 1977, a step that was interpreted as a hopeful sign everywhere. The following 
summit at Camp David (September 5–17, 1978) finally concluded with the signing 
of the “Camp David Accords” in a celebratory ceremony at the White House. The 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East includes the following points: Firstly, “a 
process for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza“; secondly, 
“a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel”; 
and thirdly, “a similar framework for peace treaties between Israel and its other 
neighbours.”48 
As a first step, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians 
were to jointly solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. An agreement was 
to be negotiated in three phases. Initially, it was provided that the conflict parties 
conclude an agreement about a freely elected Palestinian self-regulatory body in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and about its competences. Then, a transi-
tional period was to begin in which Israel was to withdraw from the Palestinian 
territories and terminate its local military government and civil administration. 
Security zones for Israel, the geographical extent of which was still unclear, were 
to be created. Lastly, in a third phase, the final settlement was to be reached. “The 
solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Pal-
estinian peoples and their just requirements.”49
As a second step, to be carried out within three months of the signing of 
the Camp David Accords, Israel and Egypt were to negotiate a peace treaty, to 
be implemented within two to three years. The treaty was to contain the follow-
ing items: Withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula which had been seized 
in 1967; recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over this territory by Israel; demil-
itarization of the Sinai Peninsula; deployment of UN troops for the purpose of 
guaranteeing demilitarization as well as freedom of navigation [for Israel] in the 
Gulf of Suez, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran; and finally, 




 Peace Treaty with Egypt 1978–1979: Peace Work of the Zionist Right   165
The peace treaty became effective in March 1979, with the main point of con-
flict in the negotiations being the Palestinian question. The Egyptian president 
sought to attach the settlement of this problem to the conclusion of peace with 
Israel, as provided in the Camp David Accords. In this way, Sadat also wanted to 
avoid putting Egypt’s position in the Arab world at risk. In contrast, for Israel’s 
prime minister the primarily goal was to conclude a separate peace treaty with 
Egypt, which Israel considered to be the most dangerous Arab state. Begin pre-
vailed, and the Palestinian question remained left out.
The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt stipulated that Israel retreat 
to beyond the internationally recognized southern border, so that Egypt could 
regain its sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula. Diplomatic relations between the 
two states were to be taken up as soon as the first phase of withdrawal of Israeli 
troops was concluded. Further items concerned the regulation of security in Sinai, 
stationing of UN troops and navigation, among other things. In an accompany-
ing memorandum, Israel was warranted oil supplies for the next fifteen years by 
Egypt, and also American support in the event of a breach of contract on Egypt’s 
part. Moreover, Israel was to receive military and economic help from the USA. 
After the Israeli cabinet had agreed to the peace treaty, the Knesset ratified it in a 
twenty-eight-hour session on March 22, 1979, with ninety-five yeas and eighteen 
nays. On March 26, 1979, the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab 
state was solemnly signed at the White House and even implemented for the most 
part over the course of the years 1979 and 1980.51
Egypt met with harsh criticism in the Arab world for its solo action with 
Israel, however, and was excluded from the Arab League. Although Begin and 
Sadat had committed to the American president to also take up negotiations con-
cerning Palestinian autonomy – as stipulated in the Camp David Accords, as a 
part of the negotiations following their agreement – Begin was extremely reluc-
tant. According to Shlaim, the prime minister was not interested in successful 
talks regarding Palestine. In keeping with the myth of the “promised land,” he 
sought to maintain Israeli sovereignty in the Palestinian territories – meaning 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip – even after the provided five-year transitional 
period.52
As it became obvious that Begin was not seeking any further negotiations, 
Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann (1924–
2005) resigned. Subsequently, Yitzhak Shamir became foreign minister, while 
Begin himself took over the defense department. After his re-election in June 
51 Shlaim 2000: 380–381.
52 Ibid. 381–382.
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1981, Begin appointed the former General Ariel Sharon as Minister of Defense. 
With these two people at the top of Israel’s government, he formulated his plans 
regarding the question of Palestine.53 
In giving up Sinai, however, Begin had reached the limits of his capacities for 
compromise. To relinquish Jewish sovereignty in parts of Eretz Israel was com-
pletely out of the question for Israel in the 1980s. After a failed attempt by the 
new Minister of Defense to create a new order in the Middle East and to solve the 
Palestinian problem by engaging in a war in Lebanon in June 1982, already Begin 
resigned by September 1983. This meant the end of his political career. 
Nevertheless, Begin went down in history as the first Israeli politician who 
dared aspire to an agreement based on abandoning a claim to territories, and 
finally accomplishing a conclusion of peace that was even realized for the most 
part. The once notorious leader of the underground militia Etzel, a national mil-
itary organization known for its terrorist operations in the founding years of 
Israel, was in the opposition for almost three decades. Until shortly after his elec-
toral victory in 1977 he successfully concluded a historic peace treaty, and was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize together with Sadat. 
The Oslo Peace Process 1993–1996: Peace Work of the 
Zionist Left 
As is well known, the Syrian and Lebanese fronts as well as the inner front of the 
Palestinian question remained on Israel’s domestic and security-policy agenda 
even years after the peace agreement with Egypt. What was happening on these 
fronts in the course of the 1980s can hardly be called a reconciliation process. 
There was the 1982 attempt to solve the Palestinian question by waging war in 
Lebanon, the ensuing eighteen years of Israeli presence in the “security zone” 
in South Lebanon, the Jewish settlement of the Palestinian territories and Syrian 
Golan Heights conquered in 1967, and finally the Palestinian uprising of 1987 to 
1992. All of this contributed to an extremely volatile relationship between Israel 
and its neighbors.
During this period Israel was ruled by a Likud cabinet (1977–1984; 1990–1992) 
and a grand coalition (1984–1990). Then in 1992, the Zionist Left came back into 
power. This government of the Labor Party, again headed by Yitzhak Rabin (as 
prime minister and minister of defense) and Shimon Peres (as foreign minister), 
made an attempt to achieve regional peace. To be mentioned in this context are 
53 Ibid. 382–383.
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the Madrid Peace Conference, forced on the Likud government by the Americans 
in 1991, and also the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough in the Oslo Peace Process of 
1993. In 1994, the Israeli government succeeded in concluding peace with Jordan. 
And over the course of 1995 there was promising progress in Syrian-Israeli negoti-
ations, which, however, suffered a severe setback with the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, and ultimately failed. 
The 1990s are often called an “optimistic peace decade” in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. For the first time in its history Zionist Israel dared tackle the Palestine 
question by political means. This made it look like the longed-for normalization 
of Arab-Israeli relations was within reach. Although the rights of the Palestin-
ian people were recognized pursuant to the 1978 Camp David Accords – with 
this agreement also providing the establishment of Palestinian autonomy – the 
Israeli-Egyptian negotiations about this very topic had ended without result in 
the beginning of the 1980s when the question of sovereignty over the Palestinian 
territories could not be agreed on.54 
Was the autonomy to apply only to the people or also to the land, the territory 
on which they live? This was a decisive question for the Oslo Peace Process. In 
Begin’s autonomy plan, this issue was approached as follows: “Israel stands by 
its right and its claim of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. In 
the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement 
and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open.”55
This meant maintaining the status quo of military occupation in the Pales-
tinian territories as had existed since 1967. The Zionist Right as well as the Zionist 
Left, within the framework of the grand coalition of the 1980s, both massively 
supported Jewish colonialization of these territories for historical-religious (the 
myth of the promised land or the myth of Eretz Israel) as well as for security-policy 
reasons (the security myth or the myth of defendable lines). Retaining their mili-
tary dominance over the entire country was absolutely essential to both political 
camps of Israel when it came to negotiating the Palestinian question. After all, it 
is inseparably linked to the other core questions of the conflict: the Israeli state 
territory, settlements, water, Jerusalem and the question of return for the Pales-
tinian refugees. Political Israel of the 1980s was not willing to discuss any of these 
questions. 
Two different state myths provided the basis for the respective positions of 
the opposing camps: the “myth of the promised land” for the Zionist Right or Reli-
gious Zionism, and the “security myth” for the Zionist Left. While the first myth 
54 Grinberg 2007: 50.
55 Shlaim 2000: 365.
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barely leaves any political negotiating range since it rules out giving up any ter-
ritories in Eretz Israel, the “myth of security” does not completely exclude peace 
negotiations as long as security remains guaranteed. Thus, in the course of the 
1980s, the “myth of peace and security” (Shalom ve-Bitahon) was successfully 
cultivated as an alternative for the Zionist Left camp under Peres’ leadership. And 
so the Labor Party, together with the other Zionist Left civil rights parties Meretz 
and Shinui, evolved to become “the peace camp.” 
And yet, not only was the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty obtained by a right-
wing government – at an inopportune time for the Zionist Left, namely shortly 
after the historic transition of power in 1977 –, but it was also concluded at the 
price of the entire occupied Egyptian territory. This clear conclusion – the entire 
territory in exchange for a peace settlement – ran counter to the Zionist Left’s 
myth of “peace and security” since, at a single stroke, it surrendered the “trump 
card” that is part of this myth, namely the territories won in the war. Many Israelis 
saw this loss as an endangerment of security because the returned territories did 
not only serve as territorial resources for the settlement project, but also as “lines 
of defense.”
The negotiation tactics inspired by the myth of “peace and security,” which 
the Oslo Peace Concept was based on, was that of “small steps.” Although this 
left some room to take up negotiations, the political goals remained unvoiced, 
and ultimately were left to the respective power relationships of the negotiat-
ing parties. Peres’ peace efforts at the end of the 1980s, undertaken within the 
framework of the grand coalition and vigorously obstructed by the Likud coali-
tion partner, may offer an in-depth look into the understanding of “peace and 
security” as the Zionist Left upheld it.
In April 1987, secret talks took place in London between Foreign Minister 
Peres and Jordan’s King Hussein. Peres sought to realize his own ideas of peace 
under the terms of the “Jordan Option.” The negotiated “London Document” 
essentially provided that a peace process would be set in motion under interna-
tional auspices. It contained the following items: Firstly, the UN secretary general 
was to appeal to the five permanent members of the Security Council and the 
parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate a settlement based on 
the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and namely “with the object of 
bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, security to its states, and to respond 
to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”56 
Secondly, the London Paper provided that the respective conflict parties be 
invited to form bilateral groups in this conference in order to lead the negotia-
56 Shlaim 2000: 444–445.
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tions. The third part contained the agreement that, firstly, no solution and no 
veto may be imposed on the parties from outside this negotiation network; sec-
ondly, that the negotiations were to be lead in the bilateral groups; thirdly, that 
the Palestinian question was to be addressed in talks between a Jordanian-Pales-
tinian and an Israeli Delegation; fourthly, that the Palestinian representatives be 
allowed to participate as a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; fifthly, 
that participation in the conference required the acceptance of the UN Security 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and also the rejection of violence and terrorism; sixthly, 
that each multilateral group was to negotiate independently; and finally, the 
London Document stressed the multilateral character of this power-neutralized 
international conference. Other matters were to be determined within the frame-
work of an agreement between Jordan and Israel.57
The London Paper was based on the Jordanian Option insofar as the Palestin-
ian Option, meaning the creation of a Palestinian state and the recognition of the 
PLO as a dialogue partner, was categorically excluded. Instead, the Palestinian 
question was to be treated exclusively in connection with Jordan. Another pecu-
liarity was that although the framework for the conference was provided by an 
international sponsorship, the UN was not allowed to influence the negotiations 
or their results when it came to their specific content, with the regulations having 
to be worked out in bilateral negotiations between the respective delegations. 
As for content, the London Document made barely any statements about the 
core points of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These, too, were to be clarified in 
bilateral negotiations. What prospects the London Document might have had, 
had its realization not been frustrated by the coalition partner Likud, we can only 
speculate. Peres exhibited extreme indignation towards his political rivals who 
stood in the way of his peace mission of 1987. He was firmly convinced that his 
initiative would have had realistic chances of success, had it been implemented.58 
But history did grant Israel’s Zionist Left another opportunity. Since the 
change of government in June 1992, Peres was once more in a position to influence 
the political process, namely as foreign minister in the so-called “Second Rabin 
Government.” At that time the bilateral talks conducted in Washington in 1991 
between the Israeli and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation within the context 
of the Madrid Conference quickly turned out to be fruitless. The differences 
between the parties on the autonomy question remained unbridgeable. While the 
Palestinians wanted to negotiate based on a Palestinian state, the Israelis cleaved 
57 Ibid. 
58 Peres 1995: 385. (Ger.)
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to a vague concept of interim agreements with the goal of maintaining their mili-
tary dominance in the Palestinian territories.59 
The futility of the Washington talks gradually increased public pressure on 
the new prime minister to make good on his pre-election promises of peace. Ulti-
mately, the Israeli leadership under Rabin, Peres and Vice Foreign Minister Yossi 
Beilin (1948–) made the historic decision to take up direct negotiations with the 
PLO, which had always been considered a terrorist organization. This made the 
breakthrough possible.
The “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,” 
also called Oslo I, which was signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993, 
was pre-eminently a mutual recognition of the rights of both peoples, a decla-
ration of intent for the cessation of the conflict and for a historic reconciliation, 
and thus for a life in peace, dignity and security. In addition, the creation of a 
Palestinian Authority (PA), which was to be appointed in free elections and was to 
gradually take over the tasks of Israeli civil and military administration, was pro-
vided by Oslo I within the period of five years. For this purpose, this new author-
ity was also to negotiate with Israel about permanent solutions based on UN Res-
olutions 242 and 338. This included core questions that had been excluded from 
the declaration of principles for the time being, such as the borders, Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements and security regulations. 
According to Oslo I, the negotiations about permanent regulations, which 
were to be brought into force five years after Oslo I, were to be taken up as early 
as December 3, 1995. The declaration of principles defined the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip as a territorial unit over which the PA was to be given responsibility, 
with the exception of matters regarding security regulations and foreign affairs, 
which were to be Israel’s domain. Israel was directed to withdraw its troops from 
Gaza and Jericho, namely as part of a treaty that was to be signed by December 
13, 1993 and implemented by April 13, 1994. Provided within nine months of Oslo 
I – in July 1994 – were free elections for a legislative council in Gaza and the West 
Bank. They were to take place under international supervision and with the help 
of the Palestinian police.60 
The “Agreement on the Autonomy of the West Bank,” also referred to as Oslo II, 
was signed on September 28, 1995. Oslo II marked the conclusion of the first phase 
of negotiations between Israel and the PLO. The agreement foresaw, among other 
things, the election of a Palestinian council and transfer of legislative authority to 
59 Ibid. 509.
60 Grinberg 2007: 78; Shlaim 2000: 516–517.
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the same, the retreat of the Israeli army from “the Palestinian centers” and the divi-
sion of the West Bank into three control categories A, B and C. 
Category A comprised the Palestinian cities and small towns that were in the 
judicial district of the Palestinian Autonomy. Category B referred to the Palestin-
ian villages and sparsely populated areas of the West Bank considered non-mili-
tary judicial districts, with security control remaining with the Israeli army. Cat-
egory C covered the rest of the West Bank and included the land seized by Israel 
that was designated for Jewish settlements and roads. Zone A comprised four 
percent and Zone B twenty-five percent of the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, Israel 
would keep more than thirty-five percent of the land for settlement purposes, mil-
itary bases and road construction.61 
Oslo II also passed only by a narrow majority of sixty-one to fifty-nine votes in 
the Knesset on October 5, 1995. The Oslo Peace Process aroused massive protests 
from the Zionist Right and national-religious opposition against the Labor Party 
government. On November 4, 1995, an extremist named Yigal Amir murdered 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. 
The sociologist Lev Grinberg points out three processes that were at work in 
Israeli society, taking place in the military, the economic and the political areas, 
which contributed to the Oslo Peace Process. The backdrop to this was partic-
ularly the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation order that had 
been persisting since late 1987. The Intifada made discontent within the Israeli 
military leadership grow, as they were being faced with the frustrating task of 
smashing Palestinian resistance. The security policy elite gradually recognized 
the necessity of a political change. Grinberg interprets a statement made by Chief 
of General Staff Dan Shomron (1937–2008), to the effect that there is no military 
solution for the Intifada, as shaking up the constitutive security myth. 
Shomron’s insight increasingly undermined the legitimation for deployment 
of the military against the Palestinian uprising. The security myth lost persuasive 
power in the sense that its basis – the fight and victory of the Jewish side as a pre-
condition for the existence as a national state – was weakened. It was the military 
in its function as an important political security authority, says Grinberg, which 
signalized to the political level that a political process was indeed a legitimate 
approach. As Grinberg argues further, the former General and Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin did in fact fear the army would be worn out by having to perform 
policing tasks related to the occupation.62 
61 Shlaim 2000: 528–529.
62 Grinberg 2007: 54.
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Apart from the security-political motive, Grinberg identifies the economic 
elite as another driving force for a reconciliation process. As the Intifada was 
turning out to be an economic burden, the ideal scenario of a Palestinian market 
as a source of cheap labor, well-controlled by Israel and aligned to the benefit 
of its economy, and at the same time as a controlled importer of goods, failed to 
materialize. With the transformation of international politics, the business elites 
of Israel turned their attention to globalization processes. Eager to unlock global 
markets, including those of the Middle East, to Israeli economy with its neolib-
eral orientation, the economic sector urged politics to solve the local conflict. In 
Shimon Peres, Grinberg discerns the political sponsor of this line of thought.63 
Furthermore, Grinberg describes a party-political process initiated in the 
early 1990s by which hopes for a reconciliation process with the Palestinians were 
fueled. He speaks of a democratization or renewal process within the Israeli Labor 
Party, which was an important mass party at that time. The party members got 
more say in the selection of their representatives, with primary elections taking 
place for the first time. Moreover, politically relevant content was included into 
the party program. Under the slogan “Change in National Priorities,” the focus of 
national interest was to be shifted away from the settlement of occupied territo-
ries, which had been massively sponsored during the 1980s, to social policy in the 
core country of Israel. In general, after fifteen years under the leadership of Peres, 
a new language and a new image for a new era seemed to be called for. 
Grinberg interprets this democratization process as a first signal that the 
Labor Party was turning away from the “old-style” paralyzing left-right debate 
of the national myths. Now more emphasis was placed on addressing “normal” 
everyday political issues faced by the average Israeli. The electoral campaign of 
1992, in which Yitzhak Rabin challenged the old Prime Minister and Likud leader 
Yitzhak Shamir, was conducted under the banner of these changed priorities. In 
this political constellation, Grinberg also sees a political alternative to the main-
tenance of Israeli dominance over the occupied territories.64 
But the question still remains whether the same leading personalities of the 
1970s and 1980s, i.e., Rabin and Peres, who have decisively shaped the Israeli 
political order with regard to security as well as settlement policy, were actually 
able to point to a real alternative. Was the Israeli Zionist Left of the 1990s really 
capable of ending the conflict over Palestine?
63 Ibid. 56.
64 Ibid. 57–59.
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The Oslo Peace Process: The Palestinian Option
In the Oslo Peace Process, Baruch Kimmerling detects a connection between the 
“routinization of war and conflict” as it is reinforced in Israeli society and the 
ideological-religious motivation of maintaining dominance over the Palestinian 
territories:
In the course of the state’s crystallization, Israeli immigrant settlers developed war- and 
conflict-oriented as well as compromise-oriented values and groups, with their accompa-
nying rhetoric. Owing to the routinization of war and conflict, however, an all-embracing 
militaristic metacultural code developed to blur the distinctions between peace and war, 
and between rational military and ideological religious ‘reasons’ for keeping the occupied 
territories. The first ‘peace in exchange for territory’ agreement with Egypt was made in 
order to increase control over the components of Eretz Israel dubbed ‘Judea and Samaria’ 
and was immediately followed by the 1982 war in Lebanon, fought for the same reason. 
The Oslo Accords with the Palestinians were agreed to by Israel primarily in order to shed 
responsibility for densely Arab-populated areas by establishing indirect control using Ara-
fat’s Palestinian Authority as subcontractor, but without giving up ‘overall security respon-
sibility’ for any part of Eretz Israel. This came about only after political and military elites 
had reached the conclusion that there was no acceptable military solution to the Palestin-
ian problem (not all Israeli Jews were, however, in agreement). The making of de facto peace 
with the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was aimed at weakening Palestinian political and 
military strength.65
Kimmerling explains the motives for the Oslo Peace Process as follows:
The existential anxiety built into Israeli collective identity and collective memory simulta-
neously fuels civilian militarism and reinforces ‘military militarism’ and the military-cul-
tural complex, creating a vicious circle that always leads to self-fulfilling ‘worst case’ proph-
ecies. Even the main motives for peace-making are driven either by xenophobic feelings of 
separateness or instrumental manipulation of improved control over ‘the other side’ and 
preservation of ‘our’ ultimate military might.66
The recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people was a 
watershed in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Up until 1993, Israel 
and the PLO were at war. In Israel’s eyes the “Palestine Liberation Organization” 
was nothing more than a terrorist organization pursuing the goal of dissolving 
the Jewish state. The announcement of the PLO, founded in 1964, that they would 
free the whole of Palestine – meaning the entire state territory under Israeli 
65 Kimmerling 2001: 227–228.
66 Ibid. 228.
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supremacy – can hardly be reconciled with the Zionist claim to Eretz Israel for 
the Jewish people. 
Over the years, Peres used his position as vice president of the Socialist Inter-
national to deny the PLO recognition on the international stage. In doing so, he 
repeatedly came into conflict with European leaders who increasingly saw an 
inclusion of the PLO as the key to solving the Palestine question. In 1985, the 
Knesset under the government Peres enacted a law prohibiting talks between 
Israelis and representatives of terrorist organizations; annulled only in 1993 for 
the Oslo Process. According to Peres’ biographer Michael Bar-Zohar, the weak-
ness of the PLO lay in the motif for its recognition. He assumes that the only 
reason Peres opted to take up negotiations with the PLO is because it had lost 
considerable political and financial influence in 1991 in the wake of the Second 
Gulf War. It was an opportune time to “conclude a deal” with a weakened PLO.67 
But in how far did the new government politically stand behind the Palestin-
ian Option that provided the basis for the Oslo Peace Process? In the years 1992 
to 1996, the Zionist Left was in a very precarious situation regarding the peace 
process. Following a yearlong political stagnation brought about by the govern-
ing coalition with the Likud, it managed to achieve a breakthrough in 1993. The 
Oslo Peace Process, which is regarded as a historic turning point, is for the most 
part considered to be the merit of the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and 
his Vice Minister Yossi Beilin. 
They convinced the hesitant Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yitzhak 
Rabin of the necessity to take up the difficult direct negotiations with the Pales-
tinians, which would include having to recognize the PLO. Thanks to their will-
ingness to accept the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat as a dialogue 
partner, Rabin and Peres paved the way for a historic breakthrough in Israeli-Pal-
estinian history. For this, all three political leaders were awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1994.
But while the Jerusalem peace government scored a lot of praise interna-
tionally, in Israel itself it was confronted with a particularly tough political and 
intellectual challenge as it had to defend the peace process against the highly 
active and well organized political opposition of the Zionist Right, or religious 
Zionism. But at the same time it was no less skeptical than its political rivals of a 
solution to the Palestine question in terms of the Palestinian Option. At least the 
specific concept of Oslo I would leave the political-military situation essentially 
unchanged for the time being. A declaration of intent marked the beginning of 
67 Bar-Zohar 2006: 616.
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a process of “small steps,” with further development hinged on the course the 
negotiations would take. 
But since Israel objected to arbitrators and, what is more, sought to defer 
tackling the core questions until later, to a time when negotiations for a perma-
nent provision would take place, much was determined by the power relations 
between the two parties. A hybrid situation arose that was characteristic for the 
Oslo years, namely while negotiations were taking place the usual occupation 
practices were continued with the necessary modifications. In accordance with 
the preliminary assumption of Oslo that the core questions of the conflict would 
be resolved only later anyway, Israel gained more maneuvering room to keep cre-
ating facts in its own interest. 
This happened despite the fact that due to its recognition as negotiating 
partner the PLO’s position was not as powerless as it had once been. The situation 
in which civil competences and thus the responsibility for the Palestinian popu-
lation were conferred to the Palestinian Authority (Oslo II), while Israeli military 
dominance still remained in place is characterized by a leftist Oslo critic’s hybrid 
phrasing: “Oslo as continuation of occupation by peaceful means.”
The Labor Party government did not even dare start decolonializing the occu-
pied territories. To the contrary, it looked for ways to keep up and even expand the 
settlement projects in spite of Oslo. On the one hand, the hybrid “Oslo Regime” 
facilitated the separation of the two collectives with the help of the military. Here 
it was especially the lockdown policy that considerably limited the Palestin-
ian’s freedom of movement and worsened their living conditions. On the other 
hand, the continuation of the Jewish colonialization of Palestinian territories ran 
counter to the separation of the two peoples that Oslo had been envisioning.
It is particularly under the pretext of this peace process that Israel brought its 
Zionism-backed separation policy more strongly into accordance with the colo-
nialization, as the Oslo Regime parceled out the Palestinian territories and thus 
segmented Palestinian society. Amira Hass draws attention to the fact that the 
number of settlers in the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) doubled 
between 1991 and 2000, rising from 91,400 to 198,300. For East Jerusalem, 141,000 
settlers is quoted for 1992, and 173,000 for 2000.68
The Oslo concept created an open situation. On the one hand, the pressure of 
the international community on Israel decreased perceivably and Israel’s image 
was strongly improved after five years of Palestinian Intifada. Both of these factors 
helped colonialization and occupation to continue without disturbance. On the 
68 Cf. Hass, Amira, “Israeli Colonialism Under the Guise of the Peace Process (1993–2000),” in: 
Hass 2006: 194–209, 208; Grinberg 2007: 129.
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other hand, the Zionist Right was fighting the progressing peace process, sup-
posedly heading towards a Palestinian state, while in actual fact the settlement 
policy was still being actively pursued. For the Zionist Right also opposed the 
option of a Palestinian pseudo-state controlled by Israel. It feared negotiations 
that may lead to Israel having to yield up territories in Eretz Israel. 
In contrast, the leadership of the Zionist Left was looking to find a middle 
ground: negotiations and reconciliation in order that settlement and security may 
be further ensured. Israel explicitly quoted the fight against terrorism, especially 
against the religious Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as a motivation 
for the negotiations. At this, the Palestinian Authority was to serve as an auxiliary 
power and relieve the Israeli army from this task. 
As far as the Israeli government was concerned, the political goal as it pre-
sented itself from the perspective of the Palestinians, namely a Palestinian state 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was in no way a done deal in the years from 1993 
to 1996. Thus Peres was in a political predicament. He was held responsible for 
the peace process, which was associated exclusively with the political goal of a 
Palestinian state. At least the Zionist Left desired that this goal be reached and 
the world community expected it, even as the proponents of Eretz Israel battled 
against it. But of all people, it was actually the leader of the peace government 
who did not stand behind this aim.69
The Zionist Left Trapped between Eretz Israel, Security and 
Peace
As the architect of Oslo and leading politician, Peres had to support the peace 
process before the domestic public even though he was against a Palestinian 
state. Therefore, Peres’ own way of dealing with the ongoing peace process seems 
absurd at times, especially when he came into a situation where he had to defend 
it against the combative Right.70 It was problematic that the political goals of the 
process were not transparent and thus could not be discussed. 
So how exactly was Peres hoping to achieve peace? It is telling in this context 
what aspects he chose to emphasize in a public talk about the Oslo Peace Process 
on March 25, 1994 with the Jewish-religious Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu Lei-
bowitz – a fierce critic of the occupation policy since 1967. Leibowitz brought 
the foreign minister face to face with the fact that “the violent Israeli occupying 
69 Amar-Dahl 2010: 336–366.
70 Ibid. 366–370.
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power has not been removed even following Oslo [I]; we have not retreated even 
by a centimeter [from the territories in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, according to 
Oslo I].” To which Peres replied, “I think, the Oslo Accords will be implemented 
within a couple of weeks. We also intend to negotiate about other territories. […] 
But we have to proceed cautiously, as we always have to win over the majority 
[of the Israeli-Jewish population] and at the same time have to fight [Palestinian] 
terror.”71 
Leibowitz countered the terror argument in reference to the Palestinians as 
follows. “I know what terror means: two hundred and sixty children, the oldest 
ones fifteen, were killed by Israeli soldiers. That is the meaning of occupation 
policy.” As for Peres’ reasoning, it was meant to take into account the wishes of 
the “Israeli broad center”: “This is why we want to get out of there. This is one of 
the reasons why we do not want to be the policemen of the Palestinian people.” 
But Leibowitz was skeptical of Peres’ statement of intent and confronted him 
with political reality: “But we still are [the policemen of the Palestinian people].” 
Peres responded that negotiations are in fact being conducted “in order to get out 
of there.” Leibowitz, who stuck to his point of view that “we have not retreated 
even by a centimeter,” had to put up with the following argumentation brought 
forward by Peres: “But we can’t retreat like thieves in the middle of the night, can 
we. After all, the Arabs [meaning the Palestinians] are killing their brothers over 
there, sadly. Innocent Arabs are being killed by Arabs.”72 
At this, Leibowitz objected that “this empathy with the Arabs is nothing but 
hypocrisy.” And then he, a proponent of the two-state solution within the borders 
of 1967, got to hear from the foreign minister what he really thinks about the Oslo 
concept: “Just like you, I would be in favor of a permanent solution, but I just 
don’t see any possibility of the two parties agreeing about the lines […]. This is 
why the Oslo concept is initially focused on creating a better climate [for negoti-
ations] in the hopes that it will be possible to draw a map which is acceptable to 
both parties in the course of five years. […] At this point in time, I cannot commit 
to a permanent solution.” In Peres’ mind, the borders of 1967 were just no basis 
for a solution. Instead he brought up his preferred confederation concept. Lei-
bowitz’ prediction from 1994 is telling here: “The things you say are not sincere. 
Because what this factually means is the continuation of occupation of Pales-
tinian people. […] We are going to continue pursuing [the occupation] in a sham 
package of lies and hypocrisy. […] This is sick hypocrisy.”73 
71 Cf. “Thus Said the Angry Prophet to the Peace Architect,” Maariv, March 25, 1994.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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But this “hypocrisy” does in fact follow its own logic if one keeps in mind 
what a Palestinian state would mean for a Jewish nationalist and security politi-
cian of many years. Such a state had been a taboo topic for security-political and 
political elites of the country since the founding of the state and the war of 1948. 
In Peres’ eyes it is a danger for Zionist Israel, also in the mid-1990s.74 
Ultimately, even the Zionist Left “peace government” cannot relinquish mili-
tary dominance in the country, which would be dissolved by a Palestinian state in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Instead, by the mid-1990s, it was inefficiently 
looking to close the abyss between the three maxims of security, Eretz Israel and 
peace, as these proved to be mutually irreconcilable. An understanding of secu-
rity in which military dominance and the Zionist tenet of Eretz Israel as the land 
of the Jewish people are assumed to be fundamental necessities renders peace 
based on a two-state solution impossible.
Because Israel could not liberate itself from its two founding myths – the 
security myth and the myth of the “promised land” – even under the leadership 
of the Zionist Left, peace had to remain an unfulfilled dream. Nevertheless, the 
Zionist Left keeps clinging to the peace process even years later because it is still 
trapped in the peace ideology or the myth of peace and security. It is not able to 
reflect on the contradictions between its Zionist goals and reality.
The actual difference between the two main camps of the Israeli political 
spectrum is the belief in the compatibility of peace with one’s own conception 
of the state. While the Zionist Right and religious Zionism do not aspire to peace 
because they are not willing to pay its territorial and identity-political price, the 
Zionist Left cleaves to the old Zionist ambition to normalize the relations between 
Jews and non-Jews, founding myths notwithstanding. But this peace ideology 
results in a depoliticization of peace: If the process of working towards peace 
is perceived as something that takes place essentially in isolation from Israel’s 
policy (which is seen as being in the interest of Zionist Israel, thus remaining 
untouchable and unquestioned) and that hinges solely on the willingness of “the 
Arabs” to recognize Israel, there really is little that can be done from the political 
point of view. One can only keep hoping that the hostility of “the Arabs” will 
disappear, while continuing to imagine peace and fight terrorism – by military 
means, mind you.
74 Amar-Dahl 2010: 328–387.
 Exit of the Zionist Left   179
Exit of the Zionist Left
Peres’ depoliticized understanding of the Oslo Peace Process and his rejection of 
the Palestinian Option proposed therein became obvious the moment he had to 
take over the leadership of the state. Between the murder of Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995 and the voting out of the 
Labor Party in late May 1996, it became clear in how far the Zionist Left under the 
leadership of Peres really represented an alternative in the question of Palestine. 
In October 1995, on occasion of the signing of Oslo II, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Peres gave his assessment of the situation before the Knesset: “The perma-
nent solution will not result in a Palestinian state, but rather will be based on new 
ideas.” He poses the rhetorical question:
Does autonomy [as stipulated in Oslo II] mean a Palestinian state? Not necessarily. It may 
be a template for many things – for regulations, or demilitarized and even domination-free 
[sic] territories. I believe that the permanent regulation will not be based on an existing 
foundation [Oslo II], but on a series of completely new ideas.75 
Even at this point in time, standing before the Israeli Parliament, the Foreign 
Minister did not feel the need to elaborate on the actual content of his “new 
ideas.” He also did not say which legal status he was planning to confer on the 
Palestinian autonomy or the vacated Palestinian territories. Rather, he shifted the 
focus to his actual objective: “Without Oslo II, Israel would have slipped into the 
danger of a bi-national state which would not even have included coexistence. 
Israel cannot and will not be an apartheid state.”76
Stressing Israel’s military and economic strength in this Knesset speech, 
Peres went on to conclude that the decision for Oslo II was opportune at that 
point in time. He points out that the Israeli army was the only one between Jordan 
and the Mediterranean, and that the fight against terrorism was not only in the 
interest of Israelis, but also of Palestinians: “The Palestinian Authority is well 
aware of the fact that if it does not smash terror, it would be infiltrated by it.”77 
Here, Peres makes his security-oriented understanding of the Oslo Process 
very clear. On the one hand, the future of the Palestinian autonomy remains 
vague, with no word being said about it. On the other hand, a clear task is given 
75 Davar I, October 24, 1995.
76 Ibid.
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to the Palestinian Authority already in advance, namely to fight the Palestinian 
terrorism directed against Israel so that it may not itself be destroyed by it. 
Shortly after Peres took office as acting Prime Minister in November 1995, he 
declared which points he wanted to give weight to in the peace process.78 In the 
beginning, Peres assumed Rabin’s former double position as head of state and 
minister of defense. But instead of giving the Foreign Ministry to his Vice Foreign 
Minister Yossi Beilin, the man so strongly committed to the work on Israeli-Pales-
tinian relations, he conferred it to the former Chief of General Staff Ehud Barak, 
a man who had taken a critical stance towards the Oslo Peace Process in his posi-
tion as army commander.
Soon Peres announced his plan: a regional peace between Israel and the 
entire Arab world. For this reason he wanted to turn to Syria in the next months, 
since “it is not pressing for now with the Palestinians.” The approaching elections 
also played a role in this change: “Another peace ceremony in Washington [like 
the one on September 13, 1993] – so it is assumed – would make the election cam-
paign superfluous.”79 Assuming that by turning to the Syrian-Israeli scene Peres 
pursued the goal of bringing his New Middle East closer, he was not successful. 
The Syrian-Israeli negotiations in Maryland (USA) in January 1996 soon hit a dead 
end. On this front, too, the territorial question remained the main obstacle. 
That Peres did not actually wish to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by making more territorial concessions is also suggested by his attempt 
shortly after the assassination of Rabin, i.e., before the implementation of Oslo 
II, to include no other than the national-religious party Mafdal into his coalition. 
Due to its adherence to the ideology of the “promised land,” Mafdal took a very 
hostile stance towards the Oslo Peace Process. 
What was Peres’ motivation for such a “rightward shift”? Grinberg attributes 
it to the fact that Peres construed the murder of Rabin as well as the peace process 
itself as a danger to the “unity of Israeli-Jewish society.” He promised the leaders 
of Mafdal to not vacate any settlements, but nevertheless failed to win it for his 
coalition. From then on, up until he was voted out by a narrow margin in the end 
of May 1996, his actions were determined by the struggle to appease the oppo-
nents of Oslo by dissolving the already vague political differences between the 
proponents and critics of the peace process. Thus, the political debate was shifted 
from the reconciliation process with the Palestinians to the question of “national 
unity” and the risk of a “disintegration of Jewish-Israeli society.” 
78 Haaretz, November 8, 1995.
79 “The Leader of the New Middle East,” Haaretz, December 5, 1995.
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Peres’ overtures to Mafdal so shortly after Rabin’s murder lead the Israeli 
publicist Jacob Jona to ironically label this closing of ranks a “hysteric alliance” 
– by which he alludes to the party-political so-called “historic alliance” between 
Mapai and Mafdal in the first three decades of Israeli policy. In this context, 
Jona criticized Peres’ lack of collegiality towards his “natural political allies” for 
peace, such as the Zionist Left party Meretz, Reform Judaism and the Israeli Pales-
tinians.80 Whether Peres really saw these avowed supporters of the peace process 
as his “natural allies,” and whether he sought the coalition with the national-re-
ligious camp out of “hysteria” and not due to an ideological closeness (possibly 
in order to have an alibi to back down should it look like territorial compromises 
were looming in the peace talks) can be deduced from his policy. 
In December 1995, Peres withdrew Israeli troops from Palestinian cities in the 
West Bank, as stipulated in the Oslo II Accord. Regions A and B, comprising the 
twenty-seven percent of fragmented territorial dominions in the West Bank, were 
transferred to the Palestinian authority, while Region C (seventy-three percent) 
remained under Israeli dominance. The Jewish settlements remained in place 
with the consent of the PA, and the Islamic resistance was neutralized by Arafat, 
who even convinced its representatives in the Palestinian territories to accept the 
Oslo Accords. As for Peres, he got moderate representatives of the Jewish settlers 
to consent to Oslo II, promising to upgrade their bypass road network and expand 
existing settlements in return. 
Thus, Oslo II was mostly realized by December 1995. In January 1996, Peres 
admitted elections for the presidency and the Palestinian Counsel in the Pales-
tinian territories, which, although provided in Oslo I Accord, had been repeatedly 
postponed. Thereby another important precondition for entering into the last 
phase of the negotiations that was to bring about a permanent solution was met.
Peres also remained true to his concept of “soft borders” with regard to the 
question of a boundary wall, and stopped the construction project that was 
already underway.81 The idea of building a boundary wall had come up in reaction 
to a deadly attack by the Islamic Jihad on Israeli soldiers within the “Green Line” 
in January 1995. The pressure from the Israeli public to actually realize the sepa-
ration of both peoples, as it is aspired to in the Oslo Peace Process, was mount-
ing. In addition to the lockdown policy being pursued in the occupied territories, 
the Rabin government was also considering the construction of a boundary wall 
with the objective of increasing the consciousness for the borders that had been 
fading since 1967. Despite considerable resistance from the settler leadership, 
80 Jona, Jacob, “The Hysteric Alliance,” Maariv, December 11, 1995.
81 Davar I, November 26, 1995.
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Rabin increasingly endorsed the re-erection of the borders, even if they should 
not correspond to the borders of 1967.82
However, there was a difference of opinion between Israel’s business elites, 
who were adverse to any separation of the two economic areas (a position that 
is reflected in Peres’ idea of “open economic borders of the New Middle East”), 
and the “security elites” under Rabin’s leadership that gave priority to “defense 
borders.”83 How pronounced the dichotomy really was between these two elites 
regarding the boundary wall question is debatable, though. For not only is it more 
than doubtful whether the military leadership really shared Rabin’s position as 
he increasingly promoted the separation solution and whether they really did 
approve of the withdrawal from the territories, it is also unclear whether the “eco-
nomic factor” was really all Peres had in mind when he invoked the unity of the 
country. 
After all, as the business elites were anxious to hold on to their dominance 
over the Palestinian market, military control over the entire country was indis-
pensable if the interests of that business elite were to be upheld.84 Accordingly, 
Peres had to insist on military dominance, even if the economic aspects and inter-
ests of the Israeli business elites really were the only thing he was focused on. 
And this point of view does not really allow for a dividing wall.
According to Grinberg, Rabin had resolved to build a boundary wall along the 
“Green Line” of 1967 since any other location would have meant breaching the 
agreement with the PLO. The re-establishment of the borders of 1967 would not 
only have meant a premature regulation of the border issue, but would have made 
the question of settlement even more explosive. Thus, a boundary wall would 
frustrate the intended blurring of the borders, and as such go against Israeli dom-
inance in the Palestinian territories.
The new prime minister surely did not wish to determine the “permanent 
borders” too early in the game, and he ordered the halting of preparations for the 
construction of the separation wall as early as November 1995. Peres described 
in flowery language the “creation of ‘industrial parks’ in the ‘areas around the 
border lines’,” particularly for the purpose “of creating employment opportuni-
ties for the Palestinians, which would result in good neighborly relations.”85
Ultimately, Peres’ political decision to not recognize the borders of 1967 was 




85 Davar I, November 26, 1995.
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in 1993. The business elites were eager for the closure of the borders between the 
Palestinian autonomy and Egypt and Jordan in order to avoid the import of cheap 
goods. This in turn conformed to the goals of the military leadership that saw the 
control over the Palestinians and the isolation of their territories from all sides as 
a security-political priority in facilitating the fight against Palestinian terrorism.86
This overlaps with the interests of the settler movement that had tradition-
ally been supported by Peres. And with the political level under the leadership 
of Peres likewise rejecting a Palestinian state in the West Bank, the Palestinian 
Option did not really stand a chance. Already in the turbulent days after Rabin’s 
assassination, Peres offered the following comment:
I have always said that peace with Jordan would arrive – and that is indeed the case. I have 
always said ‘Gaza First’ – and that, too, has come to pass. Also, I have always said, a ‘func-
tional confederation solution’ should be realized in the West Bank. You have to believe me 
that this will ultimately happen as well.87
In any case, in his short time in office as the head of government Peres took 
several measures to push through his solution concept for the West Bank, even if 
neither “industrial parks” were created in the process, nor could there be any talk 
of “good neighborly relations.” By the end of 1995, the political reality increas-
ingly started to resemble the well known “old security order” – and that despite 
the implementation of Oslo II.88 
The acting prime minister quickly took a “security-political position” and 
made two central military decisions that would soon dominate the less than 
peaceful atmosphere in the country in the first half of 1996. In January 1996, Peres 
ordered the killing of the Palestinian terrorist Yahya Ayyash, triggering a wave of 
terror that swept over Israel in the months of February and March. Then, in April 
1996, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense authorized a military operation 
in Lebanon.
Grinberg interprets Peres’ war policy as a failed attempt to imitate the ultimate 
“man of security,” former General Rabin, who had forced through a similar opera-
tion in Lebanon in the summer of 1993, and under whose power of command the 
leader of the Islamic Jihad was liquidated in October 1995, shortly before Rabin 
himself was assassinated. In how far Peres actually stood behind this strategy 
of distinguishing himself as a “man of security” with a view to the approaching 
86 Grinberg 2007: 139.
87 Galili, Orit, “Beilin in Search for Bonds, Peres Walking Backwards – Words One Cannot Say 
Before the Elections,” Haaretz, November 29, 1995.
88 Grinberg 2007: 161–162.
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elections, and whether he possibly agreed to it under the influence of bad advis-
ers, it is hard to say.
However, the fight against terrorism by means of targeted killings and mil-
itary operations is no exception in Israel’s security policy, and is instrumental-
ized also for the purposes of electoral campaign. What is striking here is that the 
leader of the peace camp did not want to pin his re-election on the continuation 
of the peace process, but rather on his military stance. These two security-politi-
cal decisions – which ultimately led to an electoral defeat – are the flipside of the 
depoliticization of the peace process. 
In his election campaign, Peres focused on covering up the political debate 
between the peace camp and the Oslo opponents while quietly discontinuing 
the Israeli-Palestinian talks. He led a depoliticized electoral campaign in which 
neither the Israeli-Palestinian relations nor the political assassination of Rabin 
that was directly related to it were addressed.89 Confident about his re-election, 
Peres even chose to see the electoral campaign itself as a depoliticized matter. Not 
only did he avoid discussing the position of the Labor Party concerning peace, he 
also pursued his “strategy of ignoring” in a televised debate with his challenger 
Benjamin Netanyahu (1949–) on the eve of the election. He simply dodged polit-
ical confrontation.90
Peres’ tactics included a decisive political move in the peace process. He 
refused to begin negotiations with the Palestinians about a permanent solution 
before the election. At this point in time, Peres could not take up the agreement 
in principle for a permanent solution that had been secretly negotiated by Yossi 
Beilin and the Palestinian representative Mahmud Abbas (1935–) in Stockholm, 
let alone make it the basis of his peace policy. 
In a nutshell, the Beilin/Abu-Masen Paper provided for a demilitarized Pales-
tinian state that was supposed to comprise ninety-four percent of the West Bank, 
wherein the remaining six percent (seventy-five percent of which were Jewish set-
tlements) were to be compensated for by a region in southern Gaza. The Muslim 
holy sites in East Jerusalem would get an exterritorial status, and the Palestinian 
capital would have been allowed outside the city limits of Jerusalem as deter-
mined by Israel. According to Shlaim, this paper, called the “coup of the century” 
by the Palestinian negotiating partner Hussein Agha, was rejected because “Peres 
could not be persuaded to endorse the plan, for three main reasons: he wanted 
89 Peres’ closest advisor Uri Savir even stresses that the discussion of the differences with the 
Palestinians regarding the pending permanent solution involve the danger of the Labor Party not 
being re-elected. This is why the talks were shifted to Syria. Cf. Galili 1995.
90 Bar-Zohar 2006: 666.
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future relations between Palestine and Jordan spelled out, he regarded the ideas 
on Jerusalem as inadequate, and he wanted to retain the Jordan Valley as Israel’s 
strategic border.”91
Conclusion: Israel’s Founding Myths and the Question of 
Palestine
For the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the peace 
process of the 1990s opened up a time window that could have led to a political 
settlement of the Palestine question. The domestic-political development that 
took place in Israel in 1992, i.e., the changeover of power in Jerusalem and the 
formation of a government willing to negotiate peace, was one of the reasons for 
this historic moment. Without the readiness of political Israel to face up to the 
question of Palestinians and of Palestine, the breakthrough of 1993 would not 
have been possible. 
The electoral defeat of the Labor Party in 1996 is generally seen as a harsh 
setback for the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. It was hoped 
that as a main instigator for the breakthrough that had been achieved in Oslo, the 
candidate of the Labor Party and thus of the Zionist Left was a “man of peace” – 
in contrast to his challenger, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu. Hence, Peres was 
also seen as the man who could have brought to a close what had already been 
started, namely a solution entailing the creation of two states. 
Accordingly, Oslo advocates regretted the narrow poll defeat. Whereas Oslo 
opponents saw the duo of Peres and Beilin as the chief culprits for the so-called 
“Oslo catastrophe,” above all because it carried the possibility that a resolution 
might take the form of the country being divided between the two peoples. Given 
the extremely unstable security situation on the eve of the election, great hopes 
were set on the Nobel Peace Prize laureate that he might steer the ship safely to 
shore. 
Yet as a diehard security politician and figure who is representative of Israel’s 
conflict-laden political order, Peres was simply not the right man. It would turn 
out that Peres advanced the peace process only very hesitantly at a time when 
the conditions for completing it were most favorable. In the end, he even chose 
to quietly discontinue it. As of November 1995, “the man of peace” found himself 
in a unique situation: After Rabin’s assassination, Peres held an unparalleled 
amount of power and authority within a broad range of political and social circles 
91 Shlaim 2000: 555–556.
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due to his influential double function as prime minister and minister of defense, 
and also because of his position as “tribal elder.” 
After Rabin’s death he could have mobilized the Israeli public for the peace 
process. The Zionist Left as well as the so-called “broad center” would have 
doubtless supported him. At that point, the right-wing opposition had been highly 
weakened as the public held it responsible for the outrageous deed of one Jew 
killing another. The preconditions for making headway in the peace process were 
therefore extremely advantageous, and that not only with regard to the domes-
tic-political situation. For with the PLO there was a dialogue partner who was 
recognized by Israel, the United Nations, as well as the Palestinians themselves, 
and in cooperation with whom a lot had already been achieved by the end of 1995. 
Not only had an interim agreement been reached and partially implemented, but 
also a “permanent solution” had already been formulated. The Beilin/Abu-Masen 
document, which was based on a division solution, had been negotiated shortly 
before Rabin’s assassination and would have been welcomed by the Palestinian 
leadership. 
The factor of age is of no small importance here either. In 1996, Peres was 
in his mid-eighties. Had he really wanted the two-state concept he should have 
seized this chance. “There are such unique fate-changing moments in history,” 
noted Israeli publicist and peace activist Uri Avneri (1923–) in late November 
1995 with regard to the political situation of the acting prime minister, “when all 
becomes possible that cannot be realized either shortly before or shortly after. […] 
The greatness of a historic leader is in recognizing such moments and seizing the 
opportunity.”92 
Yet Peres did not seize the opportunity to complete the peace process with 
the Palestinians by political means, because even in the mid-1990s the prominent 
statesman did not see the two-state concept as a viable solution in the interests of 
Zionist Israel. A peace with the Palestinians that was based on officially giving up 
any Israeli claims to parts of Eretz Israel would also mean bringing up the ques-
tion of Palestine not only politically, but also ideologically, just like in the time 
before the founding of the state. But for the Zionist Leftist Peres and for Zionist 
Israel, Eretz Israel is not up for political debate. As the “land of the forefathers” it 
remains the “promised land,” the country of the Jewish people. This is the foun-
dation of Zionism as it is being realized in Israel. 
And it is just this realization of the Zionist project in Eretz Israel that Peres 
has been fighting for throughout his entire political career. It is what he regards 
as his life’s work: immigration, settlement and security as the first principles of 
92 Avneri 1995.
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Israeli policy. But since the land was and ultimately still is settled by another 
collective, a conflict-laden political discourse emerged as the dominant mode 
over the course of the years; a discourse that was not oriented towards peace, but 
toward security. 
A statement made by Peres in the days shortly before the onset of the Second 
Intifada is revealing in this regard: “For me, crossing over from the domain of 
defense to the domain of peace was like leaving the real world in exchange for 
an unreal one.”93 Even for a supposed proponent of peace and bearer of hope, 
peace is hard to imagine. He, too, thinks of the historically grown political order 
as absolutely essential. 
The bottom line is that the political order of Zionist Israel is based on two 
founding myths: the myth of Eretz Israel as the land of the Jewish people and on 
the safety myth. These two lines of thought form the core of the Palestine ques-
tion, and therefore epitomize the key issues of the historically grown Middle East 
conflict. Both myths stand in the way of a political resolution of the conflict with 
the “Arabs of Eretz Israel.” After all, Israel’s insistence on the myth according 
to which Eretz Israel is the land of the Jewish people also means that it cannot 
acknowledge the self-determination rights of the Palestinians living in this ter-
ritory. 
For this reason, Israel cannot allow the formation of a Palestinian state in any 
part of the country. The alternative of naturalizing all Palestinians would equally 
force Israel to revise its raison d’état as a predominantly Jewish state for the Jewish 
people in Eretz Israel. Since Zionist Israel neither can/wants to split the land nor 
sees a bi-national state as a real option, the status quo of the Palestinians remains 
that of an “out-group,” in effect that of the displaced enemies of Zionist Israel. 
Not only the Palestinians are considered to be the enemies in Israel’s polit-
ical culture, however. The neighboring Arab states are as well. Already in 1948 
they intervened in the conflict over Palestine and have been involved in several 
conflicts with the Jewish state since. From the Israeli perspective, the strife over 
Eretz Israel is very closely linked to the conflict in the Middle East region. This 
extremely sensitive question of the nation state is associated with the civilian 
militarization of society that has occurred over the course of history, and thus 
ultimately with the establishment of the second myth. 
The safety myth is based on a perception that has sprung up from the history 
of Jewish suffering and assumes that the hostile relations between Jews and Goyim 
can never be fully resolved. This is accompanied by the notion that an invincible 
93 Peres 1999: 61.
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military power is absolutely essential, and it is justified time and time again in 
domestic policy as a means of protecting the Jews against their ever-present foes. 
For the Jewish state, “the Arabs” have taken over the function of the “great 
opponent” at least from 1948 on, which is why military strength could be depicted 
as the guarantor for the nation state’s existence as early as during the 1950s. So 
it is that security became the central pillar of Israeli order, a social code of secu-
rity. And as the country was being shaped by a political security culture, security 
forces were elevated to become one of the most powerful state elites. This civilian 
militarization of Israeli society was accompanied by an increasingly prevalent 
view that it is not so much through negotiations or compromises but rather thanks 
to favorable power relations that peace would ultimately be brought about. In the 
eyes of many Israelis, an advantageous balance of power is the prerequisite for 
the existence of the nation state. After all, it was the Israeli army who conquered 
the land in two wars (1948 and 1967) and now guarantees the protection of the 
Jewish state. 
Consequently, peace is deemed possible only if the existence of the nation 
state is ensured. This in turn means that military control over Eretz Israel and its 
“Arabs” must be maintained: The military administration before 1967 as well as 
the occupation policy afterwards are examples of this attitude. But because of 
this fixation on security and control stands in the way of reconciliation, a peace 
ideology has established itself in the course of time alongside the myth of safety. 
The peace ideology habitually points to the tension between the “peace-seek-
ing” Israel and its “unruly” Arab environment. It claims that despite Israel’s 
unreserved wish for reconciliation, “the Arabs” are simply not up to the task of 
making peace with the Jewish state. Based on this understanding, negotiations 
seem pointless since there is “no dialogue partner” for peace. This serves to rein-
force Israel’s self-image as a peaceful and just state – an extremely important 
domestic-political source of power for a political order that is based on violence. 
Moreover, the peace ideology also serves as a veil in pressing one’s own inter-
ests, which are understood as interests connected to the Jewish statehood and 
therefore as indispensable. The fact that Zionism, which is construed as histori-
cally just, has ultimately been accomplished sword-in-hand must be duly blocked 
out. It is this very contradiction present within the peace ideology – it draws on 
the peaceful self-image of the Jewish people on the one hand while appealing to a 
strong enemy image on the other – which has facilitated the continued existence 
of the conflict-laden order on the domestic front for so many years. 
In this order, the peace ideology and the myth of safety are resorted to as 
crucial codes of the Israeli-Zionist discourse. To the same extent they are the 
reason for and the expression of the inability to truly deal with the conflict, 
including its political and historical origins. In other words, a fundamental 
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obstacle when it comes to facing up to the question of Palestine. Indeed, both the 
peace ideology and the safety myth lead to a depoliticized understanding of the 
conflict. It is conceived of as belonging to a sphere that lies beyond any concrete 
political and historical development, and attributed to a hostility that is aimed at 
Jews in general. 
Arising from the notion that the concrete struggle over Eretz Israel is not really 
about resources (such as the territory), but is rather to be understood within a 
broader context of the history of the persecution of Jews, what evolved over time 
is a political culture in which not politics but the military is seen as the party 
which is ultimately responsible for handling the conflict. This depoliticization of 
the conflict is the consequence of the two founding myths. 
On the one hand, the sacralization of the country made sure that the “Holy 
Land” was kept off the negotiating table for many years, thus making the “Juda-
ization of the country” possible. On the other hand, the myth of safety served 
to promote an “ideologization” of security, thus leading to its depoliticization. 
In this way, security could be retained in an exceptional position as the prime 
principle – and that despite the fact that Israel’s actual security policy has repeat-
edly proven to be counterproductive, and at the end of the day is responsible 
for maneuvering the conflict over Palestine/Eretz Israel into the dead end it is 
currently locked. 
Depoliticization of the conflict, however, inevitably leads to the depolitici-
zation of peace. An understanding of the conflict based on inexplicable hostility 
does not permit reconciliation. A notion of peace that draws on the internalized 
logic of the peace ideology remains conflict-laden because it assumes that the 
core of the conflict lies somewhere else than politics. Consequently, it cannot pos-
sibly be one’s own policy or the order it is based on that needs to be subjected to 
negotiation, but rather a motive that lies beyond (one’s own) political actions. 
This view has eventually also taken root in the Zionist peace camp. Here, 
peace turns into a compulsion to get rid of the Palestinian “enemy”; it becomes 
a means for bringing about a separation from “the others” in order to finally 
be able to make the desiderated Zionist vision come true. But since the Israeli 
order (including the two founding myths) remained substantially intact during 
the peace process of the 1990s, real peace could not prevail. Rather, it had to be 
“imagined.” 
Blocking out one’s own history is the reaction to the many key questions 
remaining politically unsolvable, even for Israel’s Zionist Left. Lying at the very 
core of the numerous entanglements of the regional Middle East conflict, Isra-
el’s fought-over state territory and the status of Palestinians in the Jewish state 
remain the Achilles’ heel of Zionist Israel. In every compromise, in every retreat 
from what has already been achieved, political Israel fearfully suspects a seed 
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that may contain the failure of the entire Zionist project. From its inception, this 
project has been advanced “at the expense of the Arabs” in either one way or 
another, no matter how vehemently this fact is repressed and denied. Now any 
noteworthy concession may prepare the groundwork for the next one, any yield-
ing may be equated to weakness and could be the beginning of the end. 
This kind of reasoning results in an existential angst and a sense of being 
isolated. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in October 2000 and the esca-
lation of the conflict with the Palestinians that followed, the Jewish state has 
entered a highly precarious historical phase. After more than half a century of 
successful policy as seen from the vantage point of the Zionist reason of state, 
Israelis were faced with the fact that history is no longer on their side. Despite 
the regional-military hegemony Israel hinges its existence on, and a still consid-
erable amount of support from the West, it has become more and more obvious 
during the last decade that the political order of Israel cannot be permanent. 
The demography in Palestine defies the myth of Eretz Israel, and the continu-
ing state of war perceivably demoralizes Israeli civil society, increasingly weak-
ening the domestic political significance of the myth of safety. Military strength 
cannot resolve the conflict over Palestine. Neither can the use of violence in the 
name of Jewish statehood provide the desired security, not to mention any sort of 
normalization or peace. And although international pressure on Israel is growing 
daily, Israel keeps clinging to its founding myths and conflict-laden order. For 
the deep-seated insecurity regarding one’s own future goes hand in hand with 
a fear of facing the past. Based on its historical experience, political Israel has 
developed the strategy of waiting things out, of entrenching itself and fighting, 
at whatever front it deems necessary. And so the Middle East conflict remains the 
inescapable price Israel has to pay for Jewish national statehood – or at least that 
is what she has been conditioned to believe.
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